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ABSTRACT OF THESIS (Regulation 7.9)
The general aim of this study is to give an analysis ot perception via
a speculative re-structuring of familiar sensory material to produce alternative
possible spatial schemes. A process of considering ways in which experience
might have different and grounded different forms of space is used to elicit
general philosophical principles which Iiave application to actual experience.
The first step in this project is the identification of a phenomenology
behind our perceptual beliefs - a content to experience, wliich is in sone
way separable from our system of ontological cortmitments. As a sequel to
this, the traditional division of experience into the five senses is examined.
Consideration is given to the number and nature of these sense-modalities
and grounds are discovered for thinking, that some strong category divisions
prevail within our sense-experience.
Having aclrLeved some notion of a basic phenomenology to experience and
the character it bears, a re-ordering ot that material to suggest alternative
spatial schemes is undertaken. Initially, auditory experience is isolated
and various types of sound world tiiat could be generated out of it are outlined.
This is followed by a consideration of visual experience: the possibility
of a two-dimensional visual space is discussed before turning to a more ramiliar
three-dimensional system. After this, issues relatrng to the combination
of material from more than one sense are dealt with and the possibility of
experiencing more tlian one distinct form of space at once is proposed. Discussion
of tactual sense is prominent in this discussion.
Out of the above-mentioned speculation, general notions of space and
the nature of objects and the relations between experience and what we take
to have objective existence should tiave emerged. These are developed with
particular reference to actual experience. Attention is given to the relationship
between sensory experience and tlie growth of empirical knowledge and scientific
belief.
PGS/ABST/83 Use this side only
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It is important to say a few words on the topic of scepti¬
cism. I do not expect this thesis to represent a refution of
sceptical arguments against our knowledge of an external
world. In its pure form, scepticism is probably unobjection¬
able. In the barest sense of metaphysical possibility, it is
arguable that in all cases where we take ourselves to be
aware of something with objective existence we could be mis¬
taken. This is scepticism as doubt rather than as certainty.
For, a claim such as that the world does not exist (as in
idealism) is, ultimately, as underdetermined by the evidence
(individual sense-experience) as the claim that it does ex¬
ist. That one can always entertain doubt does not mean that
there may not be good arguments for a realist account or
that it is less rational to adopt such an account rather than
any competing interpretation. It is the purpose of this study
to discover what these good arguments are and to find the
criteria which support a rational application of a realist in¬
terpretation to experience.
I must now turn to a crucial assumption behind the specula¬
tive form of analysis being pursued in much of what is to
follow, an assumption which will have emerged from my re¬
marks so far. I have spoken of approaching actual experi¬
ence from an ontologically uncommitted standpoint. This sug¬
gests that in perceptual experience there is something prior
to or distinct from an awareness of items as ontologically
classified and, that there is a something we are basically
aware of and which is the subject matter of our ontological
interpretations: a something which would be unchanged by a
change in belief about what interpretations to place upon it.
All of these suggestions I acknowledge and wish to endorse.
I believe that there is, what one might term, a
"phenonmenological content" or, simply, a "phenomenology" to
perceptual experience. And I believe this essentially be¬
cause it is an assumption which accords with the intuitive
facts of our experience, and because the only two alterna-
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tives to this assumption seem absurd, namely, that we are
never aware of anything, or that we can only ever be aware
of external objects. I shall attempt to expand upon these
reasons a little further.
What is important for what is to follow, is that I will be able
to refer to the content of our actual experience, without be¬
ing tied down to the ontology with which, in our experience,
that content is associated. I need to be able to refer to
sensory items like colours and shapes and sounds and
tastes, without these items being taken to be the colours
and shapes and sounds of external objects. It is completely
reasonable that I be able to do this because such items do
figure in my actual experience even though I, in fact, take
that experience to be an experience of externally existing
objects. They figure because I am able to distinguish them
from my commitments to objects. This is easily brought out
by that fact that there are occasions when we change our
minds about the ontological status of something we are expe¬
riencing. In the case of hallucinations, say, we might come
to realise that we were not experiencing something with ex¬
ternal existence, having initially taken ourselves to be do¬
ing so, but we do not deny that there was an underlying ex¬
perience which remained the same, beneath the two opposed
interpretations.
Similarly, in the situation where we view a coin at an angle
to our line of sight, although, in one sense, we are seeing
something round, there is also a more basic phenomenological
sense in which we are seeing something elliptical.
What I do not want to suggest in any of this is that we are
never directly aware of external objects or that what we are
immediately aware of in perception are mental entities.
Whether it is possible to be directly aware of external ob¬
jects or whether all perceiving is mediated by mental enti-
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ties are questions which it is the purpose of this study to
answer by careful argument and analysis, rather than to make
assumptions about from the very outset. It is part of being
able to make these important philosophical decisions that we
be able to identify a content to perceptual experience; a
something the existence of which we cannot doubt. Again, I
do not mean this to imply that we can never make mistakes
about the content of our experience either in terms of the
character it has, or whether it is there at all. On individual
occasions, I think mistake is possible but, in general, when
we consider our perception we cannot question the fact that
it has a sensory content.
I ought, at this juncture, to say a little about the question
of our awareness of the phenomenological content of our
perceptual experience. It has been common, particularly in
discussions of sense-datum analyses of perception, to point
out that we are almost never aware of the kinds of items the
theory claims that we are (1). Rather, it has been stressed,
normal experience consists simply of a direct awareness of
external objects, and external objects encrusted, at that,
with all kinds of scientific or proto-scientific beliefs or
dispositional beliefs. With the consequence that, if asked to
report upon the experiences I had on my journey to work, I
would be able to say a great deal about motor-cars, houses,
office blocks, telephone engineers, and so forth, yet be
able to report next to nothing about colour patches, clicks
and buzzes, kinaesthetic sensations or any of the other typ¬
ical candidates for sense-data. In the simple situation of
the angled coin, experimental evidence shows that observers
are very bad at attending to the pure visual content of the
experience and have a strong inclination to "see " the image
presented as much more circular than it actually is
(phenomenologically) (2).
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All of these claims seem to me largely unobjectionable: my
perceptual exchange with the world does seem to be domi¬
nated by many, high-level beliefs about external objects,
and I would be hard pressed to give an account of my experi¬
ence which left out reference to such theorectically complex
objects. But none of this combines to entail that we are not,
in any sense of "aware", aware of phenomenological items
which would still have been present to us, even if (as is
conceivable) we had had a different set of ontological be¬
liefs about what we were perceiving. I believe a place has to
be made in the analysis of perception for some form of sub¬
conscious or semi-conscious awareness of purely phenomeno¬
logical items. Crucially, there should be a recognition of
the distinction between awareness on the one hand and be¬
lief or knowledge on the other. One can be aware of some¬
thing without believing or knowing that one is aware of that
thing. To have an experience is not necessarily to have a
belief. It may seem peculiar to suggest that we can be igno¬
rant of or confused about what we are experiencing via our
senses, but a moment's reflection should confirm this to be a
truism about our perception. At any moment, just within my
visual field, I am presented with a rich and dizzying assort¬
ment of visual items; I cannot possibly give my judgemental
attention to all of them. In a cognitive sense, I am "unaware"
of many of them but this does not mean that they do not, at
the same time, form a determinate part of my awareness. We
should not confuse being aware of something in this basic
sense with having explicit or incorrigible knowledge of that
thing. An understanding of the phenomenology of our experi¬
ence is something which requires conscious effort and atten¬
tion it is not an indubitable "given". From this it should be
clear that my interest in perceptual phenomenology does not
form part of a project to establish a completely incorrigible
foundation for perceptual claims and this departs quite
strongly from certain sense-datum theories such as that of
Russell (3).
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I can begin to demonstrate this by pointing out the short¬
comings of what one might call the "theory-laden" approach
(borrowing from one of its exponents - N.R. Hanson (4)). If we
assume that most perception consists of being simply and di¬
rectly aware of theoretical items then we are committed to
one of two unacceptable consequences. The first is that it
is not possible to change our theories and thus change our
beliefs about what we are experiencing or have experienced.
I know of no philosopher who has wanted to embrace such a
claim, rather, those supporting this approach have been anx¬
ious to highlight the changing nature of our theoretical be¬
liefs about the world we perceive around us. This view, how¬
ever, leads to the second, equally unacceptable, conse¬
quence for perception, namely that the world changes with
every change in theory, and that perceivers adhering to dif¬
ferent theories live in different worlds. As a specific exam¬
ple of the latter, if an aboriginal primitive, say, undergoes
the same journey ("same" from my point of view) as that taken
by me on my way to work, because he knows nothing of our
civilisation, its science, its social institutions, he can ex¬
perience none of the things I experience on the same jour¬
ney, in fact the whole notion of "the same journey" is
brought into question. Surely this is an absurd situation to
be led into simply as a result of wishing to do justice to
the significant level of belief involved in perceptual expe¬
rience? The absurdity is, however, easily avoidable; we can
do justice to the fact that people with radically different
sets of beliefs will have remarkably different experiences,
whilst still holding that there is a sense in which they are
all aware of the same things.
The theory-laden approach is subject to other dangers; be¬
cause of its emphasis upon the belief aspect of perception -
for the most part leaving us with no more than beliefs - it
very easily slips into the kind of theory proposed by D.M.
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Armstrong (5) and others of a materialistic persuasion, where
perception is analysed entirely in terms of belief (usually
as a suitable prelude to reducing perception to purely phys¬
ical notions). This sort of full-blooded, belief-based ac¬
count is simply inadequate. By draining all content out of
experience, it affronts our intuitions about our sense expe¬
rience, and leaves us with no means of explaining why we
come to have the perceptual beliefs we do have, or how it is
that on occasion we come to form mistaken beliefs. On this
approach, beliefs are simply piled on top of, or ranged
against, other beliefs. If I come to think that something I
took myself to have perceived did not exist then all that
has happened is that one belief I have formed I now come to
believe to be false, presumably because I come to form some
later belief about the existence of something- which belief
is incompatible with the existence of the former item.
If this does not represent a sufficient travesty of percep¬
tion for us to abandon this view, then there are two other
criticisms which can be made. The first is that, without a
sensory content to perceptions, we have no way of express¬
ing what the nature of objects is,of saying what qualities
they have, for, notions such as shape or colour are given to
us in virtue of our having certain sensory items. It is only
by actually experiencing coloured shapes prior to our belief
that these coloured shapes are objects in the external world
that we can have an understanding of the character we as¬
cribe to external objects. After all, many of the beliefs
someone like Armstrong has in mind are beliefs about exter¬
nal objects, yet, if there is nothing more basic than beliefs,
we cannot say what it is for something to be one of the ob¬
jects we believe in the existence of. It may be open to this
kind of theorist to say that where I talk of being aware of a
coloured shape as a preliminary to understanding the quali¬
ties objects have, he can simply talk about having a belief
that there is a coloured patch. This would be to make an
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awareness of coloured patches, and so forth, into the having
of unanalysable beliefs. There would be no means of detach¬
ing the beliefs from the things they are about. There may be
many other difficulties here; the only one I shall mention is
one which applies to the belief account generally. This is
the fact that, if we regard perceptual experience as simply a
form of belief then we are unable to distinguish it from
other non-perceptual forms of belief. Specifying the differ¬
ence in terms of what the beliefs are about will be inade¬
quate. For, if we try something like "physical objects" as
the object of perceptual beliefs this will founder on the
fact that we have many beliefs about physical objects which
are not perceptions of those objects. If the belief-theorist
asserts a primitive unanalysable difference then argument
ceases and we must rely upon our underlying intuition that
there is something we are genuinely aware of in perception,
something more basic than objects.
That theoretical beliefs (in a broad sense of "theoretical")
are almost seamlessly intermingled with an awareness of phe-
nomenological items in perception I would not want to deny.
But nor would I wish to deny that we are not always aware of
the phenomenology. We may not give our attention to it in
such a way as to be able to describe it or consciously re¬
member it (there is a case for a kind of unconscious memory
brought out by our ability to know that two experiences are
different without being able to say how) but, at some level
of consciousness, we are aware of that information and we
use it as the basis of higher order beliefs. Our awareness
can be demonstrated in many simple ways; if, for instance, I
incline my head slightly I am aware of some change in what I
experience, yet none of my beliefs about what is in front of
me change.
Naturally, once we are in
tual scheme, what belongs
possession of




the basic phenomenological items they are grounded in.
Consequently, the cognitive move from any given sensory ex¬
perience to a theoretical interpretation of it is a rapid and
largely unreflective one. This process whereby phenomeno¬
logical detail becomes submerged under complex, external
world beliefs can be demonstrated in terms of the following
example. Imagine a person who is trained to interpret the im¬
ages on a radar screen, to distinguish, on the basis of pat¬
terns of light, between things like aircraft and flocks of
birds: initially he has to consciously attend to all the phe¬
nomenological details (in a loose sense of
"phenomenological") of the images on the screen and then
make the correct inferences. Later on he finds himself
"simply being aware" of aircraft and flocks of birds, totally
unable to say what particular patterns on the screen alerted
him to their existence. Does his absence of mind prove that
such patterns cease to enter into his experience once he at¬
tains fluent use of the apparatus? Surely not?
I hope this also indicates a positive answer to the question,
"can our experiences have properties we are unaware of?" To
glean the full richness of our purely sensory awareness we
have to attend to it just as carefully as, in another sense,
we would have to attend to external objects to fully under¬
stand them, for, fundamentally, experiencing the qualities of
objects is only achieved by experiencing the qualities of
our sensations. This, I think, provides a response to the so-
called "speckled-hen" problem as directed against sense da¬
tum theories, namely that if sense data are subjective and
incorrigible but are the counterparts of aspects of objec¬
tive items then they should be as determinate as those ob¬
jective aspects which, clearly, in the case of, for example,
speckled hens they may not be. Although my approach favours
an ontologically neutral phenomenology as part of an ac¬
count of perception, it does not introduce it as an incorri¬
gible immediately given. Awareness is essentially involved
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rather than cognition. We must attend to what we are aware
of phenomenologically, in the sense of "awareness" I am us¬
ing here, before we can fully understand or know it.
Different levels of consciousness are involved. Thus, I ac¬
cept that the phenomenology that would be associated with a
speckled hen would be rich and not easily comprehended and
also a possible source of mistake, without denying the exis¬
tence of a determinate phenomenology in such a case.
This thesis is an attempt to provide a thorough outline of,
and justification for the approach to perception I favour; it
cannot be an exhaustive exploration of all the issues in¬
volved. There are certain important features of our actual
experience I shall devote little attention to. Most signifi¬
cant among these is the interpersonal element in perceptual
belief. This study will be conducted entirely in terms of an
individual subject of experience. It will be an account of
the ways in which such a subject can come to form objective
beliefs on the basis of his own individual experience, and
not of the ways in which a belief in the existence of other
perceptual subjects can influence an individual's objective
commitments. The justification for neglecting this aspect of
perception is that I assume an account in terms of individ¬
ual experience to be conceptually prior to that drawing upon
inter-personal information. The development of ontological
commitments must commence within personal experience. It is
only once a subject has a basic commitment to the existence
of an external world that he can begin to form beliefs about
the existence of other perceivers and to rely upon those
perceivers as a secondary source of further objective be¬
liefs. In any case, I assume it to be a matter of contingency
that more than one perceiving subject exists for any partic¬
ular space. We should be able to give an account of how an
isolated subject could come to adhere to a spatial scheme
purely on the basis of his own experience.
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(1) See, for example, A. Quinton THE PROBLEM OF
PERCEPTION Mind vol. 64 (1955) PP 28 -51.
(2) For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon and
a justification of the phenomenological approach
generally see C.W.K. Mundle's PERCEPTION: FACTS
AND THEORIES O.U.P. 1971 Ch. 1
(3) As in eg. THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY pp 1-12
(4) N.R. Hanson PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY CUP, London
1958.and see also W. Sellers EMPIRICISM AND
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND in Minnesota Studies of
Philosophy of Science. Vol.1





Having assumed and attempted to justify the claim that per¬
ception involves phenomenology as well as belief, and also
that it does so essentially and not redundantly, it is impor¬
tant to be a little more precise about the nature of this
phenomenological element as it will be used for the purposes
of this study.
As I have already made clear, the function of phenomenology
will be as a springboard to certain metaphysical theories.
The programme involved is one of considering how different
permutations of phenomenological materials would fall under
distinctive objective or spatial orderings. The actual phe¬
nomenological material to be approached in this way will be
that underlying our present perceptions or awareness of the
world we assume to be around us. Other phenomenological ma¬
terial would be relevant, but this we do not have access to
simply because it forms no part of our experience and we are
unable to imagine it. I assume that there are no obstacles in
principle to the possibility of other forms of phenomenologi¬
cal experience, of additional senses, that is.
The first step in the process of isolating the phenomenolog¬
ical content of our experience is to detach it from the full-
blooded perceptions it standardly belongs to. That is to
say, the sensory material we are interested in should be
thought of by itself, separate from beliefs about the exis¬
tence of items in the world which it normally generates. It is
the visual experience we have when we see a chair, say, that
is important, rather than the belief that one is seeing a
chair or that a certain object in a three - dimensional space
exists. Similarly, for hearing it would be the sound we hear
when a bell is rung that is of interest, rather than the full
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perceptual experience of "hearing a bell". Ideally, one is
seeking that which one could still be said to experience if
all belief in public, external objects were withheld.
This is a very "pure" account of the sensory experience re¬
quired as the basis for this project; it is more than we can,
realistically, hope for. In the Introduction, I have acknowl¬
edged the tenacity and pervasiveness of belief and the dif¬
ficulty of trying to focus upon the bare sensations that our
perception involves. Fortunately, for the purposes of what
is to follow, only a fairly crude ability to differentiate
phenomenology from interpretation is needed. It is not nec¬
essary that we be able to take individual acts of perception
and isolate their phenomenological content. What is needed
is a general awareness of the kind of phenomenology that
underlies different senses, to have a feeling for what sights
and sounds and touches and the rest are like as sensations,
as well as awarenesses of things.
The difficulty of attending merely to the phenomenology of
perceptual experience is at its greatest I believe where vi¬
sual sense is concerned. It is not especially demanding upon
the imagination to consider sounds simply as sound and not
sounds of anything or tastes simply as taste and not tastes
of things. It is harder to think of images and not images of
things and this is probably for two reasons. Firstly, for the
sighted, vision is the sense upon which we rely the most for
our knowledge of the world around us; we tend to think of
objects primarily in visual terms and, accordingly, all of the
non-immediately given aspects of objects tend to infect our
pure visual sensations of them most strongly. Additionally,
the visual is the richest and potentially the most confusing
of our sensory modes. Our visual images have a complexity
and variation within them that is not paralleled in the sen¬
sory "images" we have via other senses. The problem is that,
although we are subject to visual information all the time,
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on any individual occasions we would be hard pressed to ex¬
press to ourselves what we were aware of in purely visual
terms - in terms of shapes and colours, say, (which I believe
to be an acceptably neutral way of characterising them). We
would, obviously, have no difficulty in expressing what we
were aware of in terms of physical objects, but, for reasons
already explored, this is not equivalent to the immediate
phenomenology of experience.
One thing we are aware of is that, even when looking fixedly
precisely in one direction, we are not presented with a firm,
fully-defined image. Only a small portion of an image is ac¬
tually in focus, moreover the area of what we, in some mini¬
mal sense, are aware of, that of what we are actually attend¬
ing to, is correspondingly small. In order to identify ele¬
ments of our images we have to explore them by shifting our
attention around within them, as it were. Seeing is far from a
passive and instantaneous process. This feature of our vi¬
sual experience clearly complicates things from the point of
view of locating simple visual images as the source material
for the kinds of speculations I have hinted at. The situation
is not hopeless, however, and we are able to obtain what we
need for working purposes. Also, I shall return in Chapter 3
to these complexities of visual sense and cast a more
searching light upon them. Here, I wish to appeal to a gen¬
eral notion of the phenomenology of the visual as essen¬
tially involving coloured expanses. I also wish to include
shapes as a feature of the visual. Perhaps there can be a
debate as to whether shape is an intrinsic feature of visual
experience. Is the idea of an expanse without boundaries in¬
coherent? Inevitably, the issue centres upon questions
about infinity and, also, upon whether any sense can be
given to the suggestions that a subject might be able to ap¬
prehend an infinite expanse. Within our experience, we can
say that shape is imposed upon what we see (even a single-
coloured expanse) by the limits of our visual field. This
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claim requires some qualification (see my later comments in
Chapter 3) but, broadly, we can accept it as given. At any
rate, the issue of whether shape is a necessary feature of
the visual is not one I wish to pursue. Our visual experience
typically does include shape and, certainly, shape is a gen¬
uine visual feature and, consequently, I will include it in my
considerations of visual phenomenology.
The phenomenology of hearing, taste and smell I take to be
relatively accessible to inspection. Touch, on the other
hand, presents many complications and is certainly the most
intractable sense when it comes to a phenomenological anal¬
ysis. I shall defer comment upon it until later in the chapter
and shall, also have occasion to return to the topic in
Chapter 4.
Inevitably, I have made reference to "the senses" in my re¬
marks so far and this notion itself requires some examina¬
tion. Traditionally, perceptual experience is divided into
five areas of sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch; occa¬
sionally, others are proposed such as kinaesthetic sense.
The actual number of senses is less important than the fact
that there are such divisions at all. The fundamental idea is
that experience breaks down into radically different areas,
which are demarcated by the nature of their phenomenologi¬
cal content. Thus a sound and a taste are taken to be quite
different in character (although both are sensory items);
they belong to different categories and one could not possi¬
bly be mistaken for the other.
(i) A CAUSAL DEFINITION
I assume that, when people talk of sensory experiences or
items belonging to different sense categories or sense
"modalities", they mean that this is as a consequence of the
basic content of the experience and not of some extrinsic
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factor, such as causal origins. For, it might be possible to
mean by "a sound" simply "an experience causally connected
with the ear". Accordingly, the claim that there are a number
of senses would be dependent upon the existence of certain
sense organs. It seems to me that this is not what people
mean when they assert that there are certain sense cate¬
gories and, furthermore, they could not mean such a thing.
There are at least two good arguments against a causal ac¬
count of the senses. In the first instance, a causal view
does not accord with the way in which we actually decide to
which category an experience belongs. We are not in any way
involved in checking, for any given experience, what its
bodily basis is. Imagine the potential difficulties of per¬
forming such an operation. A further telling argument arises
from the fact that, if the only reason for postulating differ¬
ent senses is that there are a variety of physical origins
for sensory experiences, then we possess a large, possibly
unlimited number of different senses. Virtually every part of
the body's surface can be responsible for sensations, surely
each such part should be a sense-organ? What criteria could
be used for grouping such parts together into a less numer¬
ous set of sense organs? Equally, one might argue, on this
basis that all sense experience is touch experience, the
body being just one sense organ, with some of its surfaces
being sensitive to disturbances in the air, others to pho¬
tons; others to grosser physical impingements and so on.
If we reflect upon it, it is only because experience does
break down into discrete areas on the basis of its phe¬
nomenology that we are able to establish the causal connec¬
tions we do. If all sensory experiences arrived "unmarked",
as it were, by any distinctive character it would only be in
the case of more enduring experiences that a causal link
could be determined. We would need enough time to
"interfere" with the sense organ to establish its role in
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producing the experience. At most, on the basis of such a
theory, we would be able to infer that all future experiences
of exactly that type were mediated by that particular bodily
part or sense organ. Whereas, in actuality, because all in¬
stances of a given sense category are united by some common
feature, we are able to attribute previously unexperienced
instances to a particular sense organ, once a connection
has been made between that organ and the sense category in
a general way.
Proving that the sense-modality breakdown is one of phe¬
nomenology rather than contingency might seem rather unim¬
portant and I would concede that its significance is limited
in terms of the main thrust of this thesis, but it is by no
means an irrelevant issue. The raw material of this study is
phenomenology and phenomenology divorced from ontological
commitment (and causality is a part of that interpretative
overlay). Consequently, we need to give some consideration
to the character of that phenomenology (our phenomenology
as human perceivers). This is especially necessary as this
phenomenology may possess formal qualities which affect the
ontological possibilities which may be drawn from it. The
sense category distinctions are crucial in this respect for,
as we shall see in Chapter 4, if they genuinely exist then
they pose certain difficulties in terms of accounting for how
unitory objects in a single space can be apprehended via
different sense modalities. In some ways, the task of giving
an account of actual experience and the objects we take it
to yield knowledge of would be much simpler without the as¬
sumption of sense category divisions.
Because the phenomenology of our sense experience has im¬
plications for ontological constructions out of it, some rea¬
sonably serious consideration has to be given to it. My re¬
marks thus far have indicated that there is a prima facie
case for the existence of sense categories. Causal analyses
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of this distinction seem inadequate and we need to ask our¬
selves if there is not some other way of accounting for it
which does not involve the postulation of radical disconti¬
nuities in the material of experience. The most obvious way
of achieving this would be to claim that all sense experi¬
ences belong to the same
break down into groupings
instance, although sounds
from coloured patches all
like each other than they
as reds and blues are the
but can, at the same time,
groupings.
It is difficult to know how
all feel that sounds and images are very airterent Kinas on
experiences from each other and much more so than reds are
from blues or high notes are from low notes, yet how do we
deal with the suggestion that this is really a matter of de¬
gree? One natural response to make is that it is at least cu¬
rious that experience should fall into these restricted
groupings and that there should not be the full range of
possible experiences such that the difference between
"types" of experience would be minimised. In other words, if
the proposal under consideration is correct, one would ex¬
pect there to be experiences which were not clearly of one
particular sense category or another. If such circumstances
prevailed, one could see how a claim for strong category di¬
visions within the phenomenology of experience would be
baseless. Such circumstances do not prevail, however, and,
on the basis of what we experience within the putative sense
divisions, it is impossible to imagine what such a state of
affairs would be like.
We can emphasise the above observation by exploring in
greater detail some of the features parts of our sense expe-
qualitative domain but that they
of closer similarity. So that, for
are not categorically different
sound experiences are much more
are like, coloured patches. Much
same kind of thing, qualitatively
be seen as constituting distinct
to evaluate. such a claim. We must
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rience exhibit. Two senses in particular possess an underly¬
ing formal structure which is interesting from a conceptual
point of view but which helps to add weight to the idea of
those senses as truly independent categories. Colours and
sounds are not just areas of experience possessing diver¬
sity whilst also being bound together by a similarity about
which nothing more informative can be said than that all
colours and all sounds are just "similar" in some inexplica¬
ble way. Rather, one is able to say that all colours or all
sounds are ordered in respect of each other. For colours we
have the colour circle and for sounds we have the tonal
scale of pitches.
Thus, these senses do not consist simply of a cluster of
possible instances, all somehow similar to each other yet in
no specific way with none more closely linked than others.
Instead, the similarity that holds admits of gradation. One
sound may be closer or more similar to another, albeit dis¬
tinct, sound than it is to some third instance and the same
is true for colours. All possible sound or colour instances
can be located upon a comprehensive scale expressing their
relations with each other.
(ii) SOUND
For sound we have the linked scales of pitch and loudness.
Any given sound, of its very nature, must be some degree of
pitch and loudness. It is inconceivable that there be a
sound which lacks any determinate pitch in the sense of its
standing between other sound types in a "higher than" "lower
than" relation. Equally, if a sound exists it must have some
given loudness or volume; it must be "louder than" or "softer
than" other possible sounds. Consequently, for any point on
the pitch scale the full range of loudnesses is possible,
and, equally, for any degree of loudness there can be any
pitch instance.
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Frequently, timbre is cited as a third intrinsic quality of
sound, but this is open to some question. From a scientific
point of view, timbre can be analysed in terms of pitch. The
particular timbre a sound has is a direct function of the
tonal properties of the sound. Any sound, as well as its pri¬
mary pitch, also exhibits a collection of subsidiary pitches,
a sequence of overtones. It is the particular intensities of
these that give the sound its characteristic timbre. We are,
however, approaching sound from a phenomenological orienta¬
tion and the above reduction of timbre to pitch is not con¬
clusive. Nonetheless, the overtone sequence is not purely a
scientifically detachable phenomenon but one which we can
experience. With a little attention, the pitch constituents,
of a given timbre can be discerned.
If timbre were to be taken as a genuinely independent qual¬
ity of sounds, then there would be difficulties from the
point of view of proposing a formal structure like those of
pitch or loudness to unite and interpret timbres. It is not at
all clear that different timbre instances occupy a specific,
undeniable ordering. Certainly there is no such structure
ready to hand. Powerful attention to the phenomenon of tim¬
bre might reveal this structure, but, on the balance of the
evidence, the sensible course is to deny the separate exis¬
tence of timbre and to opt for its analysis in terms of pitch.
When I speak of a formal structure underlying a phenomeno¬
logical area, as with pitch and loudness for sound, this is
meant in a strong sense. These scales or orderings are in no
manner accidental or contingent, they are intrinsic to the
phenomenological items concerned. Pitch and loudness ex¬
haust the nature of sound (as do hue, brightness, and satu¬
ration when we come to consider colour). The ordering that
sounds are placed in is not an arbitrary one. Although peo¬
ple may be introduced to the pitch scale in a didactic way,
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it is not of its essence a convention. In such a situation,
one is not simply learning that, as a matter of convention or
custom, certain types of sounds are placed in a certain ar¬
rangement; "this next to this, this next to this" and so on.
Rather, one is learning that one sound should be so placed.
The ordering expresses the inner nature of the sounds. The
learning situation should produce a recognition. One clear
indication that this is the case lies in the fact that a sub¬
ject, once the system has been illustrated to him, can go on
to apply it for himself to fresh examples. Different pitches
from those taught to him may be related to existing ones in a
way which does not involve guesswork and which, most signif¬
icantly, conforms to the judgements of other subjects.
The fact that I mention a learning context at all, given that
a subject could work out the system for himself, is because
this is, in fact, the most likely way someone would come to
apprehend the pitch sequence. This further enforces the
point already stressed that although phenomenology is basic
and prior to ontology this does not entail that the subject
has infallible or exhaustive knowledge of it. This applies to
the basic awareness of the material experienced, to the im¬
mediate "feel" of it but, certainly, also, to the formal prop¬
erties that it embodies. We cannot expect the complexity of
the pitch scale to be instantly comprehended from the expe¬
rience of a single sound or even a cluster of sounds.
Despite these comments, there might be some who are still
sceptical about the "intrinsic", "a priori" or "logical" nature
of the formal structures we are considering. Criticism can
arise from two quarters; one empirical the other more philo¬
sophical.
On the empirical side, the existence of the phenomenon of
tone deafness can be taken as a counter-example of the
claim I am making. There appear to be some hearing subjects
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who fail, even after tuition, to make the tonal distinctions
which I have claimed are intrinsic to different sounds. This
might be taken as evidence that the tonal structure is an
arbitrary imposition upon the phenomenon of sound. (It is
possible, of course, to short-circuit the whole problem by
claiming that a tone deaf person simply hears exactly the
same tone where the non-afflicted hear different tonal val¬
ues. This solution is a little too cavalier and it is more in¬
teresting to assume that tone-deaf subjects hear qualita¬
tively the same sounds as other subjects yet fail to discern
a scaled ordering to them). There are two responses to this
interpretation of the problem however. One is that an expla¬
nation is then required of how those who succeed in operat¬
ing with this allegedly artificial system manage to do so
and, especially, of how agreement between different subjects
arises. The other, more hard-headed, response derives from
consideration of the fact that there are lots of areas where
we do not take the failure of a subject to recognise or ac¬
knowledge something as a refutation of the reality of that
thing. In logic or mathematics, we do not regard the failure
of a student to master a particular proof as a refutation of
that formal truth. Nor, in the perceptual realm, do we regard
the limitations exhibited by the fully deaf or blind as bring¬
ing (necessarily) the properties of sound or colour into
question.
The more philosophical argument can be seen as a develop¬
ment out of these considerations. Firstly, it can be argued
that the rejection of the phenomenon of tone-deafness as
representing a challenge to the principle of tonality as a
real feature of sound depends too heavily upon inter-subjec-
tive evidence. That is, a complete ontology including other
observers is being presumed in the process of, supposedly,
examining the character of basic experience as possessed by
a single subject prior to any such ontological interpreta¬
tion. In the present context, however, this objection is not
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really valid. The features of tone or hue are not essential
springboards for the generation of an ontology from a phe¬
nomenology and so circularity is not involved. It is true
that the existence of such features may affect the exact na¬
ture or "shape" our ontological constructions may take, but
they are not crucial to determining whether an experience is
of objective existents or not (as we shall see in detail in
the next chapter).
A second, more radical argument operates, even on the pre¬
sumption of inter-subjective data. This is the claim that
there is nothing to be preferred in the concerted recogni¬
tions of one part of the population against the correspond¬
ing denials of another part of the population: there being no
reason why the scale of the agreement should inspire re¬
spect in itself. All that we have, it could be claimed, is the
simple phenomenon of agreement (and even that is open to
challenge) either between subjects or between different oc¬
casions for the same object, not a proof of an underlying,
metaphysical backing for such judgements. In some ways this
is traditional scepticism but we find, I think, a sophisti¬
cated modern version of it in Wittgenstein's writings, on
rule following in general and with specific reference to num¬
ber in REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS (2) and to
colour theory in REMARKS ON COLOUR (3). Clearly, this is not
the place at which to confront all of these issues, but I
should like to state that the claim that language is a "game"
or convention does not proceed with the facility it is some¬
times assumed to do. There are persistent difficulties at¬
tached to the idea that harmonious linguistic usage may have
nothing to do with an underlying commonality of experience
or understanding. A good illustration of this is provided by
Bernard Harrison in his book FORM AND CONTENT (4) where he
considers the largely unchallenged claim that significant
differences in people's colour experience would not emerge
in deviant language usage. This is the traditional proposi-
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tion that I might see red where someone else sees yellow but
that we would both use the same descriptive terms for these
different experiences because of the public nature of lan¬
guage learning and the consistency of the divergence of ex¬
periences. Harrison points out that things cannot be this
simple. Colours have an internal complexity and correspond¬
ing linguistic consequences, which mean that there is the
possibility of establishing that different observers see dif¬
ferent colours (in a phenomenological sense) even although
they agree in the naming of their experiences. In the exam¬
ple just given, for example, there are general features of
reds and yellows as properties which prevent them from being
interchangeable without doing violence to other areas of
language. Reds are generally darker than yellows with the
consequence that queries about the shade that is seen
should elicit a discrepancy of reply. Of course, it might be
that the hue character of yellows and reds be consistently
inverted also but this would throw up discrepancies else¬
where - as in comparisons with other hues.
In a similar way I would argue that our language of pitch and
loudness is more deeply rooted in the nature of sound expe¬
rience than talk of following a convention would suggest.
There would be genuine problems about taking the notes as¬
sociated with the current piano keyboard and re-casting them
in a different ordering. For one thing the recursive element
of pitch identification would be lost; it would be impossible
to locate a previously unheard note in the "higher/lower"
sequence . Linguistic conformity between language users
would break down at this point. In general, we should be more
impressed by the ability of one group of people to consis¬
tently make a whole range of distinctions than by the failure
of another group to make any distinctions at all in the same
circumstances. Of course, secondary reinforcement can be
given to the capacity to order sounds at the phenomenologi¬
cal level by higher level empirical evidence. The pitch se-
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quence, for instance, has a physical correlate. (It is worth
noting however that this is not simply the case where hue
perception is concerned. There is no constant one-one corre¬
lation between light wavelength and perceived colour (5))
All in all, we have every reason for saying that the formal
orderings of pitch and loudness reflect the inherent charac¬
ter of sounds. These relationships express the very essence
of sounds. A sound would not be the kind of thing it is, from
a phenomenological point of view if these relations did not
hold. It is part of the character of a sound that is a B flat
that it is higher than an A and this notwithstanding the fact
that certain individuals who clearly have auditory experi¬
ence fail to recognise such orderings.
There are some general points we should note about the for¬
mal structures of pitch and loudness. Both represent linear
scales. The sequence of pitches or loudnesses does not re¬
peat such that, taking any point on the scale, one could
pursue the sequence in either direction and eventually ar¬
rive back at that point. Both sides admit of unlimited gradu¬
ation. There is not a finite number of pitches say. The scale
we are familiar with from Western music with its semitonal in¬
tervals is arbitrary to the extent that it breaks up the
tonal continuum, although non-arbitrary to the extent that it
does recognise basic formal features of sound. That there is
such a potential infinity of tonal distinctions does not,
naturally, mean that we in fact do or could discern such a
range. Similarly, there is a cut-off point in terms of the ex¬
tent of the scale that we perceive: there are notes which
are so high that we cannot hear them. On the loudness side
of things, there may be a point after which we can no longer
make any more distinctions of volume. This, however, may not
lead us to conclude that the possibility of sounds higher
than or louder than those we can discern does not exist, any
more than our failure to break up the tonal range into more
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than a finite number of steps imposes limits on the number of
tones there can be.
All of which may seem peculiar given our phenomenological
foundations. Surely, sounds and the like are just and what¬
ever are experienced and it is contradictory to find our¬
selves committed to a whole plethora of entities with no
place in our experience? This, however, is not the case and
there is an important point to be made here. For, although
our starting point is raw experience, the particular instan¬
tiations of it may point to possibilities beyond that actual
input. Thus, in discovering the formal structure of tonality
for sound on the basis of sounds actually experienced one
realises something about the possibility of what sounds
there may be in the abstract. It is not that one becomes com¬
mitted to the idea that it is possible to experience an in¬
finitely graded or unlimited range of tones, rather that such
a range is conceivable and no particular instance can be
ruled out. If we take the experience of two separate tones
however close in pitch, how can we know that there cannot be
some intervening, intermediate tone? Our experience will
consist of countless situations where two tones are subse¬
quently divided by some third experienced tone. What could
there be about certain intervals which precludes the possi¬
bility of an intervening note?
This reinforces the general point that the account of per¬
ception I favour, although phenomenological in orientation,
does not postulate a passive process of accumulating single
undigested sensations. To arrive, ultimately at an objective
scheme, a subject must attend to the basic data, extract its
formal qualities and recognise the relations which hold be¬
tween different parts of it. A process of conceptualisation
goes on and this from the earliest stages. Long before ob¬
jective notions become relevant, at the stage of phe¬
nomenology qua phenomenology, general or abstract notions
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are warranted, notions taking the subject beyond the bare
particulars actually experienced.
Without labouring the point, we can see that the pitch and
loudness orderings capture and exhaust the nature of sound
experience as given, but also go beyond that actual experi¬
ence and dictate possibilities or introduce concepts which
may find no confirmation in actual experience.
One difference, perhaps, worth noting between the pitch and
the loudness scales is that the loudness axis must have an
origin, in silence, that is, whereas, the pitch line can have
no logical starting point any more than pitch or loudness
can have a natural end-point, although remarks, supra, about
the realities of what is actually discerned apply here.
Before closing discussion of sound and its formal proper¬
ties, we should, perhaps also note that our conventional
scale system for pitch also makes explicit other intrinsic
features of sound. Here, I have in mind the octave repeti¬
tions and the relationships between other intervals. Clearly,
I wish to suggest that there is something substantial about
these affinities and not merely stipulative.
(iii) VISION
Let us turn now to consider visual sense and its formal, un¬
derlying properties. These have already been mentioned as
hue, brightness and saturation. In a general sense, I assume
that many of the arguments relevant to sound experience
have application also to the visual. Consequently, I shall
not argue the case against scepticism in terms of the visual
relations at issue. I assume the scales of hue, brightness
and saturation to express real features of the visual.
Together, they exhaust the colour aspect of the visual
("colour" to stand for the combination of a particular hue
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with a particular degree of brightness and a particular level
of saturation). Thus, it is not a contingent or arbitrary mat¬
ter, for example, that orange is closer to red than it is to
green. We could not operate such a re-ordered version of the
colour circle.
As before, the fact that these relations have a strong or
"logical" status does not entail that they are immediately
obvious. There is a genuine sense in which the colour circle
represents a discovery about colours or hue, albeit of a
conceptual rather than factual nature. Similarly, one might
be confused about the relationship widely separated hues
had with each other in terms of other intervening hues. One
can easily see how this could be resolved by the introduc¬
tion of the colour circle. Its continuum of shades relates
all actual and conceivable hues to each other with a logic
that is undeniable.
Again, although depictions of the colour circle are determi¬
nate and finite in their nature, the colour circle is essen¬
tially a conceptual structure. We have to accord it infinite
gradations. Even though we can experience or distinguish
only a certain number of shades, we cannot theoretically de¬
limit the range of distinctions. As with the pitch scale, we
have to conceive of a stepless flow of shades.
One interesting difference between the hue scale and those
we have already examined in respect of sounds is that, where
the latter are linear or polar in structure, the hue scale is
cyclical. Rational pursuit of the variations of shade in ei¬
ther direction will lead back to the original shade. Also we,
should note that although the brightness or saturation axes
extend in opposed directions, in the same way that the loud¬
ness scale does, they are bounded at both ends. These
scales find a natural termination in blackness and whiteness
and greyness and pure hue, respectively.
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Because of the delimited character of the colour relations
(in extent not gradation) it is possible to represent all
three in a single model. This is a three dimensional figure
consisting of two cones brought together in a diamond-like
construction. The colour circle exploits the circular aspect
of the structure; the opposed poles represent the black and
white of the brightness scale, and the saturation range can
be played out by movement from the surface to the centre of
the figure. Apart from being a satisfying means of capturing
the relations in question, this figure reinforces a truth
that we must not lose sight of in our analysis, namely that
hue, brightness and saturation exist as part of the unity
that is colour. The separate relational scales link in indi¬
vidual instances of colour. A given brightness can unite
with any point on the hue or saturation scales and this is
correspondingly true for any hue or given saturation in re¬
spect of brightness or of each other.
As with sound, we have located a strong conceptual struc¬
ture behind the phenomenon of colour but, in contrast with
the position arrived at for sound, this structure does not
exhaust the full character of the visual - for there remains
the property of shape. One can argue about whether all vi¬
sual experiences necessarily involve shape but, as a fact we
do experience shape. Consequently, we have to give some
consideration to the visual quality of shape and, specifi¬
cally, to whether it admits of analysis in terms of a rela¬
tional structure of the sort we are by now familiar with.
A moment's reflection will tell us that we do not have some
ready-to-hand property such as hue or saturation which re¬
lates all possible shapes to each other in some scaled or
ordered way. We cannot take this linguistic deficiency by it¬
self as proving that such relationships do not exist between
shapes. Indeed, we must all intuitively feel certain shapes
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to be "closer" or more similar than others. And, similarity
and degrees of it is central to the relations we have been
considering up till now. Is an oval not more like a circle
than a square? The problem is that although there will be
many such cases where a confident judgement of similarity
can be made there are many where it cannot and there exists
the difficulty of generating a rigorous structure which re¬
lates all shapes to each other and which quantifies their
degrees of similarity or proximity. Devising such a system
would be no small undertaking and I do not propose to fully
attempt it here, but I would like to indicate the form it
might take.
Such a scheme would be based upon the notion of linking up
shapes by sequences of intermediate shapes differing from
each other only in the most minimal way. We would have to
have the notion of one shape being transformed into another
by a series of infinitessimal modifications of it. To articu¬
late the system properly would involve mathematical con¬
cepts and would accordingly be an idealized account of the
empirical source material, but this is no objection to it. If
we think of a shape being a line of contiguous points which
meets with itself so as to enclose an expanse of space or,
strictly, colour (leaving out questions about the character
of the space involved) and a point of as being dimensionless
and if a line is conceived of as being composed of an infi¬
nite number of such points, then we can move to a considera¬
tion of how the location of the points of such a line can be
changed so as to alter the shape that the line creates. We
ought to be able to see ways in which there could be more
and less radical changes of a given shape. A completely rad¬
ical change would be one where every point forming the out¬
line of a shape would be moved - movement being expressed
by the points being plotted onto a background, a grid. A
less fundamental change of shape would involve a relocation
of only some of these points. Of course, where we are talking
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of an infinity of such points it is difficult to talk of
smaller numbers of points, because, even where only a part
of the line is moved, an infinite number of points is in¬
volved. Perhaps it is simpler to speak of the line and parts
of the line forming a shape rather than the theoretical
essence of that line - its sequence of dimensionless points.
An even more useful simplification, might be that of conceiv¬
ing of the line involved on an analogy with a totally flexi¬
ble loop of string or wire. With a notion such as this in
mind, we can see how there could be alterations to the shape
the loop constitutes at any time. If we use such an analogy,
we reinforce the finite properties of the outline of the
shape (even if it is capable of infinite division), and can
recognise the effects of alterations to parts of the line
upon the rest of the shape. At the same time, from the point
of view of the theoretical analysis, we could assume the out¬
line of a shape to be elastic and imagine changes which pro¬
duce no realignments elsewhere. It is only space, sim-
pliciter, that we are concerned with, not size or other quan¬
titative notions. However, while bearing the above options in
mind, it is perhaps easier to conceive of modifications being
made along the lines of those to a loop of fixed size. We can
see how some modifications would be more radical than oth¬
ers. Certainly, we can think of how there exists, for any
given re-shaping of the loop, a more minimal modification of
it in a shape intermediate between the original shape and
the subsequent reshaping. As with previously discussed
qualities, we can see how there is a potential infinity of
shapes, because, for any two distinct shapes there is a pos¬
sible intermediary - from which insight an infinity of shapes
can be generated. What is actually experienced is, as ever,
a different matter. From the idea of the loop being altered
via such minimal alterations (ideally infinitessimal varia¬
tions producing a "flow") we can see how one shape could be
transformed into any other, in an ordered, logical fashion.
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We can see how there is a sense in which all shape instances
can be linked together in terms of a scale of such in¬
stances, an underlying structure, much as for the other
properties of visual items.
Is this adequate to establish the structure we are looking
for? One obvious area of doubt derives from whether we
imagine changes of shape to occur along the essentially
physically determined lines of a rigid loop, or whether we
imagine shapes being related to other shapes via a series of
intermediate shapes which involve alterations to the dimen¬
sions of the original shape - an "elastic" loop - in other
words. As a demonstration of this difference in approach, we
can take the example of a square being transformed into a
circle. Where the line involved is taken to be of fixed
length, any operation to curve any one of the sides would
necessitate a convergence of two of the connecting sides.
Where, however, the outline of the square is taken to be
elastic in nature it would be possible to curve one of the
sides without any alteration to the alignment of the existing
sides. The possibility of these distinct modes of transforma¬
tion presents us with competing "routes" from one shape to
another, and this, clearly, is a challenge to the unitary na¬
ture of the ordering that shapes are claimed to conform to.
It does not seem legitimate to rule out the latter alterna¬
tive on the grounds that a shape has to retain its original
dimensions through change, because, as we have said, shape
seems to be a clearly distinct property from that of size
(which I would assert is a purely relative notion). Rather, we
should acknowledge this possibility and consider any other
ways in which there can be alternative transformations and
consider what consequences this has for the relational na¬
ture of shape. One obvious way in which there can be another
form of divergence to plotting the range of shapes that ex¬
ist between one shape and another can be most clearly
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demonstrated by taking the case of an asymmetrical shape in
relation to any other shape. Where a symmetrical shape such
as the square of the previous example is concerned, one can
argue that it is an issue which side is modified first as part
of the shape's transformation into another shape, such as
for example a circle. One might say that there were four sep¬
arate "routes" from a square to a circle, depending upon
which of the sides was altered first. A counter to this, how¬
ever, would be the claim that the four variants were only
trivial departures from a single route. There could be said
to be four routes, only on the basis of the square being
viewed relative to a fixed background against which it is
possible to identify distinct sides of the square. Viewed
purely by itself, as a shape, which particular side is varied
first ceases to be an issue (the notion of particular being
rendered questionable). The series of shapes between a
square and a circle is unique (setting aside the
rigid/elastic bifurcation just discussed). With an asymmetri¬
cal shape, however, this is not the case. Viewed from an in¬
trinsic, shape perspective there is a genuine difference be¬
tween a range of "transformations" commencing from one side
of the shape and those commencing from another. If this is
accepted, then we have to acknowledge the existence of any
number, literally, of "shape routes" between an asymmetrical
shape and any other given shape. The question must, then,
be whether this completely invalidates any claim that shapes
are related to each other in quite specific ways.
A little reflection should show us that the scaled nature of
shapes does not have to be rendered questionable by the
above discovery. For, although there may an infinite range
of routes between one shape and another this does not mean
that such a range includes any conceivable route, or routes
involving every possible shape. Although infinite in number,
the routes involved are of a fully determinate nature; they
will have a quite specific quality determined by the princi-
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pie of minimal modification already mentioned. This still
means that shapes are linked to other shapes in a rational
rather than arbitrary way but that the links are no longer
the unitary axes they have been for qualities considered
hitherto. Rather, shapes will be linked upon a huge, unimag¬
inable network of linear connections - strings of shape
variants - involving divergent routes to identical conclu¬
sions as well as unique pathways from some shapes to some
others. We can expect the network to be cyclical rather than
polar. We would be able to trace routes from any shape
through other shapes and eventually back to the original
shape, without purely reversing the route followed.
This cannot be considered more than a sketch of what a sys¬
tem of relations for shapes might be, but, it goes some way
towards giving formal support to the intuition that there are
degrees of similarity/dissimilarity between different shapes.
In the final event, it has to be said that whether shape is
susceptible to the kind of analysis that applies to colour is
not crucial to the purpose in hand. As aspects of visual ex¬
perience, colour and shape are inseparable. There may be a
question as to whether colour implies shape, but certainly
shape implies colour. The above proposed scheme for shape
may break down, but for any shape to be seen it must have
some properties of colour and, thus, become bound into the
system of hue, brightness and saturation relations we have
discussed. Consequently, the comprehensive nature of these
relations in respect of visual experience is not challenged
and they remain a contentful and potent way of defining the
sense in question.
The more thorny issue that now faces us is that of what can
be said of the remaining sense categories. For sight and
hearing, we have been able to break into the brute fact of
an item being visual or auditory, and reveal certain more
specific defining properties with a relational structure be-
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hind them. This has largely been achieved by taking a closer
look at qualities we ordinarily acknowledge in our talk about
these senses. When we consider the remaining senses, how¬
ever, the available qualities in normal discourse do not
seem to contain the same potential. The problem stems from
the restrictedness of general properties for the senses in
question.
Civ) TASTE AND SMELL
If we consider taste, for instance, although there are gen¬
eral descriptions we use of tastes, descriptions which apply
to a range of clearly distinct tastes, they do not seem to be
fully generalised, in the sense that all tastes, necessarily,
fall under them. Sweetness would be such a property. A whole
range of different tastes - oranges, mints, chocolate, coffee
- can possess degrees of sweetness, but equally well they
might lack any degree at all. That sweetness is a property
which admits of degrees is interesting, however, if we con¬
sider the foregoing discussion.
Perhaps, the shortcomings of sweetness as a defining prop¬
erty can be remedied by taking it in conjunction with its
traditional opposite, bitterness, which is also a graded
property. Linking the two properties into a single scale has
the advantage of being much more comprehensive than either
taken singly and produces a property range which becomes a
plausible candidate for a defining property of taste. Despite
this, it is not fully inclusive for there are tastes which
cannot properly be said to be any degree of sweetness or
bitterness - what would one say of potatoes or cheese for
instance? The obvious response to this difficulty is to ex¬
ploit the fact that if bitterness and sweetness are to be
united in a single scale of instances there must be a transi¬
tional point between the two extremes. It does not however
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seem to be necessary that there be a neutral point on the
scale: we might simply have a straight "flip" between one
quality (bitterness or sweetness) and the other but, cer¬
tainly, there is room for the inclusion of an intermediate
step. Unfortunately, such a move might seem like a spurious
way of conferring universality upon the, putatively, related
qualities of bitterness and sweetness. This is because such
a claim can be interpreted as stating no more than that all
tastes are either, bitter, sweet or neither which, of course,
in no way establishes the universality of a bitter/sweet
property range.
It may be that there is a way around this problem and that a
non-trivial property scale can be discerned which unites all
of those experiences which we classify as tastes. I do not
propose to pursue such a quest, however, and perhaps the
only fair thing to conclude at this juncture is that we have
no particular reason to believe in a unifying property for
taste, although we cannot rule out the possibility of it.
If we switch our consideration from taste to the closely re¬
lated sense of smell, we will encounter many of the same dif¬
ficulties. There do not seem to be any commonly accepted
properties which have the all-embracing nature we have
shown to be necessary as far as defining or constitutive
properties of sense categories go. Again, although a source
of difficulty, this deficiency is not in itself conclusive
proof that there are no such properties to be found for
smell. One point worth mentioning here which has some tan¬
gential interest is the relatedness of taste and smell. The
most obvious connection to mention is the familiar one of
causality. As a heavy cold will confirm, the range of gusta¬
tory sensations available solely via the tongue, which is
normally held to be the sense organ for taste, is very lim¬
ited. The richness we normally associate with taste experi-
f
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ence is supplied by the olfactory dimension of what is
placed upon the tongue. In other words, it is the stimulation
of the taste buds in combination with the nose which pro¬
duces the usual range of tastes so-called.
As has been stressed sufficiently already, such causal in¬
formation is logically posterior to the phenomenological ma¬
terial we are concerned with and, consequently, irrelevant
to present considerations of sense divisions. For, even if
taste and smell have a sense organ in common (as is the case
for certain taste experiences) this does not entail that the
content of taste and smell is the same. It might well be that
taste and smell do constitute distinct spheres of experience
and, certainly, this is conventionally assumed to be so. I
feel, however, there is a case for saying that certain expe¬
riences are difficult to classify as being under either the
category of taste or under that of smell. Certain very pun¬
gent or acrid smells are like this, I would suggest. The fact
that we speak of "smells" in these cases is more to do with
the absence of anything, perceptibly, in the mouth, than the
intuitively olfactory quality of what is experienced. One
feature of conventional usage which ought to lend weight to
the view that there is not a radical formal divide between
taste and smell, is the feature of shared descriptions. There
are adjectives which we use to characterise both tastes and
smells and it would be difficult to argue that all of these
are being used in two distinct senses - though there are
some cases where this may be true. Without arguing this
point through in the detail that is required for proof, I
would suggest that there are strong reasons for saying that
the differences between tastes and smells have more to do
with the physical origins of the experiences involved, than
their intrinsic phenomenological features. That is, an expe¬
rience is called a taste if there is clearly (for tactual rea¬
sons, usually) something in contact with the tongue, and
called a smell if there is not.
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Is seems to me that, if we are serious about evaluating per¬
ception and the claims that surround it from a rigorously
phenomenological standpoint - and I have insisted that we
should be - then we should not be afraid to abandon certain
traditional or common-sensical claims if they conflict with
such an approach.
It almost goes without saying that there is no immediately
suitable property of smells for the development of the kind
of comprehensive system of properties which has proved so
interesting in the case of vision and hearing. The fact that
there are so many shared properties where taste and smell
are concerned ought to indicate that the introduction of
smell does not extend the range of available properties sig¬
nificantly. I propose to leave these two senses (if, indeed
they are "two") at this incomplete stage, for the reasons
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter and which I shall
return to a little later.
(v) TOUCH
It falls to us to conclude our review of the sense modalities
as traditionally conceived with a consideration of the re¬
maining sense, that of touch. In many ways this poses more
problems from the point of view of analysis than the hitherto
considered senses. This is primarily because touch does not
receive the same kind of acknowledgement in conventional
thinking that the other senses do. One way in which this can
be expressed is in the lack of a direct object of awareness
for touch. There are not "touches" in the way that there are
images or sounds or smells or tastes. There are things which
one is said to feel via the sense of touch, but these are
physical, external objects, and not things which one could
easily think of as existing even if belief in an external re-
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ality were withdrawn. Although images, sounds and the rest
are often taken to refer to items which have objective real¬
ity - an extension of the basic sensory object - I would sug¬
gest that it makes sense to speak of experiencing a sound
without that sound being the sound of anything, in a sense
implying existence, or that the sound itself is an external
item (whatever that might be). Because we do not have an ac¬
cepted term covering all touch experiences, we invariably
talk in terms of particular external objects as the objects
of a touch experience. We are left without a term to serve as
an intermediary between a subject or a tactual experience
and objective reality. Accordingly, our statements about
touch have an inbuilt ontological commitment. We always seem
to be experiencing (feeling) books, cups, cloth, water and
never just "touches".
One response to this feature of talk about touch would be to
say that touch does give us direct, unmediated contact with
physical objects and that there is no phenomenological di¬
mension to touch. This would have the consequence of making
touch a completely veridical mode of perception and this is
something which is, surely, unacceptable. Tactual mistake is
perfectly conceivable, and frequently happens. Dreams can
include tactual sensations and no-one would want to suggest
that, in virtue of being tactual sensations, these guarantee
the existence of the objects they seem to be sensations of.
There are also well-chronicled examples of hallucinatory or
illusory tactual experiences - the so-called "phantom-limb"
experiences where subjects feel themselves to be in posses¬
sion of parts of the body which they have actually lost.
(Although this might be "touch" in its broad sense as includ¬
ing kinaesthetic and other bodily sensations). Another dif¬
ficulty with a view of touch as pure awareness of an exter¬
nal world is that it deprives us of anything that charac¬
terises the kind of experiences involved as a distinct
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sense-category. For, where other senses are concerned, even
if they are, ultimately, united by shared external objects,
there is an individual phenomenology which creates the dis¬
tinct categoreality of each sense.
If for no other reason than that tactual error is possible
and that a plausible account of such errors requires that
something have been experienced in a phenomenological
sense, I shall assume that touch is not an incorrigible form
of awareness of the external world. I shall assume, that is,
that there is a genuine sensational dimension of touch which
would remain in the absence of ontological commitments and,
in any case, does persist in situations of error or illusion.
Tactual experience is not "colourless": there is something
about an experience which tells us, even if the experience
is identified with an aspect of a real object, that it is a
distinctively tactual experience. Having said this, how¬
ever,it is still true, as I have already acknowledged, that
we are less consciously aware of the phenomenology of
touch. We find it harder to focus upon many of the sensa¬
tions of touch as distinct from the items we normally take
them to be awarenesses of. I cannot completely explain why
touch should be more intractable in this respect than other
senses, but there are certain suggestions we can make. One
feature of touch worth commenting upon is the absence of an
easily identifiable sense-organ by which it is mediated. The
only response to a demand for an organ of sense for touch
would be to nominate the entire body; including not only its
external surface but also parts of its internal surfaces and,
also, what lies behind such surfaces within the flesh. Not
the entire body is a source, or even potential source, of
tactual sensations, the brain, for instance, is insensate in
tactual terms. Consequently, it is difficult to state, defini¬
tively, what is to count as the tactual sense-organ(s). The
problem this poses is not, essentially, to do with locating a
sense-organ - this does not have a great deal of theoretical
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importance, anyway - but rather the tendency to widen the
range of tactual experiences qualitatively and, also, to
complicate our interpretative picture of things in such a
way as to obscure the phenomenology of touch. For, where
the other sense modalities are concerned, the sense-organ -
the part of the body mediating the experience - is relatively
unimportant and, usually, an ignored part of the perceptual
experience. What is important tends to be the external items
one is aware of. Where touch is involved, however, the medi¬
ating area of the body is often taken to be significant in
itself for, one of the features of touch is that, in a way
that other senses do not, touch provides us with information
about the state of our body. A single touch sensation can be
simultaneously providing us with data about an external ob¬
ject - its shape, size and location - and a part of our body -
that which is in contact with the object - and the state it is
in - perhaps indented or squashed in some way. It might even
be said that not only does every tactual sensation provide
us with information about the condition of some parts of our
body but that, moreover, it provides proof that the stimu¬
lated bodily part exists at all. If you like, external forces
acting upon the body are a constant reminder of the fact
that we have a body.
That different tactual sensations tend to be associated with
different parts of the body as well as with different objects
clearly makes those sensations seem more disparate. In a
way, they are being burdened with an added level of ontolog-
ical interpretation which has the effect of submerging the
sensations per se.
Furthermore, what we also need to recognise is that there is
a realm of tactual sensations which do not relate to exter¬
nal objects at all in the above sense. There are many sensa¬
tions which are normally taken as tactual, including:
twinges, tics, chills, pains, which have a bodily location,
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but do not indicate any particular physical influence upon
the body, or even any physical condition within the body.
There are, also, perceptions of heat and cold, many of which
are felt, not in a restricted bodily part, but generally.
Additionally, there are sensations of orientation, usually
termed, "kinaesthetic" sensations. In saying this, I am not
denying that many of the above sensations can also be rep¬
resentations of external or internal physical facts: a pain
as well as being a pain may also be an awareness o£ a sharp
object penetrating the skin for instance, it is just that
there are pains which are not treated as perceptions of some
physical state of things. Also, it may be the case that ex¬
tensions in our knowledge convert these non-objec¬
tive/physical sensations into explicit awarenesses of phys¬
ical states. Thus, for instance, I might come to regard what
was just a sensation in my leg as the feel of a blood clot as
a consequence of an empirical connection between these two
being made for me. What the existence of an area of touch
experience not absorbed into physical theory means, how¬
ever, is that an added level of complexity exists within the
tactual domain, further explaining its relative opacity from
a categorical point of view.
It might be noted, all the same, that the last mentioned
group of pure tactual sensations provide the best images of
what the underlying phenomenology of touch is like for all
types of touch experience. A pain, which cannot be thought
of as a physical object even though it is given a general
physical location, is analogous to a sound where hearing is
concerned - it can stand for something which could intelligi¬
bly be taken to exist even if an external world were denied.
Reflection should make us aware that there is nothing excep¬
tional about pains within the tactual realm, it is just that,
of their very nature, they impress their phenomenology upon
our consciousness in a way that other forms of tactual expe¬
rience do not. We can expect some separable phenomenologi-
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cal element to underlie all areas of tactual perception. One
problem I should, perhaps, mention in passing is that the
status of pains as tactual experiences might be open to
question. If tactual experience is thought of as a mode of
perceiving physical objects, then pains might seem somewhat
anomalous. Against this I would say that we must remember
that pains are physically located, in parts of the body, and
perceptions to do with our body are just as much perceptions
of external or objective space as those to do with other ob¬
jects. I have already stated that many sensations of other
objects, have a duality in that they are simultaneously in¬
formative of the state of or existence of our body. With the
development of empirical knowledge, many simple pain experi¬
ences can come to be more full-blooded perceptions of phys¬
ical states. Furthermore, there is a good case for saying
that pains are not a special category of tactual experiences
but rather a sub-species of other tactual experiences. What
I mean by this is that there are not just pains, but different
types of pains. There are stabbing pains, burning pains,
stinging pains, throbbing pains and so on. Pains can be seen
as developments or extensions of other particular types of
sensation. For instance, a burning pain can be seen as re¬
lated to a degree of warmth which is very pleasant, or a de¬
gree of heat which is not particularly pleasant yet not ac¬
tually painful. The pain we feel when we burn ourselves is
still a perception of heat, it is not a new kind of sensation
nor, I would argue, is it two sensations; the one a neutral
perception of heat similar to other sensations of tempera¬
ture, the other a pain and thus a distinct kind of sensation.
Rather, I would want to argue that pains are degrees or
shades of ordinary tactual sensations which are unaccept¬
able to us. They, for whatever reason, generate a certain at¬
titude or disposition in us towards them. Simply put, pains
are tactual sensations we do not like. I would not want to
claim that this is a conclusive line of argument, but I would
hold that pains have some place within tactual experience or
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perceptual experience in general. They cannot be taken as
purely subjective or mental items in a sense that divorces
them from other perceptual sensations.
One problem that might be said to emerge from the features
we have extracted from touch is that of the sheer diversity
of the experience involved and this accepting the argument
that there is a genuine phenomenology to all these experi¬
ences which we call touch. In terms of the preceding analy¬
sis as applied to the other sense modalities, if we ask the
question whether there is some constitutive property for
touch, any possibility of an answer seems remote. To start
with, as we have acknowledged, the phenomenology of tactual
perceptions is largely inscrutable and, beyond this, the
range of phenomenological items could be very extensive -
when we consider that touch is to include sensations of tem¬
perature and kinaesthetic experiences as well as those of
pains and awarenesses of physical objects. There is
patently no uniting property or properties ready to hand for
this range of experiences and intensive scrutiny would be
required to remedy this. In keeping with previous, less ex¬
treme situations, however, I would say that the absence of
any conventional acknowledgement of a thematic property for
touch does not necessarily give grounds for denying that
one exists. At the same time, one has to say that it leaves
it an open question whether there is such a property to be
found for touch experiences - as presented.
One could say that the sheer diversity of touch experiences,
so called, should provoke a scepticism as to whether there
can be a uniting property. If we think of, say, pressure ap¬
plied by an object held in the hand, and the general feeling
of a low air temperature, the possibility of there being a
common feature to both experiences does not seem great.
What this implausibility might suggest, is that touch is
something of a catch-all category or a repository for any
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sensory experiences we cannot categorize under any of the
other sense modalities. Accordingly we might feel that a
deeper inspection of the experiences that, putatively, con¬
stitute the sense of touch would reveal two, three, or more
separate sense categories. Perhaps these might have indi¬
vidual uniting, constitutive properties, in a way that is not
currently obvious for touch as we now consider it.
Again, I do not want to pass judgement one way or the other
upon this possibility. What I would prefer to do is hold open
the option of there being more sense divisions that those
commonly supposed, as well as there possibly being fewer
then these. In putting up something of a defence for the no¬
tion of distinct categories when it comes to the phenomenol-
♦
ogy of our experiences, I do not mean to rule out all revi¬
sions of our assumptions about the senses.
(vi) THE SENSES AS CATEGORIES
Before leaving consideration of touch it is important that we
make some comment upon the fact that touch is meant to give
us an awareness of a physical property which we have dis¬
cussed in the context of a different sense-modality, namely
the property of shape. The acknowledgement of this clearly
poses a threat to the notion of touch and vision being com¬
pletely separate senses. It is tempting to say that, if
senses are defined by the properties or objects they give
access to then here touch Cor that part of it relating to
shape) and sight must be a single category of sense. Clearly
this is not something we would normally want to claim. I
would argue that the phenomenology of touch and vision are
quite distinct, whilst acknowledging that it is possible to
have an awareness of shape via touch sensations. Seeing the
shape of something and feeling the shape of something are
quite different experiences; in fact, rarely do we form an
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awareness of the shape of something via a single tactile ex¬
perience, a process of exploration is normally required.
Obviously, there is some relationship between what we expe¬
rience under the two senses, but this is not one of sharing
the same phenomenological content. The question of colour
is naturally a telling consideration. The notion of a colour¬
less shape could be said to be absurd, yet we have no
awareness of colour via touch.
One could argue that "colourless shape" is contradictory as
a possible object for sight, but not so for touch. For any
kind of phenomenological parity to be maintained, however,
some kind of direct tactual analogue of colour would be
needed to "fill-out" the common element of shape or outline
when experienced via touch. The experience of surface or
texture naturally comes to mind here. This would have the
consequence that, in a situation where we both feel and look
at a shape we would simultaneously have two experiences of
shape; one where it is filled out or defined by colour, the
other where it is shaded in by sensations of texture or sur¬
face. The shape dimensions of the two experiences would be
identical, it would just be the "filling" which would be dis¬
tinct.
This account has no real plausibility. The tactual experi¬
ence of shape is just not like this. As I noted earlier, an
awareness of shape via touch is acquired by exploration and
it is largely achieved by attention to factors which have
nothing to do with a simple experience of surface of a quasi
visual sort. More important are considerations such as the
movement and orientation of the contacting bodily parts and
how much of them is in contact with the chosen object. The
movement of hands and the shapes fingers have to adopt to
conform to an object, it is these that tend to be crucial is
determining the shape of something via touch. I would argue
that what is going on here is an empirically-based operation
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of translating tactual, essentially non-visual data into vi¬
sual terms. From a history of co-ordinating tactual into vi¬
sual experience it is possible to take a touch experience
alone and form an idea of the related possible visual expe¬
rience.
This is not to say that objects and shape do not figure in
tactual experience, they do, not in some quasi visual way,
but rather in terms of a genuinely independent phenomeno-
logical form. Providing further argument for this and estab¬
lishing the complexities involved, however,is a task which is
best left until Chapters Four and Five where we shall have
occasion to consider the interaction of the different senses
and of how they can relate to unitary objects in space.
Suffice it to say at this point that the fact that an aware¬
ness of shape can be obtained through touch as well as vi¬
sion does not necessitate the treatment of these supposed
senses as one. They are not merged from a phenomenological
point of view by the common element of shape, any more, per¬
haps than are vision and hearing merged by the fact that of¬
ten one can tell the shape or composition of something
through hearing (as when familiar sounds are involved).
To attempt a summing up of the position we have reached via
the discussion of this chapter, we can say that there are
only two senses where I have isolated properties which can
stand as properties integral to those senses, in a defining
or constitutive role. These are sight and hearing. For the
remainder, suggestions have been no better than tentative,
partly because I have been unprepared to devote the space
necessary for conclusive results. I want to defend that de¬
cision in a moment, but, prior to doing so, it is essential to
remind ourselves of the purpose of this chapter and the na¬
ture of the results obtained for vision and sound. Having
accepted that there is a phenomenology to perception, the
first question to ask is whether it simply consists of the
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"buzzing", "blooming" confusion that William James once de¬
scribed it as (6), or whether there are interesting concep¬
tual divisions within it.
Bearing in mind, also, that beyond the important objective of
trying to elicit the character of the phenomenology upon
which I have laid so much stress there is also the matter of
the consequences that sense category divisions give rise to
at the interpretative, ontological level already alluded to
and to be appropriately considered in Chapter Four. Both of
which considerations render attention to this issue highly
desirable if not strictly indispensible to the central dis¬
cussion of this thesis. We certainly seem capable of making
these category divisions within what we experience and not,
I have argued, on the basis, primarily, of empirical or post-
phenomenological considerations. The question has been,
"what is the basis of these demarcations?" One option is to
say that the differences between the content of the senses
is brute and simple and something which, although recognised
by us, is incapable of further elucidation or analysis. At
the end of the day, this may turn out to be the case for some
senses, but I have suggested that for at least two senses
there is an added level of analysis we can perform. In the
case of visual and auditory material we are not confined to
saying, "the visual is this (ostensive) kind of thing and the
auditory is that kind". We are able to describe qualities pe¬
culiar to each sense which all instances of that sense pos¬
sess. I have cited these properties as important because
they are not contingently present in all known instances of
these senses, but necessarily applicable to all possible in¬
stances. There could not be colour without a particular hue,
for instance. (I acknowledge, however, the persistence of
certain extreme forms of scepticism vis-a-vis this claim).
Moreover, these properties are relational in that every
bearer of them possesses them in some degree and is thereby
related in a determinate way to all other instances of the
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properties concerned. This produced scales or ranges of the
property instances (possible instances) concerned.
The importance of such property scales is that it gives us a
very clear notion of what it would be for the sense divisions
concerned to be spurious. If vision and hearing were not
genuinely distinct from each other in a strong, conceptual
way, it would be possible for the scales of their properties
to merge at some point. Thus, for example, it would be theo¬
retically possible to pursue the pitch dimension of sound
along all its instances until it became a given degree of
brightness. For any property scale there would have to be an
instance which was a natural successor of some indisputable
member of that scale and which was also a degree of some
"other" property scale. A consequence of this, also, would be
that the instance which linked one property scale of one
supposed sense with that of another would have to fall under
the other properties constitutive of that sense.
Accordingly, in the case envisaged, the phenomenological
item which was a natural part or extension of the
pitch/loudness scales would also have to be part of the hue,
saturation brightness and, possibly, shape property scales
of colour. I hope I have said enough to establish the incon¬
ceivability of this situation. One problem is that of how the
cyclical nature of the hue scale of property instances could
be "broken into" by a separate linear scale. Whichever point
on the colour circle sounds entered at would have to have
two, infinitessimally differing neighbouring instances which
diverged; one following the line of the colour circle; the
other heading off into the pitch/loudness scales.
A further problem arises if we ask the question whether, in
terms of the example we are considering (though the diffi¬
culty would arise if any of the other permutations were se¬
lected), it is a pitch of a specific loudness that leads into
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the colour circle (and its brightness and saturation varia¬
tions) or simply a pitch at any of its possible loudnesses.
A final question, even if the above puzzles have been re¬
solved, is that of whether the instance which is the logical
successor of some genuine member of the pitch (/loudness)
sequence and which also belongs to the realm of colour
properties is meant to have only colour properties or sound
ones as well. If such a connecting item has properties of
both sound and the visual it becomes both unique in auditory
and visual terms and hybrid to a bizarre degree. If, on the
other hand, the said item has only visual qualities then it
is open to us to protest that it is not a genuine extension
of the relevant auditory property ranges. The pitch sequence
could be said simply to come to an end and that of the
colour circle begin in contradiction, of the claim at issue.
What we can say is that our considerations of the senses of
vision and hearing and their essential properties leave it
unimaginable that the two senses could merge, and they do
everything to reinforce our unreflective belief in the radi¬
cal distinctness of the senses concerned. Certainly, for the
remainder of this study I shall assume that vision and hear¬
ing involve discrete areas of our phenomenological experi¬
ence, and do not admit of certain forms of combination or
conflation.
Making this assumption does have consequences for some of
what I shall discuss later, but does not strike deep enough
to render the essence of that discussion invalid should that
assumption, pace the preceding evidence, turn out to be
false. It is for this reason that I have been happy to at¬
tempt no more than a cursory consideration of the more com¬
plex sense-modalities. It is sufficient for the purposes of
what is to follow that I establish the possibility of sense-
experience being divided along categorical lines and take
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that possibility into account. It is not vital that I fully de¬
termine the number or nature of the ways in which that expe¬
rience is divided. The visual and the auditory and their
clear separation from the phenomenology that remains - the
gustatory, olfactory and tactual as we, pre-theoretically,
consider it - establish enough of a precedent for the place
of sense-divisions within pure sense-experience for our pur-
(1) As found in Eg. ARISTOTLE.
(2) L. Wittgenstein, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF
MATHEMATICS, Blackwell, Oxford 1964.
(3) L. Wittgenstein, REMARKS ON COLOUR, Blackwell,
Oxford 1977.
(4) B. Harrison, FORM AND CONTENT, OUP, Oxford, 1973.
(5) See Mundle, PERCEPTION: FACTS AND THEORIES. Ch. 9.





In our first chapter, we have directed our attention towards
what I have spoken of as the "content" or "phenomenology" of
actual experience (and, by "actual experience," I mean that
experience which is common to most of the human race.) I
have tried to isolate the substance of the different senses
which we normally think of ourselves as having. A something
that we can regard as uniting all the experiences falling
within any given sense, regardless of what those experi¬
ences can be said to be experiences of - in an ontological
sense. That is, I have attempted to get behind the views of
cars or the clicks of doors or the odours of lemons to some
feature or features which relate those specific experiences
to the rest of the experiences available within the sense-
modalities in question, in some generalized sense.
Two things are to be achieved by this process: one is a re¬
inforcement of the basic claim behind this work that there is
a phenomenological dimension to experience, the other is
that there is some conceptually sound underpinning to our
everyday assumption that there are sense category divisions
within experience (though the number and nature of these we
have not conclusively established). It is really the first of
these that is of importance for the present chapter. That we
have to allow for sense categories within experience, is
something that we will have to give some thought to later
when we come to consider the notion of forming a composite
"picture" of reality from material experienced within differ¬
ent senses.
At the moment, I wish to take a single sense, strip
ontological overlay, as we might call it, and use





ing the link between experience and metaphysical interpreta¬
tion. Specifically, I intend to consider how sensations or
experiential material belonging to one of the senses we have
discussed could ever occur in such a way as to provide the
basis for an ontology or "conceptual scheme" quite different
from that which we actually arrive at from that sense. The
interest of this exploration, if successful, lies in the
wedge it drives between experience and ontology and in the
consequent promotion of possible alternative ontologies to
those currently wedded to given categories of sense experi¬
ence. Not that, I hasten to add, the function of this is
meant to be a sceptical one regarding our present interpre¬
tations; rather it is an attempt to eliminate certain tempting
prejudices in favour of our everyday, human metaphysical in¬
terpretations and to eliminate prejudices which incorporate
the assumption that only these accepted interpretations
have intelligibility, in addition to their being, as a fact,
true or correct. Hand in hand with this kind of broadening of
metaphysical horizons should go a deeper understanding of
what an ontology or an ontological interpretation of experi¬
ence is. I hope that something essential to perception as a
philosophical issue will emerge: some insight into the link
between an individual and a space and some elucidation of
central notions such as the subjective and the objective.
The sense I have chosen as the basis for this speculative
analysis is hearing. The particular suitability of this sense
for the project in mind lies in the fact that it has a phe¬
nomenology distinctive enough to allow for unproblematic hy¬
pothetical manipulations of it (which would not be so true of
smell or touch) yet at the same time is not so rigidly asso¬
ciated with space and objects such as to import an unwanted
ontology into those processes (something sight would
threaten to do). Further incentive to focus upon hearing is
provided by the existence of interesting precedents for this
in the philosophical literature. Most notable among these is
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P.F. Strawson's INDIVIDUALS (1) and the chapter entitled
"Sounds," but also worthy of mention is J. Bennett's KANT'S
ANALYTIC (2) There is a good measure of overlap between my
views and these theories though there are points of dis¬
agreement as well. Possibly the greatest source of diver¬
gence is in the distinct contexts surrounding the theories
in question. Strawson and Bennett's views on alternative
spaces or "conceptual schemes" (as Strawson tends to refer
to them) are not developed as a part of a general theory of
perception or the relationship between experience and meta¬
physics, as is the case here. However I prefer to develop my
own account first and to draw comparisons and contrasts be¬
tween it and other precedents afterwards.
(i) SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.
It is worthwhile beginning with a brief consideration of how
sounds fit into our actual view of space and its objects. In
some respects, sound is peculiar when we confront it in this
way. There are certain unresolved ambiguities in the way we
talk: about sounds. On the one hand, we speak of sounds as if
they were themselves a species of object in space, yet, of¬
ten paralleled with this approach there is our, perhaps
stronger, tendency to speak of them as if they were simply
caused by physical objects in space, and were lacking in
spatial existence themselves. When we talk of sounds being
in a certain place, in many ways, this is just a kind of
shorthand for saying where such sounds can be heard which
is not necessarily the same thing at all. If pressed about
the claim that there was a sound in a certain place - a room,
for instance - we would find it difficult to be more precise,
in spatial terms, as to its location. Even if, by exhaustive
exploration, we were able to locate all the points in space
at which the sound could be heard, we might find it difficult
to express the sense in which the sound occupied the three-
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dimensional region of space in question. Clearly, its pres¬
ence is an invisible and intangible one ana, accordingly, not
a physical one in the sense that we standardly use. There is
nothing unique about this in sensory terms: the same state
of affairs obtains where smells are concerned. And, it might
be said that, although neither can be said to be physical,
this does not preclude sounds and smells being genuinely
spatial items - objects, of a sort, in space. This can be
seen as fitting in with much of our unreflective talk about
sounds (or smells). One feature is the intensity of the expe¬
rienced item. Although a sound may be heard over a range of
spatial positions, it will not be equally loud at all of
these. Also, the quality of the sound may vary with location
and acoustics may affect the pitch of a sound.What these
kinds of considerations begin to raise is the question of
the individuation of sounds. If, by moving position, we come
to hear different things, qualitatively or quantitatively
speaking, are we justified in describing what we hear at
each position as one and the same sound? Similarly, if what
we are listening to is an intermittent sound, albeit unvary¬
ing in pitch and loudness, do we hear one sound repeated, or
several sounds in succession? Consider also the familiar
railway train or police car phenomenon, where an emitted
whistle or siren sound distinctively changes in pitch as the
vehicle passes the listener according to the Doppler effect.
In such a situation, how many sounds are heard? We know that
for the occupant, of the moving vehicle no changes occur, is
this sufficient license to claim that for the stationary lis¬
tener there is only one metaphysical item experienced? I
suggest that a little reflection upon these questions will
reveal that there are fairly standard ways of dealing with
these situations from a linguistic point of view, but that
the solutions are essentially arbitrary. In other words, we
will not find anything in the facts of the different situa¬
tions which explains why sometimes it is one sound and on
other occasions two or more. This lack of a consistent prin-
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ciple for the individuation of sounds or smells may not seem
a serious objection to their being real objects, but, al¬
though it may not be decisive, it does represent a difficulty
which has to be resolved. Until we are able to say where one
sound starts and another ends, we have a major unclarity in
our metaphysical account of sounds.
This unclarity may admit of elucidation, but the fact that we
do not currently operate a consistent account in these mat¬
ters is of significance in itself. What it points to is the
suggestion that we are unable to take things like sounds and
smells seriously as genuine spatial objects or particulars
in the way that we assume tables and chairs to be. What I
mean here is not that we do not believe sounds and smells to
have any objective, and physical status; we certainly think
they do have - but that they have that status by an indirect
route.
We have to bear in mind that the whole orientation of our
study comes from what is immediately experienced and, ac¬
cordingly, we have to hold the actual phenomenology of hear¬
ing and smell firmly in mind. This means that we are not al¬
lowed to appeal to causal explanations or theoretical enti¬
ties in order to account for the existence of auditory or ol¬
factory experiences in spatial terms. In other words, we are
not permitted to express the existence we take sounds or
smells to have in terms of arrangements of physical parti¬
cles or wave patterns in some physical medium. The reason
being, that these physical or material or objective or spa¬
tial features have no necessary connection with the sensory
experience they are meant to embody. We have to discover
that the experience of a particular sound is caused by a
certain disturbance in the air (or more basically, by the ac¬
tivity of certain physical objects). We do not establish "at
a glance" what the objective counterpart of a sound experi¬
ence is; the information is not contained in the experience
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itself. That is, we do not take some identifiable part of the
experience we have under senses like these and interpret it
literally as being, itself, a part of external reality. We do
not come to consider an auditory or olfactory experience as
an experience of a certain kind of objectively existing ob¬
ject, where the object is supplied by the phenomenology of
the experience concerned. When we give a causal/physical
type of account of a sound's real-world existence we are not
in any way reifying, in the above sense, the experience of
hearing that sound. Rather, we are providing an explanation
of that sound experience and, at best, pointing to an essen¬
tially non-auditory counterpart for that experience.
Moreover, a range of different counterparts might have been
discovered as the basis for a given sound, for example drums
might have sounded like cymbals and vice versa.
To make this clear, we need to consider an example of a
Primary Quality (in the Lockean sense) (3), and perhaps
those properties derived from vision would be the most
straightforward. If we take a feature of visual experience we
find that, by contrast, with hearing or smell, we are able to
coherently project that feature beyond personal experience
into the objective sphere. We can identify the content of an
experience with a part of the world. There is a direct con¬
nection between the content, at a phenomenological level, of
visual experience and the physical object it is meant to be
of or inspired by. There is a connection between a sphere as
a physical object and the experience that is to be had in
seeing it and this is a connection which is radically differ¬
ent from that which holds between a sound wave and the ex¬
perience of a sound. I do not want to over-emphasise the
harmony between a visual experience and an object, for it is
certainly the case that an object as a physical entity occu¬
pying three-dimensional space has a range of properties that
far exceed those present in any image of that object. An ob¬
ject means more to us that than can be experienced in a sin-
- 58 -
gle image of that object or, moreover, a collection of such. I
mention this as a caveat here, later it will be necessary to
explore these relationships in more detail.
As far as sound is concerned, the point I want to make at
the moment is that there is a vague or doubtful link between
the actual phenomenology of sound and the external world
and objects in that world. It is not that we never take the
phenomenology of sound experience and treat it as a direct
apprehension of something existing in objective space - if
anything, that is our unreflective way of treating such ex¬
perience. The point is that an attempt to be more self-con¬
scious about this process leads to uncertainties and con¬
ceptual difficulties, especially when a scientific under¬
standing of sound emerges. This means that we cannot use a
term like "sounds" unambiguously, for it might refer to a
kind of object in public space or it might be restricted to
the realm of purely subjective experience. For the purposes
of what follows, it is important to disregard any objective
status given to the phenomenology of sound and to approach
it from a neutral perspective so that it is just a species of
experiential material in an ontologically unclassified form.
From this starting point I wish to suggest an ontological
structure for sound which is conceptually viable but which
is quite distinct from any we might justify on the basis of
present sound experience, or, that is, upon that present ex¬
perience taken in conjunction with the rest of our sense ex¬
perience and the ontological commitments it engenders.
In the course of developing notions of alternative sound-
based spaces it will, obviously, be essential that we get to
grips with key metaphysical concepts such as space and no¬
tions of objectivity and subjectivity as well as certain
other terms whose importance will soon emerge. This, un¬
doubtedly, will lead us into a realm of controversy and ex¬
pose the enterprise to charges of question-begging. For, to
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claim that certain possible organisations of sound experi¬
ence will constitute spatial systems will be to presuppose a
particular concept of space. This concept will, clearly, be
one which involves enough breadth for it to be extended be¬
yond our present form of experience. This, for many, may be
a source of objection in that the inevitable differences be¬
tween any projected form of experience and the one we have
could be cited as sufficient to entail a change in the mean¬
ing of the term "space" and, thus, to invalidate any claim to
have discovered possible alternative spaces.
I do not want to deny the potential for this line of objec¬
tion. Following Strawson, I would, however, want to present
it as a form of dogmatism. Such a position is dogmatic to the
extent that it begs the question in the opposite direction
from the one just considered: for it takes as its premise the
statement that space can only be as we currently experience
it. The way in which we can slice through the impasse of
these competing dogmas is via a strategy which acknowledges
the relative unimportance of being able to arrogate terms
like "space" to the present enterprise in contrast with an
ability to draw certain useful distinctions under whatever
name. I believe that it is the close similarity that such dis¬
tinctions have with current metaphysical classifications
that provides the interest in our capacity to use them in
novel experiential situations.
The best approach will be to build up the situation I am in¬
terested in from its most basic elements, hoping to draw out
relevant distinctions in the process. Inevitably, general
points relating to non-auditory as well as auditory material
will emerge, but this is entirely desirable.
Initially, I want to establish the rudimentary situation of a
subject confronting a sense-item. Terminology is difficult
here; the situation to be identified is intended to be neu-
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tral of any theoretical description and what I am looking for
is an intuitive acknowledgement of the kind of encounter in¬
volved. To have acknowledged a primary, phenomenological
component in experience is virtually to have grasped the
essence of this situation. One area of potential difficulty
lies in the need to talk of a "subject" of experience. I am
anxious to avoid being drawn into complex issues of per¬
sonal identity yet some notion of a subject will have to be
presupposed. It is tempting to by-pass such difficulties by
simply referring to experiences or awarenesses of sensory
items without committing oneself on questions as to who has
such experiences or awarenesses. The problem with simply
postulating the existence of sense experiences is that, to
give a plausible account of how these become the basis of
metaphysical interpretations, we need some concept of an
active, intelligent subject which can process as well as re¬
ceive sensory information. I have already stated that, in
general, the important question is not whether certain infer¬
ences or judgements are actually made but whether they
could be made. This does not, however, represent a faultless
means of avoiding consideration of the nature of the subject
in relation to experience, because, even confining ourselves
to talk of what conceptualizations are warranted by given
experiences, we still have to have a notion of the subject
that could perform such judgemental acts. I cannot hope to
delve very deeply into these questions of personal identity.
I shall work with minimal assumptions in order to confine my¬
self to notions which can ultimately be shown to have some
genuine basis, whatever that is.
An idea with which I wish to commence is that of a first en¬
counter between a subject and a sense item. "Sense item"
here can be a fairly broad term covering not just simple in¬
stances of the known senses; sounds, tastes, smells, etc.
but also, perhaps, sequences of these; an experience of a
string of notes for example. This solves difficulties partic-
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ularly in respect of images where questions arise as to
whether images have to be uniform as in a total field of one
colour or whether they can have separable visual elements.
At the same time there has to be some restriction upon the
degree of complexity such sense items can have - restric¬
tions which will become obvious as I proceed. The point I
wish to make about these situations of initial sensory en¬
counters is that, for the subject concerned there can be no
grounds for his (I shall use "his" though "its" really has the
generality I intend) forming a judgement as to whether the
item or experience concerned had objective or subjective
existence. Accurately speaking, the whole question of
"objective or subjective?" would not arise. The suggestion
that the concepts themselves would be a part of the sub¬
ject's consciousness prior to the sensory situation which
requires them would be avoided. We might want to say that
some kind of distinction would be felt, namely the distinc¬
tion between the sense items and the self. In other words
there would be a sense in which the experience was an alien
element, quasi-objective in its not being a part of the self.
We might, also, want to cite other properties peculiar to
such experiences or sense items; properties which distin¬
guished them from other parts of a subject's experience or
mental phenomena. One obvious possible distinction to make
is that between sense items and such things as memories or
imaginings. There are dangers here, however. It is tempting,
to claim that the key difference between a perceptual item
and products of the imagination including memories is the
presence of will or control. Volition is something of a red-
herring, however, where perception is concerned: the fact
that an experience is not created or governed by the will
(whatever that means) does not guarantee its objectivity,
nor, equally, does the presence of some level of control
over what we perceive, in that we have some control over our
sense organs and we have some control over the worldly
items that impinge upon the sense organs. At the same time,
- 62 -
there are many non-perceptual experiences over which we
have no control, such as hallucinations. It is the presence
of certain structures or relationships within experience
that is crucial, I shall argue, though this does have the
consequence that total or unrestricted control over what one
experiences would rule out its objectivity.
Returning to our original point, where such initial or limited
encounters with sensory items are concerned, we can say
that the question of objectivity or subjectivity would not
arise. This might be open to challenge in that it could be
claimed that the objective/subjective distinction is an ex¬
haustive one, and that the implied neutrality the above con¬
fers upon the items of experience is senseless. It may not
be clear that anything which is not objective must be sub¬
jective; perhaps things are only subjective in a form of ex¬
perience where other things are objective. That is, if the
objective/subjective distinction is a way of drawing a line
between two separate areas of experience, then, where there
are no grounds for such a division it seems at best arbi¬
trary to claim that the totality of that form of experience
falls within one half of this dichotomy, namely, the subjec¬
tive. Surely the sensible thing would be to say that the dis¬
tinction does not operate at all in this situation? Having
said that, there is much to be said for the view that the ob¬
jective/subjective distinction is not just any operable dis¬
tinction but a distinction based on specific criteria. That
is there are definite qualities which elements of experience
must possess in order to be classified as objective.
Consequently, if only subjective criteria are fulfilled by a
form of experience then that experience is justifiably
judged subjective, in its entirety.
Putting this issue to one side,
points which can certainly be made
we are considering. One is that, in
however, there are some
concerning the situation
a certain sense, subjec-
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tivity is a negative property, in that it represents the ab¬
sence of a certain structure to experience, that is, the
structure which causes experience to be objectively inter¬
preted and, as such, the subjective is more amorphous and
less easy to conceptualize in the absence of its objective
opposite. Thus, from a purely psychological point of view, it
is unlikely that a subject will come to identify his experi¬
ence as being subjective, that is, as not being objective.
This is of course, only a psychological point, it is not logi¬
cally impossible for a subject to form an understanding of
the concept of subjectivity in the absence of experience of
its more positive counterpart and to apply it to the situa¬
tion in hand. What, clearly, is out of the question in the
present imagined situation is the possibility of the subject
classifying his experience, the sense items, as either ob¬
jective or subjective. He simply does not have enough infor¬
mation at such an early stage. So, to this extent, it is cor¬
rect to say that the experienced items are neutral. However,
according to the view one takes concerning the exhaustivity
of the objective/subjective distinction, it may be that the
items must belong to one category or the other, but that the
subject is unable to say to which one.
We have, then, a situation where a subject (whatever that
means) confronts items of sense experience and can do no
more than distinguish them, perhaps, from other mental (as
we would say) phenomena, and, perhaps, see them as in some
way distinct from the self. What we need to do is to explore
the ways in which this situation would have to be developed
for questions of objectivity and subjectivity to be decided.
This will, naturally, involve producing an account of these
key metaphysical concepts and, to that extent, what follows
must belong to a very controversial area of philosophy. I
have already made certain distinctions in relation to scep¬
ticism, and I will state here that what follows if it does not
capture the ultimate essence of what it is for something to
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exist outside the mind or within the mind then it does at
least capture all the important consequences of these deep
concepts.
Given my earlier claim that we can regard objectivity as the
more specific or positive half of the ontological dichotomy
we are interested in, the line of inquiry to follow will best
be that concerning what causes an experienced item to be¬
come part of an objective framework. If we take the insight
that it is nothing about a sense item per se that causes it
to be justifiably taken as having real or objective exis¬
tence, then we are inevitably drawn to the conclusion that
what makes the vital difference are the relations that item
has with something else. The crucial relations, I would sug¬
gest, are those between one sense item and another. In
proposing the basic sensory situation or encounter, I al¬
lowed for groups of sense items as well as solitary particu¬
lars to be presented to the subject. Where such groups are
concerned, we can expect relations to exist, relations ap¬
propriate to the sense category concerned. Relations of
pitch and loudness would hold for sound items, positional
relations of left/right, above/below would apply for visual
information. What would hold for the other known senses it is
harder to say given our uncertainties about whether fully
inclusive relations exist for smell, taste and touch. Also, I
have no reason to close off the possibility of forms of ex¬
perience, of sense categories beyond the familiar ones and
here there can be no way of telling the kinds of properties
and relations such purely potential forms of experience
might have. Thus, it would seem that we can only devise mod¬
els in terms of sound or vision which, although not uninter¬
esting, is quite a restriction. I am not convinced, however,
that this has to be the case. Obviously, with more intensive
investigation appropriate qualities might be drawn from
senses such as touch, smell and taste to provide the basis
of relations between instances of those for our present pur-
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poses. However, without exploiting this avenue, there is an
alternative form of relation available which could cover
these recalcitrant senses.
Relations of pitch, loudness, or position are relations which
can, and normally do hold between items existing or per¬
ceived at the same time. Accordingly we can say that they
are relations which can hold synchronically or, for simplic¬
ity, are "synchronic relations". The obvious alternative to
this general form of relation is a diachronic type of rela¬
tion and it is this which offers the possibility of construct¬
ing something to cater for the, otherwise problematic,
senses. These "diachronic" relations are different from the
synchronic ones in that they have no specific content, noth¬
ing which is peculiar to the category of sense they operate
in. There is a content difference between a relation like "to
the left of..." and "louder than..." but for diachronic rela¬
tions the essence of the relation is time. The relation is
essentially that of "after...." or "before..." This presents
problems in that it is open to someone to object that a tem¬
poral relation cannot be used as the basis of an objective
spatial framework. The question would be, how can the fact
of an item being experienced after some other item, have
comparable status with that of, say, one visual item being to
the right of another? It might also be queried how a world
constructed out of temporally ordered items could have a
separate time dimension, for, surely, it has converted any
temporal properties into spatial ones? Although there are
prima facie difficulties here, ultimately, they do not repre¬
sent an objection to the proposed use of diachronic rela¬
tions. The clearest method of demonstrating this is not to
continue to discuss it in abstract and general terms, but to
set out in terms of a concrete example how the intended form
of relation would operate. I propose to do this using an au¬
ditory situation. This is, admittedly, somewhat unusual given
the fact that I have acknowledged that sounds are endowed
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with synchronic interrelations. My reasons for choosing this
approach are two-fold: one is to do with the fact that I wish
to make some comparisons with the sound model proposed by
Strawson. The other is that paradoxically, perhaps, there
are special difficulties involved in constructing spaces
from synchronic relations - difficulties which should become
apparent later.
(ii) A SOUND MODEL:RE-IDENTIFICATION.
Let us start, then, with a situation where a subject experi¬
ences or is faced with a given sound, that is, a particular
with specific properties of pitch and loudness. This repre¬
sents the most primitive situation where there can be no
grounds for an ontological classification. It is not essen¬
tial that the subject be only presented with a solitary
sound; there could be several, but to assume this introduces
a distracting level of complexity. In terms of a progression
away from an, at best, ontologically uncertain or subjective
situation, the obvious first step is the introduction of fur¬
ther sound items into the perceptual situation. This being a
diachronic model, we require the occurrence of a further
sound after the initial one. Given the problems mentioned
earlier concerning the individuation of sounds, we need to
say briefly what a single sound is to count as. For present
purposes, I take a single sound to be a note which remains
at a specific pitch and loudness: as soon as the sound
changes in either or both of these dimensions then it has
become a new or different sound. Additional to this, should a
sound change in the limiting case of ceasing to have pitch
or loudness i.e. of silence prevailing, then that particular
sound has ended and any subsequent replacement even of
identical pitch and loudness is a fresh particular. Thus, in
the present model, sounds can be replaced either by other
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sounds or by silence. At the moment, for the sake of simplic¬
ity, I shall work in terms of sound replacements of sounds.
Our first sound we can term "a" and then its replacement "b"
and so on for any subsequent sounds augmenting this with
dashes if need be. Hence we can envisage a situation where
the initial experience of a single sound is superceded by a
whole sequence of sounds. What would this add in metaphysi¬
cal terms to the initial situation? Essentially it would make
no significant change. The presence of further sense items
does not by itself add any more weight to those individual
items in terms of their ontological status. It is, however, an
important development if it is followed by further features.
If the sequence of sounds simply continues as a linear pro¬
gression, then nothing of any consequence can be drawn from
such an unstructured experience. If we imagine, however,
that the sequence reverses or in some way repeats - if after
sound "z" sound "a" (of "a" type) reappears and then "b" and
"c" and so on then we have quite a different situation. It is
different in that it now starts to become possible to talk of
experiencing the same particular sound again. We begin to
have grounds for saying that a subject re-encounters the
very same sound.
It is particular re-identification that Strawson singles out
as crucial to the possession of a genuine objective, spatial
scheme. How is it that these kinds of repetitions warrant
talk of re-identification? They do so, essentially because
they place individual sense-items in a context, an ordering
in which they can also re-encounter a "c" and an "a" sound in
the same positions relative to "b". It might be demanded how
this fixed ordering licences talk of particular re-identifica-
tion with the attendant metaphysical consequences of this,
where the situation involving just an unbroken sequence
does not. We could ask both how does the presence of a re¬
peated ordering guarantee that particulars within it are one
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and the same and not fresh particulars and, also, what pre¬
vents items in an unrepeated sequence from continuing to
exist beyond the times during which the subject experiences
them? This latter challenge makes sense to the extent that
it assumes that, where a particular is re-identified, this ne¬
cessitates its having continued to exist from the time of its
initial identification, during a period when it was unper-
ceived. This seems to be a reasonable understanding of what
is involved in the claim that something is identical with
something existing at an earlier time.
Perhaps, this is open to challenge, however. There might be
those with deeper metaphysical intuitions who would wish to
claim that something can go out of existence for a period of
time yet reappear at the end of that time (perhaps in another
part of space) as one and the same particular. Loosely
speaking, it does not seem absurd to say that a thing could
disappear and then reappear, but I think closer inspection
should cause some measure of puzzlement - certainly a temp¬
tation to ask "where" the item went to during its apparent
absence. The awkwardness becomes acute when we ask how the
reappearing item is distinct from an exactly similar but
fresh particular. To such a question no criteria for distin¬
guishing between the two can be given - this is impossible,
ex hypothesi. All that could be said is that there is a fun¬
damental metaphysical difference; that the two proposed-
items, the reappearing particular and the freshly created
one, are simply and ineffably distinct. It would be tempting
to declare such a claim meaningless but perhaps this ap¬
proach produces an epistemological crisis in that there can
be no means of knowing whether on certain occasions we are
being presented with the same or a different particular, ab¬
solutely no information can be acquired to decide the issue.
Whereas a view of particular identity which takes continuity
to be a decisive factor allows us, in principle and often in
practice, to distinguish between the two. Consequently, it is
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fundamentally this definition of identity that we operate
with. Accordingly, I shall take seriously the assumption that
continuing existence is implied by re-identification.
If persistence is taken to be implied by re-identification
then we can see what a significant leap is involved in the
re-identification claim being made for the repeated sound
sequence. Continued existence outside of the sense experi¬
ence of the subject is entailed and this is certainly central
to any concept of objective existence. The question we are
dealing with, however, is one of how an ordered sequence
provides grounds for this claim where an unstructured se¬
quence does not. The essential difference between the two is
one of evidence. It is not that it is inconceivable that the
sound instances in the open-ended progression are persist¬
ing, independent particulars, it is just that there are no
grounds for thinking that they are. On the other hand, in the
alternative situation, the fact of re-encountering a certain
type of sound item in an already familiar location, that is,
placed in the same position between previously encountered
sound types does provide grounds for saying that such a
sound type is the same sound token as the previously en¬
countered one. The reasoning being this, if we experience a
certain sequence of separate sounds and then re-experience
that sequence - either by the sequence going into reverse at
some point or by the beginning being re-encountered - it is
more likely that we are meeting the same items again and
that they have endured during the period they were unexpe¬
rienced than that they and their orderings are freshly cre¬
ated.
It is difficult, however to say what "likely" exactly amounts
to here. "Likely" suggests a law of objects and their be¬
haviour in an external world which renders such conclusions
probable, whereas such laws follow upon the establishment of
objects and cannot be prior to them, especially not in such
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a way as to be instrumental in establishing the existence of
such objects. A preferable notion is that of conceptual
economy or efficacy. It is, in a way, simpler to treat two
qualitatively identical experiences as being of one and the
same item, rather than as the same experience repeated. A
level of structure, coherence, and organization is intro¬
duced by a preparedness to make this kind of re-identifica¬
tion. What is momentous about such a judgement, of course,
is the fact that it inevitably involves a move towards objec¬
tivity. Following the understanding of identity criteria I
have argued for, it is not possible to refer to something as
one and the same particular as some earlier experienced item
without implying that that something has endured over that
period of time and has persisted through a time when it was
not experienced by the subject. And existence outside of
the experience of a subject, if not the last word on what ob¬
jective existence is, is at least, crucial to any notion of
it.
To see the rationality of making the re-identification we are
concerned with here, it is, perhaps, better to turn the situ¬
ation around somewhat and start with the assumption that an
experienced item is an objective particular. Having made
such an assumption or, perhaps, conjecture about some ele¬
ment in his experience, the subject has committed himself to
certain consequences which flow from the notion of objectiv¬
ity. One of these is that what he experiences could have ex¬
isted and could continue to exist outside of his experience.
So, naturally, one test of whether the sense item really is
an objective particular is that of determining that it can be
rediscovered some time after it has disappeared from his ex¬
perience. One feature of establishing that the same item has
been re-encountered, is that of finding an item with just the
same qualities as the original, but, also, and relevant to
present concerns, is the fact of finding the item in the same
"location", that is, discovering it in the same relation to a
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sequence of items previously experienced. To re-encounter
the same type of sense item in the same context and espe¬
cially where this involves "retracing one's steps" in the way
already described does lend weight to the claim that that
sense item is identical with the one previously experienced.
At this point, there is little more we can do than present
this as a brute fact about what counts as evidence and, per¬
haps, about human psychology. This may seem painfully inad¬
equate, but there are, at least, two sources of reply to this.
One is that the importance of the existence of stable rela¬
tions between types of sense item in terms of objectivity
should become apparent as we develop our model more fully.
The other is that, in the final analysis, I believe it is im¬
possible to produce an account of perception and ontologi-
cal commitment which does not incorporate facts of psychol¬
ogy as well as conceptual or logical truths.
This may appear to be a damning confession in what is in¬
tended to be a philosophical account of perception. Surely,
there can be no place for any conclusions which are dictated
by simple psychological dispositions rather than the compul¬
sion of logic? Naturally, I do not believe that this is the
case. Conceptual arguments about the nature of the meta¬
physical terms involved and about the kind of experience a
subject could, conceivably, be presented with take us to a
certain point. That point, however, remains short of cer¬
tainty concerning the existence of objects outside the mind.
The final step to that objective destination can only be
generated by what, are essentially psychological rather than
philosophical considerations. We are in the realm of what is,
"more plausible", "more convenient", or that which pos¬
sesses "greater simplicity", or "conceptual economy" - no¬
tions which, although endowed with some objective content,
essentially escape philosophical scrutiny and find their ex¬
planations in psychological dispositions.
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From the beginning, I have cast doubt upon the possibility
of producing an account of perception which incorporates a
refutation of scepticism. The suggestion that scepticism
makes, namely that all of the evidence for external objects
is compatible with the view that there are no such objects,
will always be valid. It will be valid not least because it is
inconceivable that there could be evidence of sufficient
strength to counter such a suggestion. What is important is
not that scepticism is proposing an alternative which might
be true, but that its Idealist alternative has no greater
claim to truth than the Realist option we are developing.
Both theories lack conclusive proof in terms of the eviden¬
tial data they relate to, that is, our sense- experience.
What there is to choose between the two theories belongs to
a separate domain, that of psychological acceptability, we
might say. Our choice is between an approach which leaves
experience endlessly multifarious and an unconnected flow
of private sensations and an approach which imposes an or¬
der upon what we experience and relates different parts of
it to each other.
The point about the inconceivability of obtaining conclusive
proof in favour of either a Realist or an Idealist theory is
worth emphasizing, I think, especially as it has conse¬
quences in terms of the kinds of sensory schemes which can
function as the basis of an objective spatial order. The in¬
conceivability in question flows from the nature of the con¬
cepts of objectivity and subjectivity themselves. In order
to establish that Realism was correct we would have to prove
to ourselves that items in our experience continue to exist
outside of experience. But, clearly, the problem here is that
this could only amount to our experiencing such items per¬
sisting outside of our experience, in that, it is impossible
to imagine confronting anything other than within the sub¬
jective, personal medium of our experience. We cannot step
outside of ourselves, as it were, and "check up" on objects
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not presenting themselves to consciousness. These, if you
like, are necessities flowing from the nature of the self and
I just take them as given. These consequences apply as much
to Idealism as to Realism, for how would one set about estab¬
lishing that something did not exist when it was not a part
of one's experience? For the theory to be true, objects or
sense items would have to disappear simultaneous with our
awareness of them, and, by definition, we could not be aware
of this happening. The simple fact of items disappearing
from our awareness proves nothing: we have to be able to es¬
tablish that they had no existence prior to being a part of
our experience and that they have not continued to exist
somewhere outside of our subjective awareness, in order to
establish that once we ceased to be aware of them they
ceased to exist.
All we have, therefore, to decide the case in either direc¬
tion is circumstantial evidence; evidence, that is, which is
susceptible to sceptical doubt. Is it not rational in the ab¬
sence (in principle) of any more binding form of evidence to
act on the basis of such evidence? I think this is made es¬
pecially compelling by the difficulties of trying to maintain
a genuinely sceptical position; one of complete uncommitted-
ness to either a Realist or Idealist interpretation of sense-
experience. Consider the difficulties of acting towards
one's experience with an open mind as to the nature of that
experience - given our earlier comments on the exhaustive
nature of the objective/subjective distinction. Again, per¬
haps this is no more than a psychological issue, but in the
absence of a philosophical decision it seems impossible to
argue that there is not legitimate scope for such considera¬
tions. And, in conclusion, I must represent myself as provid¬
ing an analysis of perceptual decisions we actually make and
as presenting perceptual decisions we could, reasonably,
make in certain experiential conditions, rather than as
proposing perceptual decisions which are categorically en-
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tailed by the experiential evidence. The fact that doubt is
possible does not make commitment illegitimate, or decision¬
making irrational.
One consequence of the points we have made about the sig¬
nificance of unperceived existence in terms of developing
objective interpretations of experience is that certain con¬
straints are placed upon the sorts of experience that can
plausibly support such interpretations. I mentioned earlier
certain difficulties that apply to sense experience charac¬
terized by synchronic relations; these are caused by poten¬
tial difficulties concerning the need for evidence that items
persist outside of the subject's experience. The situation
is a paradoxical one in that it can arise in circumstances
which, in a certain sense, might seem ideal from an epistemo-
logical point of view. The difficulty occurs if we take a sit¬
uation where a subject is presented with an unchanging
sense experience, where, say, a collection of sounds are
heard. Given that sounds have synchronic relations between
each other - relations of pitch and loudness - there is po¬
tential for the kinds of spatial framework which can be the
basis of an objective interpretation, but the permanent
presence of the sound items concerned weakens this poten¬
tial by precluding evidence about the unperceived persis¬
tence of these sounds. In the face of the difficulties as re¬
gards proof that an object continues beyond the time when it
is perceived, it might, intially, seem that a solution would
be found if those objects never disappeared from awareness
at all. In reality, however, this would not do anything to re¬
duce what scope there is for the belief that objects of
awareness are private to that awareness. What lends support
to the speculation that objects of awareness are real is the
fact that they disappear from awareness and that there is
accompanying evidence for their continuing existence. Thus,
a form of sense experience which is changing and where
types of item are encountered, lost touch with then re-en-
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countered, united by some definite chain of intervening
items or experiences is a much sounder basis for an objec¬
tive interpretation of those items. Although I mentioned the
example of sounds and their pitch and loudness relations,
the problem could be expressed equally well in terms of vi¬
sual experience.
None of this is meant to suggest that these synchronically
related items cannot form the basis of an objective spatial-
scheme, merely that the presence of change - disappearance
and reappearance - are necessary to provide the evidential
stimulus towards such an interpretation. The ways in which
synchronic relations can constitute a foundation for an ob¬
jective spatial system I prefer to delay consideration of un¬
til I have completed consideration of our present diachronic
model.
To recapitulate, we had reached the point where the sub¬
ject's experience was described as consisting of a sequence
of sounds which repeat in some way, either by going into re¬
verse or by repeating on a cyclical basis. The fact that the
subject meets types of sounds he has met before in the same
context I have argued supports the view of those experi¬
ences as experiences of one and the same sound-particular
or sound "object". The question of whether the subject has
any control over what he experiences, whether, say, it is
some conscious rational act on the part of the subject which
determines when the sequence will reverse, is unimportant
here, though I shall have something to say about this later.
The stability of relations and the fact that all sense items
are related to all others via the diachronic sequence is im¬
portant, however, our example adheres to these principles
more closely than it needs to as far as stability is con¬
cerned.
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(iii) RE-LOCATION OF OBJECTS IN SOUND SPACE
Although an order of some sort needs to be discerned among
sense items, there can be limited alterations to that order.
This can be demonstrated in the case of the present model.
If we take the sequence of sounds we are interested in to
be," a,b,c,....x,y,z," we can imagine that having reached s the
subject "moves" back in the opposite direction in terms of
what he experiences. As a variation upon the situation we
have assumed up to now, however, we can suppose that, in¬
stead of encountering t, then s, as previously would have
been the case, the subject experiences s, then t, on his
progression back to a. In such a situation the natural con¬
clusion would be, not that fresh particulars of an s and t-
type were involved, but, rather that s and t have exchanged
places and remain identical with those particulars previ¬
ously encountered. That such a conclusion is acceptable is
because changes such as these happen against a stable
background of relations. It is because sense items hold cer¬
tain relationships with each other over a period long enough
for a subject to comprehend them and form an interpretation
of them as constituting an objective space that changes
within that created space become possible.
Naturally, the change we are contemplating is a very minor
one, but there is no reason why more drastic changes should
not be possible. There could be a number of exchanges among
the sound particulars within the sequence. What is important
is that there has existed enough stability to generate a
sense of the external sound space in the first place. Once
this has been achieved, there is no reason in principle why
the whole of the content of the sound world cannot be re-ar¬
ranged simultaneously, although more gradual change might
be necessary for psychological reasons (comprehensibiiity).
This is because, if we have genuinely formed an objective
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interpretation of our sound experience, we will have, neces¬
sarily, formed a notion of space and space becomes the fixed
background against which the sound-objects can move and re¬
tain their identity.
This notion of objects and space going hand in hand may
seem an obscurely metaphysical one: why cannot there simply
be the existence of objects tout court? In fact, the devel¬
opment of a concept of space is an entirely natural one. It
is no more than an extension of the idea of position or loca¬
tion in the sequence of sounds. Along with the idea of one
item being after or "next to" another, should emerge the idea
of the sequence which such items occupy as a form of ab¬
straction from these. We can develop the idea of the possi¬
bility of certain relations of the "before" and "after" vari¬
ety existing separated from any given form of variable in
terms of the particular sounds which would hold these rela¬
tions. In other words, we can form the notion of a sequence,
a range of positions and relations between them (each im¬
plies the other), without having to think of any particular
instantiation of that sequence. Achieving this is simply to
entertain the idea of a space; in this case a sound space of
a diachronic form.
Relating the development of this spatial awareness to our
model as we presently have it, we can see that, with the
conceivability of sound particulars exchanging places that
is, positions in the sequence, arrives the idea of there be¬
ing something over and above the particular arrangement of
sounds. We realise that a place in the sound sequence could
be occupied by any other sound; that there must be some¬
thing which underlies the actual sound items and the ar¬
rangement they are in. In other words, a world cannot just be
the totality of its objects, its existence beginning and end¬
ing with their existence. Objects are crucial to the extent
that without them we could have no awareness of space: we
- 78 -
come to know a space, its dimensions, positions, and possi¬
bilities by the items we experience in it. Space itself, by
its very nature, is imperceptible. The epistemological pro¬
gression is thus, that we are aware of certain sense items,
become aware of certain repetitions of types of these and of
stable relations between them and then, on the basis of this,
take these sense items to be objects with independent exis¬
tence and, by this step, become committed to the idea of a
space in which those objects exist.
This is not the last word on the guestion of space, there are
other qualifications I wish to make in a moment, but, prior to
that, there are some general points about spaces that de¬
serve to be mentioned. Space is not without its paradoxes
and one of these is to do with the creation and disappear¬
ance of spaces. It is difficult, perhaps, to know what to say
of space itself; when we become aware of it, how long has it
been in existence? Is it possible that it comes into being at
the moment we experience its contents? Obviously, in gen¬
eral, we would want to say that it is our awareness that
comes into being rather than space or even the objects in¬
volved. This, however, just leads us to the question of
whether there can ever be circumstances when it is sensible
to talk of the emergence or destruction of space. Suppose,
after a period of encountering a form of objects, all such
objects ceased and, as a subject, one was confronted with a
sensory blank: would this be sufficient to say that space as
well as objects had disappeared? We realise that the alter¬
native is simply to say that space continues yet is empty.
What is there to choose between the two? If we consider it,
once the possibility of a certain kind of object has been
demonstrated to us and we have formed a concept of the
space such objects imply, the possibility of, at whatever
time, further such objects existing is permanently estab¬
lished for us, and this could be seen as tantamount to say¬
ing that space is permanently there. The difficulty with this
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is that it would seem to suggest that once a space has been
created it can never be destroyed. This may appear odd,
given that what spaces there are is surely a contingent mat¬
ter and that it is conceivable that one which does exist
might not. This though, may not be valid; for there may be
something peculiar about the creation of a space, as op¬
posed to that of other things, such that, where one comes
into being, its perpetual existence is logically necessary.
This might cause us to reflect upon the origins of a space:
once we know one to exist, can there be a time before which
it did not exist or must it always have been possible for
items of that spatial type to have existed? I do not know
that there is necessarily a symmetry between past and future
in this respect, but the idea is compelling, which again
seems to minimise the possibility of a space not existing. We
also need to consider the case of empty spaces in relation
to possible yet non-existent spaces. It would clearly seem
possible for a space to exist, yet to be empty, and yet, even
thus, be a part of someone's experience in that the objects
which could have filled it could be perceptible for the sub¬
ject. Yet, under such circumstances, the subject would have
no awareness at all of that space; for him it would be the
same as any number of spaces which do not exist. If this is
the case then we must be permanently in doubt as to what
spaces exist and what do not, in that, failure to be aware of
a space is not proof of its non-existence. We could just re¬
gard this as one of many areas of irresoluble uncertainty we
are faced with as perceivers, but the awkwardness that re¬
mains is one of stating the difference between an empty but
actual space and a possible but non-existent space. For, the
point about a possible space is that, although there is no
sign of its existence and it is taken not to exist, we can
know just what it would be like for it to exist and for ob¬
jects to exist in it. This can be taken as equivalent to as¬
suming an empty space to be in existence, because, in real
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terms, all that is being held is that a certain type of object
could exist. What this boils down to is an issue about
whether there is a basic metaphysical difference between
possible spaces and actual but empty spaces or whether they
really collapse into each other united by the concept of
possibility which is central to both of them. What we have to
ask is whether, when we talk about a space, we are talking
about a real, metaphysical entity or whether we are talking
about a modal truth. We have to decide whether the claim
that a certain space exists is not just a deceptive way of
saying that certain objects and arrangements among them are
possible.
This is a difficult issue, and strong intuitions confront
what arguments there are against the metaphysical status of
space. Surely we feel that what objects entail and exist in
is as real as they are themselves. We think of space as a
particular in itself with its places and parts, and not merely
as the possibility of objective particulars. Also, a disturb¬
ing consequence of identifying actual but empty spaces with
possible spaces is that all spaces which are conceivable
must exist. This seems counter-intuitive to say the least,
and I shall have occasion to discuss this issue further in
Chapter Three.
To keep things in perspective, however, the actual conse¬
quences of deciding for one view as opposed to the other
are negligible. What will be of interest, to us is what we can
experience, that is, objects or actual, occupied spaces.
What is, also, important from the point of view of this thesis
is the coherence of the idea that there can be more than one
form of space, regardless of whether that is a metaphysical
existent or simply a possibility of certain objects and per¬
mutations of them. For this, in terms of many traditional
views, may be controversial and the development of the pre-
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sent sound model is meant to be an argument for a possible
multiplicity of spaces.
(iv) EXTENSION
Having made some necessary comments about space in the ab¬
stract (it is, after all, one of the central concepts of this
perceptual enquiry), it is time to return to the case in hand
and the specific form of space involved, though the comments
involved will have general relevance. The issue I wish to
take up is that of the dimension a space has or the limita¬
tions it imposes upon objects or their possible arrange¬
ments. In the current model I have implied that via a certain
range of experiences of sense items, the notion of objective
sound-particulars is generated and from these the notion of
a space, a space based on the sequence of sounds in ques¬
tion. We can abstract from the particular sounds and their
particular arrangement the notion of locations which could
be filled by a whole range of different particulars (either
freshly created ones or existing items in new locations). On
this understanding, in our sequence, a,b,c,....x,y,z, any
sound object can exchange with or replace any other; no re¬
strictions are implied.
Now, a moment's reflection should tell us that this would not
necessarily be the case for every spatial system. If we
think of the objects in actual visual space we know that, al¬
though movement is possible without loss of identity, it is
not possible for any object to exchange places with any
other object whatsoever. There is a limiting factor of size.
Objects occupy a given amount of space or size of place and
this imposes a limitation upon what other items can be sub¬
stituted for them. Visual (and tactual) space, in other
words, have extension or dimensions. The sound-space we
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have created appears not to have these. This may seem para¬
doxical - a space without dimension? - but it need not be in¬
coherent. We could say that such a space has logical rather
than physical places or positions, the locations of the
sound objects are dimensionless points. It is the fact of the
sound rather than the size of the sound that is important. A
sound simply exists without any form of dimensions, but, by
its existence, establishes a quasi-mathematical point, at
which other such sounds could exist and sound-space is sim¬
ply a sequence of such dimensionless points. This may break
with familiar notions of objects and space, but I do not know






There are certain difficulties which arise from making the
assumption in question. One is to do with the individuation
of objects. If all the sounds concerned are qualitatively
different either in terms of pitch or loudness or both then
individuation is straightforward; we can use the criteria I
have already given. If, on the other hand, we are presented
with sounds which are qualitatively the same, but have been
fixed as numerically distinct by their separate locations
upon the sound sequence, difficulties can arise if we then
suppose a situation where these sounds move into juxtaposi¬
tion in the spatial sequence. For, the two sounds will be
heard as one continuous sound. Now, it may be that, because
of our inspection of the rest of the known sound sequence,
we are, as a subject, certain that the single heard sound
represents two objects and not one, but we will, neverthe¬
less, be unable to say where one starts and the other fin¬
ishes. Imagine, that is, that p and q of the sound world are
qualitatively indistinguishable and that p changes places
sense are necessary t
are contingent featur
of approaching this is
model and of its prima
d any genuine space or
is of our known space,
via a deeper inspection
facie claim to be a di-
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with q. This might not be held to be a problem, for it is pos¬
sible in a visual space for two exactly similar objects to be
side by side in such a way as to be indistinguishable.
Although this is true, the nature of the space concerned
does furnish a means of dividing between the two, namely
measurement. Because size is a measurable feature of actual
space (leaving aside metaphysical questions as to whether
the feature is relative or absolute), if we have a knowledge
of the size of the two objects concerned, simple measurement
will give us a method of distinguishing the two where their
visual or tactual qualities fail us. The same cannot be true
for the sound world we are envisaging; there is no means of
demarcation between the two sound objects. Again, one could
say that this is unfortunate, but not a serious criticism of
the theory being proposed. For we have every reason to hold
that two objects are present and later events might easily
cause them to be separated and distinguishable again. It
could, perhaps, be presented as one of those situations of
uncertainty which we have already acknowledged to be an in¬
alienable part of human experience and our attempts to form
an understanding of the world. This, perhaps, should be ac¬
cepted, though the proliferation of such situations should
be resisted and closer inspection reveals that the uncer¬
tainty involved does ramify into other areas, as I shall now
indicate.
If sound objects have no dimension and if there is no expe¬
riential difference between one object and two or more with
identical properties occurring together then it will always
be possible that in hearing any sound we are hearing
(experiencing) several objects. We can have no way of
telling: it could be, in fact, that every item on our sound-
model sequence is a multiplicity of objects, in fact any num¬
ber at all, there being no physical limitation that can re¬
strict the number possible. This, surely, is a very perni¬
cious consequence of the assumptions at issue. It threatens
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the whole notion of a sound-object itself. The whole basis of
generating an objective interpretation of the given sound
experience was an ability to identify parts of that experi¬
ence and to suppose them to be particulars and find this
confirmed by their recurrence as elements in an ordered se¬
quence. Present considerations now cast doubt upon the sta¬
tus of these particulars - can they really be taken as the
objects we previously assumed them to be? A way around, this
would be to say that, although we can no longer naively as¬
sume such sounds to be single objects, we can still legiti¬
mately assume that a particular "something" is present, per¬
haps a whole group of particulars.
More radically, it might be decided that the notion of a par¬
ticular object is no longer appropriate and that a mass term
should be introduced, so that a given sound (as previously
defined) is simply an indivisible "lump" of that sound stuff.
This does not really carry us much further, however, as many
of the difficulties re-assert themselves. Although introduc¬
ing a mass term briefly eliminates questions about the num¬
ber of particular objects present, it really does so by re¬
verting to a form of simple object. This is because the
sound-stuff which is present when a sound within the se¬
quence is heard is still particular and has to be kept dis¬
tinct from any similar sound heard elsewhere in the se¬
quence. Accordingly, the same problem of individuation could
be said to arise if we suppose that sound masses of the same
sort from different parts of the sound space (the sequence)
come together, for how can we tell which part of the sound is
which? If it is objected that this is a misunderstanding of
the concept of a mass as opposed to an objgct and that the
two masses upon meeting become one mass, as droplets of wa¬
ter might, still another difficulty arises. This is the diffi¬
culty of describing what happens in the merger. We start with
entities which are apparently distinct from each other and
end up with a single item composed of both of them, so
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surely the final product must be more than each by itself,
yet in what way can it be? Because the sound world proposed
is non-extended, we cannot talk about the merger producing a
single mass which is greater than either mass alone, because
size and measurement do not apply. We become at a loss for
descriptions of the situation. Does one item disappear in
the merger and if so, which one? Do both disappear and a new
sound mass come into being, if so, how do we know this? The
whole objective and particular status of the material con¬
cerned becomes undermined. Where there appeared to be a
firm grasp upon objects there is indecision and confusion
with a consequent weakening of the whole fabric of the
space in question.
Without pursuing these difficulties any further I think it
can be seen that there are at least grounds for doubt as to
whether a world lacking some parallel of size or dimension is
a possibility. The problem really stems, I think, from the is¬
sue of particularity. If it is a necessary consequence of
designating a sense item an object, that that object be a
particular, or something which is that thing and no other,
separate even from items exactly like it, then there seem to
be problems for proposed objects which have no substance,
for their supposed particularity has nothing to be rooted in,
which tends to render them objectively ephemeral. It is hard
to see how something which is not a particular in this basic,
admittedly unanalyzable, sense can have the qualities objec¬
tivity demands, namely, independent existence capable of
continuance outside experience. I shall leave things some¬
what inconclusive here, however, because there are, in any
case, reasons for thinking that our second model does pos¬
sess properties of dimensionality, or has the potential for
them.
The obvious quality sounds possess that is relevant to a di-
achronic space is that of duration. It is obvious that to ex-
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ist at all, sounds or sound objects must have some time-
span. We have not, however, given any indication of the ac¬
tual length of time they exist for in our proposed model. It
is perhaps interesting to ask at this point, in the light of
our preceding discussion, whether variations in the experi¬
enced time of the sound items would threaten an interpreta¬
tion of them as objects of some simple, absolute and exten-
sionless type. Surely, the difference would have to be ac¬
counted for? It might be argued that the subject was in some
way "lingering" over certain items compared with others, but
even this, given the rudimentary state of our model would
have to be explained. There are questions about whether the
subject has control over his experience to the extent of be¬
ing able to "hold" a sense item before him.
The other problem is that the idea of "lingering" is strongly
suggestive of the kinds of spatial qualities of extension
which are illegitimate here. "Lingering" suggests an idea of
motion, of the subject moving across his sound world, but
this, of course, is an intrinsically spatial idea in the for¬
bidden sense of objects having dimension or extension. A
more likely interpretation is that time is a significant spa¬
tial factor where these proposed sound objects are con¬
cerned and that, in a sequence where sounds endured for dif¬
fering lengths of time, this would cause a subject to regard
the underlying space as shaped accordingly. In other words,
he would think of sound objects as having different sizes
according to their temporal lengths and this would mean that
they occupied unequal amounts of the sound space. This
would have the consequence of placing limitations on the
kinds of exchanges that are possible. A sound lasting ten
seconds could not occupy the place in the sound sequence of
a sound lasting half that length unless there were other re¬
arrangements. Similarly, where a sound object replaces an¬
other longer than it, there would be a gap to be either filled
by another sound or else a period of silence. Silence we can
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take to be equivalent to empty space. With the arrival of
this situation, we can see how spatial restrictions which ap¬
ply in a visual space such as our own could be mirrored in
alternative forms of space. It has to be admitted, however,
that there is a problem about the measurement of time.
The above example is fraudulent to the extent that it makes
reference to precise temporal measurements. Naturally, for a
subject to be able to avail himself of notions of time such
as seconds, minutes and so on, a vastly more complex world
than the one described would have to be presupposed. What I
would argue to be possible, however, is some basic aware¬
ness or intuition of time on the part of the subject, a sense
of certain sounds lasting longer than others. Agreed, this is
somewhat vague, and it is difficult to see how a subject
could sharpen up his judgements concerning temporal dura¬
tion, for what process could be fastened upon to act as a
point of reference, or clock? But, this said, we do not have
to assume that, because there may be a lack of precision in
the subject's judgements, (and there may not be - to the ex¬
tent that one could suppose that the subject was unhesitat¬
ing in making comparisons of one sound's duration with an¬
other) that there is a corresponding lack of precision in re¬
ality, in the sound world itself. We can suppose that the
sound world obeys rigid temporal laws even though they may
escape measurement by the subject. It could be that, al¬
though the subject has a rough notion of what rearrange¬
ments or exchanges are possible amongst the sound objects,
it is only experience which reveals which are actually pos¬
sible. For instance, the subject might suppose that two
sounds at separate points in the sound sequence were equal
in duration, but discover, by an exchange between the two,
that one was shorter than the other as revealed by an ac¬
companying moment of silence when located in its new posi¬
tion.
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We need to recognise the full consequences of adopting this
view of sound objects. Importantly, by treating the duration
of sounds as metaphysically significant, a strong parallel
with physical extension of the familiar kind is established.
One consequence of this is that we have to introduce a con¬
cept of motion to describe how the subject experiences his
world. If we think that there is a sequence of sounds differ¬
ing in terms of pitch or loudness and lasting different
lengths of time and if we hold that these sounds exist out¬
side of experience, that they are external objects in other
words, then we have to think of all of what is experienced
continuing after experience has ceased. This requires not
only the properties of pitch and loudness, but also some
temporally related property continuing. I say "temporally re¬
lated" because there is a basic difficulty about saying that
a sound's duration has to continue after the time during
which it was experienced. There is an absurdity about saying
that the length of time a sound is heard for, has to continue
to exist as just that specific length of time, after it has
expired. If sounds are held to exist when not being heard
then, naturally, their duration is much greater than their
duration in a subject's experience. What sense can there be,
then, in trying to utilize the duration a sound has in expe¬
rience for metaphysical purposes? The answer is that dura¬
tion cannot be taken in itself as a spatial property for
sound. Rather, it has to be seen as an expression of a re¬
lated property. This property can only be some species of
extension of a one-dimensional kind. The simplest explana¬
tion of the varying durations for the sounds heard, is that
the length of time a sound is heard for is a function of its
size; its uni-dimensional length.
This, then, presupposes that the subject "moves" (it is hard
to see how any other word could be used) across the sound
sequence at an even rate. It could be argued that this is
arbitrary, to the extent that, on the same evidence, one
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could say that all sounds are equal in length (spatial) but
that the subject, the observer, moves at varying speeds past
these sounds. This has to be conceded: the evidence, as
stated does not separate the two interpretations. At the
same time, there is a simplicity about assuming the favoured
interpretation, if only at a psychological level. Also, in any
form of space there will be divergent possible descriptions
of motion. In our own space, we might describe a person"s
walking down the street as the street moving and the indi¬
vidual remaining stationary. It is only considerations of
simplicity which exclude such inversions. It is simpler to
ascribe change to a part of the world rather than to the
whole of that world, save that part. In the present case it is
simpler to assume that things are as they are experienced,
i.e. that sound objects differ in size, and then, if they ap¬
pear to vary at a later time, to account for this in terms of
changes in the subject and his rate of travel, rather than a
whole shift of dimensions in the sound world.
Putting aside competing explanations such as these, what is
of importance is that, however it is presented, there is a
genuine spatial object, in terms of dimension, to be derived
from the sound situation in question. This is a striking de¬
velopment in terms of our present conception of sound where
the entire nature of sounds is meant to be exhausted by
qualities of pitch and loudness, the duration of sounds be¬
ing taken as an external feature of them. Here, because of
the contextual situation of sounds, duration becomes signif¬
icant, it becomes converted into a spatial property of
sounds, in keeping with their newfound objective status gen¬
erally. Having established the possibility of this form of
dimensionality for sounds, we can easily see how juxtaposi¬
tions of qualitatively identical sounds no longer raise theo¬
retical problems, though they may pose practical ones. If we
know how "long" a sound is, then, if it is joined by another
the same "length" as it, we should know at what point this
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occurs and thus be able to distinguish between the two
sound objects. The only difficulty is our inability to sug¬
gest how precise measurement might occur in this sound
world. We can, though simply, assume a decisiveness, or
sense of certainty on the part of the subject as far as
judgements of duration are concerned. This assumes that the
intuition that certain things last longer than others is a
primitive one, logically prior to the creation of clocks or
other systems for conventionalizing measurement.
(v) MOTION.
This has been a lengthy diversion but a vital one in terms of
the metaphysical ground it has covered. I want to return,
now, to some other issues arising out of the sound model as
developed thus far. One important feature which I have in¬
troduced, without giving it detailed attention, is that of
change, transition or motion among the sound objects. I have
used examples of exchanges between objects at different lo¬
cations in the spatial sound sequence. Questions might arise
as to how these transitions actually happen. In real space
objects move through that space by occupying fresh posi¬
tions within it. For two objects to exchange places both ob¬
jects would have to occupy a continuous flow of intermediate
points between their original positions and their final rest¬
ing places. These cannot be just the same routes, because,
as solid objects, the objects cannot inter-penetrate and
pass through each other (if, per impossible, they did, their
separate identities would be threatened) they must follow
routes that diverge at some point in order to by-pass each
other. Having before us this paradigm of motion or exchange
in actual visio-tactual space, we have to decide whether
some parallel form of it has to be found in a sound world for
claims regarding motion amongst its objects to be coherent.
It does not require any deep consideration to realise that
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there is little prospect of articulating an analogous form of
motion for the sound world. The most obvious obstacle stems
from the one-dimensional character of the space concerned.
By definition, there is no second dimension in which sounds
can pass by each other. Also, we have no reason to think
that sounds could pass through each other without similar
logical problems arising as those applying to physical ob¬
jects.
A second problem is that of deciding what motion could actu¬
ally be like for a sound. We can perhaps make sense of it to
a limited extent. We could, for instance, think of a sound
being placed next to a silence - an empty space - and we
could think of that sound moving into that space leaving an
equal space behind it, thus retaining its own size. The ques¬
tion that arises out of this scenario, however, is that of
whether the sound moves in the sense of a fluid motion or
whether it merely "jumps", that is, fails to occupy a range of
intermediate locations between its origin and end-point. This
leads us to the issue of what it would be like for a sound to
"flow" (I assume at present, anyway, that a jump involves no
particular conceptual difficulties). Particularly, what would
it be like to experience such an event? If we focus upon the
example just given, I think there is some sense we can give
to the notion of experiencing a sound moving its spatial lo¬
cations. If we imagine the subject pursuing the familiar pro¬
gression along the line of sound objects and if we assume
that after one such object there is a previously established
sound gap, but that, on this particular occasion, the sub¬
ject, upon reaching the sound, hears it for longer than
usual and then experiences a shorter gap and that, upon re¬
turning along the sequence he does not meet the sound first
as usual, but, rather, the gap lasting its normal length, fol¬
lowed by the sound, then under these circumstances we can
say that the subject has experienced the sound in motion.
What we are imagining is that the sound object is moving as
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the subject, himself in motion, hears it - this explaining the
fact that it is heard for longer. It seems to be possible to
generate some account of how objects might move, to a lim¬
ited extent, in such a sound world. The limitation involved
is that upon objects exchanging places, and this is a direct
consequence of the one-dimensional character of the sound
space. Perhaps this should cause us to challenge the effi¬
cacy of the paradigm of movement that we have been using
here, and examine the alternative model using "jumps" or
"leaps".
In this type of account, objects would just exchange places
in an instantaneous way, without, in any sense, moving
through a whole string of intermediate locations. This would
cover exchanges between objects separated by other sound
objects as well as exchanges between direct neighbours.
Although the former involves "leaping over" stationary ob¬
jects and the latter does not, this really seems to be only a
question of degree: the fact of there being a jump - a sud¬
den unmediated change of position - is what is essential to
both. The question we have to ask is whether such jumps are
conceptually acceptable. If we have before us present con¬
ceptions of how objects move in space, there are bound to be
difficulties about conceiving of what is happening in this
situation. Questions such as "how do these sound-objects
get from one position to another?" spring to mind. Or, "do
these objects go briefly out of existence or disappear into
some other dimension during the transfer?" By itself, de¬
viance from a pattern which may be specific to one form of
space is insufficient ground for criticism. We have to deter¬
mine whether there is some conceptually necessary component
to our familiar form of motion. The greatest area of poten¬
tial difficulty for a theory which posits jumps to explain
motion for its objects is the preservation of identity. The
danger being that, where an object disappears and suppos¬
edly reappears elsewhere a doubt can be raised as to
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whether what reappears is genuinely the same particular as
the one which disappeared. If we remember, one of the cru¬
cial functions of space in relation to re-identification, was
its capacity to provide an answer to the question "how can
this item be one and the same as an item experienced at an
earlier time?" The concept of space allows us to explain how
an item has continued to exist between separated times at
which it was experienced. Space provides a non-subjective
medium for temporal endurance.
Naturally, the suggestion behind all of this is that unbroken
temporal persistence is a sine qua non for identity, that,
for objects experienced on separate occasions to be identi¬
cal, it has to be demonstrated that there is a temporal link
between them; that there cannot be a time between the two
experiences when neither existed. The question, thus, be¬
comes one of whether this criterion is reasonable and, sec¬
ondly, if it is, whether this sound space example falls foul
of it. Given the description of the exchanges in question as
instantaneous jumps, the sound-space form of motion does,
essentially, meet the criterion and consequently, we could
ignore the first part of the question. This said, I think it
worth suggesting that the rule may not be absolutely invari¬
able. On grounds of sheer simplicity or convenience, it might
be preferable to regard certain temporal discontinuities as
not affecting the continued identity of an object. For this
to be acceptable, it might be that a spatial continuity was
necessary for a re-identification to be acceptable. Which
brings us to the second prong of our concept of identity.
For, part of deciding that two separately identified objects
are one and the same, is that there be a spatial as well as
temporal continuity between them. If we cannot demonstrate a
spatial route between the two items, that is an occupation of
intermediate places at all intervening times, then identity
fails. It can be seen that this places more problematic re¬
strictions upon the sound world situation. The one thing
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that has been assumed is some form of spatial jump when an
object moves from one place to another. This could be seen
as defying the spatial requirement for identity, in that we
are unable to trace an object through the various intermedi¬
ate locations between its starting point and its supposed
final destination.
Again, one possible response is to question the complete ap¬
plicability of the spatial criterion at issue. Perhaps the
most rational conclusion, in a situation where an object with
certain qualities is to be found at one location and then
disappears, simultaneous with the appearance of an object
with the exact same qualities at some other location, is that
the two objects are one and the same, and that some form of
transition has occurred. Such a conclusion would be further
reinforced by the above state of affairs being accompanied
by a "move" in the opposite direction by another object cre¬
ating the space for the first object another object to fill
and it filling the space left by the first mentioned object,
an exchange, in other words. Where problems could arise is
where several qualitatively identical objects were involved
in exchanges of position with other objects at the same
time. If a, d, and g are indistinguishable and they simulta¬
neously come to occupy the places of p,s and v, how could a
subject tell which of the former objects had exchanged with
which of the latter? Obviously, confusion of identity is pos¬
sible in our actual space, but this is for practical or con¬
tingent reasons as we may not be able to keep everything
under continual observation, whereas, in the sound space,
the confusion could not be avoided even under ideal circum¬
stances of observation. Are we to take such irresoluble sit¬
uations or the possibility of them as a conclusive argument
against the coherence of the form of motion being proposed
for sound objects? I would submit that there is no particular
reason why we should abandon a concept which operates un¬
equivocally in most situations, but breaks down in a few.
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where the usefulness of the concept, in general, exceeds
that of any alternative.
If our intuitions about identity are strong enough, we can
still say that in situations such as the above there remains
a fact of the matter, identity will hold between the objects
under scrutiny and objects formerly identified in different
locations, it is just that it will be impossible to determine
which individual is identical with which. It is also worth re¬
membering, perhaps, that our notions of identity as applied
to visual space are not entirely free of ambiguity; puzzles
and paradoxes can develop from them (consider the classical
problem of the ship of Theseus as but one example). In gen¬
eral, we should be wary of setting too much store by fea¬
tures of actual space which may be more contingent than
necessary, and of demanding they find counterparts in all
alternative spaces.
If, however, it is felt that the theory of motion for sound
objects as proposed really does put more logical strains
upon the notion of identity for those objects than it can
withstand, then we need to assess how much detriment this
does to the possibility of such sound objects and their
space. Essentially, it is only the theory of motion or transi¬
tion that is under attack; there is no obvious connection
between this and the background theory of the sound space.
Naturally, by the standards of our experience, this is an
anomalous situation, for we have a space where movement, of
any significant kind ( the exchanging of places), is incon¬
ceivable. The fact that objects are, necessarily, static does
not, however, mean that they are not objects, that is, inde¬
pendently existing particulars. It is the ability of the sub¬
ject to move as an observer within such a space which elic¬
its the objective nature of the items he experiences. In
general, though, I incline to the view that sense can be made
of exchanges between objects in a one-dimensional space.
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Naturally, an area to explore and an enrichment of the pre¬
sent model would be the potential in sound experience for
producing a multi-dimensional sound space. This might evade
the difficulties attending the one-dimensional space. I pre¬
fer to delay discussion of this possibility, however, until a
little later, when it can be introduced as a part of a more
complete examination of spaces based on synchronic proper¬
ties. For the moment, I wish to take up two outstanding mat¬
ters relating to the present model. The two are somewhat re¬
lated: one relates to the orientation of the space concerned
- "linear or cyclical?" - the other concerns how we regard
the subject's movement through or across the sound space.
Cvi) LINEAR/CYCLICAL SPACE (THE ISSUE OF VOLITION)
At the very beginning of this chapter I introduced the pos¬
sibility of the sound-space being conceived of on a cyclical
or linear basis. Perhaps, more detail of what is meant here
should now be given. In linear space, any finite sequence of
objects, however long, does not exhaust that space as the
sequence is infinitely extendible in either direction, and
this is so in principle for, there may be large areas of
empty space. Also, no amount of travel along the space in
either direction would bring a subject back to where he
started. A cyclical space, on the other hand, is finite: there
is a limit to the number or size of objects it can contain,
and travel along it in either direction will, eventually, lead
back to the point of origin. These are definitions of the two
types of space, but which of them applies in a situation of
actual experience may be a difficult matter for a subject to
decide upon. This will be especially true in the case of lin¬
ear space. For, how can a subject establish that the space
he experiences is infinite and that no amount of travel will
cause him to repeat his experience? However far one ex-
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plores, it will always be possible to think that just a little
more travel will bring one back to a part of space previously
experienced. In other words, where an experience does not
repeat itself a subject can still not be certain that the
space involved is linear, such certainty can never be
achieved. There is something of an asymmetry between this
and the cyclical space, for there, experience may provide
evidence of its existence. If one pursues a sound sequence
and reaches the point where the sequence repeats, and this
continues to happen and also does so when moving in the re¬
verse direction, then this gives a grounding to the claim
that the space is circular. Of course, it is possible to sug¬
gest that the spaces merely appears to be circular and that,
in fact, the subject is continually experiencing fresh par¬
ticulars exactly the same as those already experienced. This
essentially belongs to the realm of scepticism we are al¬
ready familiar with, rather than of reasonable doubt which
the previous uncertainty for linear space falls under. It
would be gratuitously contorted to reject a cyclical inter¬
pretation of the above type of material. As far as the doubt
that affects linear experience is concerned, it does not
strike at the objective status of the sounds experienced. It
is the fact of a fixed sequence that is important rather than
the infinite/finite nature of that sequence.
As a general point, if there is any anxiety about the notion
of a circular space, I can only point to actual space and
cite the fact that modern physical theories declare it to be
circular (finite but unbounded), in that a straight line pur¬
sued in any direction would return to its origin. If there are
difficulties about the nature of an infinite space, then it is
always open to regard what appears to be linear space as a
suitably large circular space.
A difference between the two








sequence which determines the objectivity of the sounds ex¬
perienced can be apprehended by travel in a single direc¬
tion. Whereas, for a linear space, a reversal of direction
has to be achieved before such a sequence can be discerned.
This brings us directly on to the question of how such mo¬
tion is to be understood. Primarily, there is the issue of
control. It would seem that the subject would have to have
some influence over what he experienced, that he would have
to be able to decide which direction along the sound se¬
quence to move in and, even, whether to move at all. Also (in
a linear space) he would have to have the capacity to stop
and change direction.
In fact, however, none of this needs to be the case. A sub¬
ject could be completely the victim of his experience. The
question of what volition or control actually is, is a fraught
one, philosophically, but insofar as it means anything, we
could assume a subject to have no control or influence over
the way in which he experiences things, and yet, quite legit¬
imately, form from that experience an understanding of ob¬
jective particulars and a space. At the same time, it is vital
that the subject receives the right kind of experience: the
sequence of sounds and, crucially, the repetition of that
sequence have to be presented to experience before the rel¬
evant basis for objectification exists.
What control on the part of the subject might be thought to
have relevance to is the issue of whether it is subject or
object which moves. That is, one might think that, in a world
where the subject is passive in respect of what he experi¬
ences, it is natural for that subject to see himself as
static and objects in space as moving past him. Again, I
think this is unfounded. What is of prime importance is not
whether the subject has agency or not, but broader consid¬
erations of simplicity or conceptual economy. To return to
an example already mentioned from actual experience, even if
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I felt myself to have no efficacy in terms of worldly events,
it would still not be sensible for me to regard myself as
static and the street and all else connected with it as mov¬
ing, in a situation where I walk or "am walked" down the
street.
One area where volition might have a function in spatial
terms is in respect of a possible enrichment of the sound
model which I wish to devote some attention to. Even here,
though, volition is not essential to the possibility in ques¬
tion, but does render it more psychologically palatable. What
I have in mind is a variation upon the one-dimensional model
which allows divergence or "branching". The idea being that
any sound object in an established sequence need not lead
to the sound we currently postulate but could lead to an al¬
ternative sound object which, perhaps, forms part of a sepa¬
rate sequence. For example, at point p in the present se¬
quence a subject might, instead of moving on to q, move to
sound p'and then p"and p"'and so on, pursuing a separate
chain of sounds. Any number of such alternative routes can
be supposed to exist, running from any item in any sequence.
If we follow through the implications of this possibility we
can see what a complexity potentially exists. No longer do
we have a single strand of sounds, but rather a huge network
of such strands, every sound a junction or crossroads for
such sequences. This complexity is, of course, the limiting
factor of the viability of such spaces. Repeated experience,
we have already established, is the key to any objective in¬
terpretation of items within experience. Unless such ad¬
vanced spaces are manageable enough for repetitions to oc¬
cur and patterns to become familiar, a subject will be unable
to make objective sense of them. This should still allow for
a good "measure of complexity (consider our present abilities
to explore and form an objective understanding of our three-
dimensional space with its huge potential for divergence and
branching). Where questions of volition have relevance lies
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in the fact that exploration of complex sound spaces might
be more comprehensible if we assume that the subject has
control over his movements. Also, we can assume that there
is some internal difference of feeling and will involved in
branching in one way rather than another. Much as at a fork
in a path there is a difference in sensation involved in mov¬
ing to the left from that in moving to the right and also the
ability to control which of the two occurs, we can assume
some equivalent to exist for the sound situation. But, al¬
though the possibility of this helps to reinforce the coher¬
ence of the proposed development of the sound model it is
not strictly necessary to it. Even using what we might call
the "passive" account of subject movement, sense can be
made of the model. So long as the subject is moved in such a
way as to experience the requisite repetitions and sense of
order they engender, he can form an objective image of his
experience. It is not essential that a specific sensation ac¬
company particular changes in direction: a route will be
recognised by its content rather than by some related,
quasi-kinaesthetic sensation.
Returning to the model itself and the nature of the branches
which are possible, it is worth noting that two distinct
forms are available. We have mainly suggested the possibil¬
ity of sequences of sounds branching off from sounds lo¬
cated within another sequence and then the same possibility
of branching applying to any one of the sounds within that
branch and so on, possibly ad infinitum. So, that what we
have bears analogy with the branch system of a tree. The al¬
ternative form of divergence, not previously alluded to, is
one which creates a network of sound sequences. The differ¬
ence being that, here, branches can be taken which may lead
back (perhaps by further branching) to different points on
the sequence already departed from. Thus, some kind of
criss-cross pattern, rather than a strictly linear one, is im¬
plied. This naturally, compounds the problems involved in
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comprehending the orderings involved. Here, some genuine
sense of orientation might be required to prevent the system
lapsing into chaos in the subject's mind. It might be neces¬
sary for the subject to have some sense of direction he is
moving in so that he has some equivalent of saying things
like "if I move in a straight line for three sounds and then
turn left for two sounds, then left again for three sounds
and finally left for a further two sounds, then I will be back
where I began". This example suggests an even, symmetrical
grid pattern, but any structure could be imposed, however
eccentric. Also, although it is convenient to outline the
possible situation with a spatial analogy drawn from actual
space, we do not have to assume that all possible sound-
world networks or branch systems could be modelled in three-
dimensional space. We have to remember that we are working
in a different spatial medium and need to restrain ourselves
from thinking of the sound world in visio-spatial terms sub¬
ject to the logic of that form of three-dimensional space.
Connections might be possible between sound objects which
would be incoherent if those objects were conceived of
along visual lines.
The possibility of this kind of diversity is certainly an en¬
richment of the basic model, but one should not be deceived
into thinking that the sound space has been transformed into
a multi-dimensional one or that synchronic relations have
been introduced. Sounds are still experienced singly and
successively and, although there may be multiple strands of
sound-objects they are still one-dimensional in nature. This
latter point is proven by the fact that motion is not signifi¬
cantly altered in such an extended model. Objects still can¬
not "pass by" each other: "jumps" or "leaps" are still re¬
quired. The only fresh development is the possibility of
items in our initial sequence being replaced by items from
intersecting sequences (genuine movement of the sort out¬
lined earlier). For instance, we could imagine our basic a-s
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sequences being intersected at f and p by a circular se¬
quence a'-z', so that f and p are members of both sequences
(note the possibility of combining circular and linear or ap¬
parently linear sequences). We could suppose that f links
with c'and d'and p with m'and n'. If we also assume that
there is a space in the circular sequence between r'and s',
we can imagine the whole chain of objects moving around to
fill that space (displacing it, if you like) such that f be¬
comes replaced by c'and p by m'. This gives our model more
flexibility than previously, but it is still very limited in
terms of its capacity for continuous movement as a means of
exchange between objects. Accordingly, we have reached the
point where we must consider whether synchronic relations
have anything fresh to contribute to this area. This, al¬
though primarily an issue relevant to the sound model before
us, has far reaching implications for alternative forms of
space, in that it should reveal general restrictions and re¬
quirements upon synchronic properties.
<vii) SYNCHRONIC RELATIONS
We have a paradigm of synchronic relations used as a basis
of a spatial system in actual experience. The left/right,
above/below relations of visual or, possibly, tactual experi¬
ence allow us to relate one object to another (one distin¬
guishable colour patch to another). This gives us the fixed
framework of relationships or locations which we should, by
now, recognise as the basis of our individuations and re-
identifications which are integral to an objectification of
sense-items. I have indicated a problem about a fixed and
unvarying experience, to the extent that, where items remain
permanently within a subject's consciousness, there is a
lack of stimulus and evidence for the judgement that those
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items exist independently of that consciousness. So, in ad¬
dition, to the framework of relations between visual items, it
is important that the visual field changes such that certain
items disappear and then re-appear. Thus, a turning of the
head (although this is a loaded description) produces, say,
a disappearance of items at the right hand side of the vi¬
sual field and an emergence of fresh items at the left hand
side of the field. A reversal of the process produces the
reappearance of the disappeared items.
This gives us a working example of synchronic relations op¬
erating as a foundation of an objective spatial scheme, we
have to determine whether any of its essential features are
provided by sound and its properties.
The two forms of synchronically relevant relations are pitch
and loudness. Pitch relates sounds to each other on a "lower
than/higher than" scale of relations; a scale which, within
our experience has limits. Although subdivisions of the
scale cannot be limited in principle, the extremes of the
scale may be laid down by experience, although these do not
necessarily have to be taken as limits set by logic.
Loudness is a relation of intensity rather than of quality.
We can say that it is a linear, non-circular scale which has,
as one to its extremes, silence. The other extreme is harder
to specify, for the same difficulty pertains as applies to
pitch: logically, there may not be a limit to how loud a sound
can be, but within experience there may be levels of sound
louder than which we cannot distinguish. We do not need to
concern ourselves, particularly, with this issue. I assume
that linear space which terminates is a coherent notion.
Historically, this has been treated as problematic: the idea
of a limit or boundary has led to questions about what lies
beyond the supposed limit, thus revealing the idea of a limit
to be incoherent (4). If this continues to prove influential,
then the situations concerned can simply be described as
ones where the subject is incapable of exploring and experi¬
encing more of the scale than he does, or where potential
points on the scale are uninstantiated.
Let us, then, keep the previous synchronic paradigm before
us and consider whether sound properties supply the neces¬
sary framework for object if ication. What we isolated as be¬
ing of importance was a structure or ordering of items which
was reasonably firm and which provided the basis for recog¬
nition or re-identification. Certainly, pitch and loudness
provide orderings for sound items. We could imagine a sub¬
ject confronting a collection of sounds at different pitches
or a collection of sounds at different loudnesses.
Obviously, it is possible for these to occur as a single set,
but, it is necessary to decide whether it is the pitch or the
loudness ordering that is of significance, as I shall explain
shortly. Also, we have to say that a collection of sounds
must be at different pitches for a collection to be said to
exist, because sounds at the same pitch would simply merge
and be heard as one. Similarly, it will be necessary for
sounds at different loudnesses to be at different pitches
because if, for the sake of argument, there are two sounds
at separate levels of loudness, yet at the same pitch, then
they will be heard as one and their loudnesses will simply
combine adding their respective intensities together. This
caveat aside, we can posit a subject experiencing sounds
and being aware of a scaled ordering amongst those sounds
of either a pitch or loudness type. This would seem satis¬
factorily similar to the visual situation. What we added to
that arrangement was change: a shift in what was experi¬
enced, plus repetition. Taking pitch we could imagine the
basic experience changing such that the subject "moved" up
the scale, as originally heard. This could then be reversed,
bringing the subject "back to" the original experience and
the notes which had disappeared. A similar situation could
be envisaged for loudness; there would, however, be the
•aforementioned requirement that all the sounds be or differ¬
ent pitches. A range of loudness could be established, and a
subject could progress across these and return in the ap¬
propriate way. Given the potential for infinite gradation in
either scale and the specification of only a finite number of
sounds, there would be gaps Ln the spaces resulting from ei¬
ther sequence. In fact, to assume otherwise in the case of
pitch would create other problems. A subject presented with
the total range of pitches might find it impossible to dis¬
tinguish the individual sounds which are to form the basis
of objects. On the other hand, even if a total block of sound
is experienced, but still only a segment of the entire scale
of sound, so that sound disappears at the lower end of the
scale and appears at the higher end and vice versa, then it
would be possible for the subject to think of space as filled
by some species of continuous object.
On the face of it, pitch and loudness provide the structure
necessary for a spatial system. Items can be identified and
re-identified, and an underlying notion of location is engen¬
dered. All of which does lend strong credibility to spatial
claims for these two synchronic properties. There are, un¬
fortunately, areas of concern, though they may not amount to
a total refutation of the spatial claim involved.
The problems arise if we try to contemplate movement or ex¬
change for the pitch or loudness objects we have proposed.
What becomes immediately apparent is that, by contrast with
our diachronic model, we cannot conceive of sounds occupy¬
ing fresh locations in the spatial scheme or sequence. This
is because the spaces involved have been defined in terms
of pitch or loudness scales, and so the locations they com¬
prise have a specific character and cannot be neutral in re¬
spect of their objective content. Simply, we cannot think of
a sound of a given pitch or loudness moving into the place
of a higher pitch or loudness; to do so would contradict the
whole essence of the scale or space. The capacities of such
spaces have not been defined by a simple "next to " kind of
relation but by a "higher than./"louder than..." form of re¬
lation. A lower note occupying the place of a higher note in
the scale is a contradiction of the essence of the spatial
scale in question. This may seem confusing to the extent
that one can quite easily imagine two notes in the scale ex¬
changing places, in that, as the subject moves along the
scale, he encounters a higher note in the place of a lower
one and vice versa. This is acceptable to the extent that we
have spoken of the subject encountering one segment of the
scale at a time so that, here, a higher note could be heard
as part of a lower segment, and then, as the subject moves,
the missing lower note could be heard with notes forming a
higher segment of the scale. A little reflection should cause
us to see that this does not represent a genuine exchange
or transposition. We have to resist the temptation to revert
to a diachronic understanding of the sequence involved
here; the ordering at issue is not a contingent one, devel¬
oped from external relations between objects unrelated to
their content. For pitch and loudness, it is the inner nature
of the properties involved which creates the sequence.
Sounds cannot be slotted into the sequences concerned, ir¬
respective of their content. If we consider the case of a
subject experiencing a segment of the scale and we suppose
he hears five sounds, 'a, b, c, d, e' which are either a scale
of rising pitches or of loudnesses and then we suppose, c
disappears and the higher sound h joins the group, the sub¬
ject does not have any reason to locate h between b and d.
Why should he? Sound h is higher than any of the other
sounds heard, and accordingly, cannot be forced onto the
existing scale. The only consistent conclusion a subject
could draw in this situation would be that somehow his audi¬
tory field had been widened to extend to h and f ana g had
disappeared. If, however, he "moved on" and a and b disap¬
peared and f and g appeared, the whole coherence of the
subject's sound experience as forming a space would be un¬
der threat. Moving further and encountering c would not im¬
prove matters because its lower pitch or loudness value
would debar it from occupying the place of h between g and
i, and so the concept of an exchange between c and h would
gain no purchase.
We realise, then, that there is a significant difference be¬
tween spaces based on these properties of pitch and loud¬
ness and others we have considered. The difference being
that movement or exchange for the objects which such spaces
comprise is inconceivable. The only possibility for change
lies in the substitution of an item at a specific location for
one at the same point but with a different loudness - in a
pitch based space. There is an additional complication for
loudness-based spaces, mentioned earlier: if the substituted
sound has the same pitch as the neighbour of that substi¬
tuted for then the sound will merge and produce a combined
loudness which will locate them at a different point on the
scale. It might be that the subject could deduce what had
happened here, and then realise that he was, in fact, expe¬
riencing two separate objects "side by side" but it certainly
produces a complication. The requirement for the variation
in either pitch or loudness for a substitution is that, with¬
out it, there would be no reason to suppose that one sound
object had disappeared and another had appeared in its
place. The exception to this is if a time lag occurred such
that a sound disappeared for some perceptible period, and
another replaced it. Even here, though, it is possible to
claim that the second instance was simply the return of the
first sound - a form of debate we have considered earlier.
In general, we can see that the space we can generate purely
from the synchronic relations sounds are capable of is
severely restricted by the standards of the previous, di-
achronicaily constructed sound space; not to mention our
own visual, synchronic space. I do not: think that this is
tantamount to a dismissal of such a synchronic sound space,
however. Basic requirements are met with: there are grounds
tor a subject to base an objective interpretation upon.
Still, one might worry over the fact that visual synchronic
relations produce such a rich and changeable form of space,
and sound relations of the same type do not. The solution to
this puzzle lies in the fact that there is a crucial differ¬
ence in form between the two sets of relations. Both hold
synchronicaily, but the sound relations of pitch and loud¬
ness are essentially internal relations and those of visual
orientation are external. Pitch and loudness exhaust the na¬
ture of a given sound in a way that "to the left of..." etc. do
not for colours. A visual object can come to have completely
different relations with fellow objects and remain the same,
as an object. If a sound changes its pitch or loudness rela¬
tions with other sounds it, quite simply, becomes a different
sound. I am not denying that there is a loose sense in which
we can say that a sound is the same sound even though it
changes its pitch our loudness (usually where there is a
continuous change in these) but this is not the same sense
as that in which a visual object remains the same object
when it moves through space and establishes different rela¬
tions with other objects. This is an important division to
make among synchronic properties regardless of its scholas¬
tic overtones. Although we can form no idea of perceptual
qualities other than those we are familiar with, the possibil¬
ity of them is entirely coherent and we can, at least, expect
them to appear with synchronic property relations which will
fall under one or other of the two types mentioned here, with
the divergent potential for more or less complete spatial
schemes these types have been shown to have.
Before closing discussion of synchronic relations com¬
pletely, it is worth mentioning the copic of synchronic rela¬
tions combining with diachronic ones in some spatial way.
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Specifically, it might be fruitful to consider whether any im¬
portant contribution could be made to our diachromcaliy
constructed sound space by development of its synchronic
potential as provided by pitch and loudness.
The most promising outcome one could look for is one where
the pitch or loudness qualities of sound added a fresh di¬
mension to the essentially one-dimensional sound world. So
that, as well as the diachronic axis of "before" and "after"
or "next to" there would be a synchronic axis of "higher
than" or "louder than". This would mean that for points on
the sound sequence where, currently, there are single
sounds (only one sound experienced at a time) there would
be several sounds, spatially related to each other as a con¬
sequence of their pitch or loudness properties. Ideally, this
adds a kind of depth to our sound space, its two- dimension¬
ality would provide the facility for a more sophisticated
form of movement than the one we have fashioned from the
resources of the sound model so far. Specifically, it might
be possible to give an account of objects in the sound se¬
quence "passing by" each other in a continuous sense, not
the current jerky, "leap" based one. This is because the
possibility of objects existing side by side has been opened
up. We have already given an account of what it would be
like to experience sound objects in motion: essentially,
when they are moving in the same direction as the observer,
they would last for longer in his experience and, when mov¬
ing in the opposite direction, for a shorter time. In this
changed situation, there would be the added feature of hear¬
ing the sound objects move into new relationships with other
such objects. There would be a kind of "overlap" phenomenon.
Thus, we could have a scenario where our familiar a-o se¬
quence had running parallel to it an a'-s' sequence, and a
a"-s" sequence, and an a"'-s"' sequence. So that, the sub¬
ject, as he moves along the sequence, at each point where we
previously supposed that he met a single sound from the a-z
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series, now meets two additional sounds of the same duration
or spatial dimensions, let us suppose, for simplicity. In a
situation where one of the sound objects changes its posi¬
tion in the auditory space, that sound will move out of its
synchronization with its two associated sounds and start to-
be heard along with one of the adjacent groups of sounds in
the sequence. The sound may end up being in phase with the
new group of sounds, but it need not be. As it is, if the
transition is to be the fluent one we are interested in,
there must be a period when the sound is heard unsynchro-
nized with either the grouping it separated from or the
grouping it joins (that is if we are assuming that the move¬
ment is witnessed by the subject at all, for transitions
might well occur outside of his experience;. The finer de¬
tails of this arrangement should be easy enough to imagine.
Introducing the other qualitative aspects of sound, pitch
and loudness, seems to have very productive consequences
for our basic model: its rudimentary facility for movement is
greatly enhanced. Certainly, the account just given seems
unobjectionable, but the question that must be asked is
whether its formulation is made possible exclusively because
of the properties of pitch and loudness. We spoke of expect¬
ing the fact that pitch and loudness can form spatial axes
to compose a second dimension for the original sound world;
we need to consider now whether this is what actually has
been achieved. Our assumption was that the sounds a', a",
etc. which were added to the basic a-z sequence would be
ranged along either a pitch or loudness scale ana, as such,
would form a short spatial dimension of the sort we have out¬
lined for these types of synchronic properties. We immedi¬
ately see that there are difficulties with this view. One is
the fact that the dimension added is merely a fragment: are
we to suppose that it is continued into an empty space?
Also, the subject does not traverse this dimension; he does
not seem to be able to move in the new direction, which is
supposedly, provided by the pitch ana loudness scale the
new sounds create. Without exploring these issues, however,
there is a separate conclusive objection to the proposal we
are considering; this is that pitch and loudness per se are
redundant as far as establishing a mode of transition is
concerned. We do not need to specify groups of sounds or¬
dered along pitch or loudness axes. Ail we need are groups
of sounds. It is true that pitch differences will, in general,
be necessary in order for the groups of sounds to be heard
as such - although on specific occasions we may have sounds
of the same pitch together, indistinguishable at that point
in the sound space, but with separate histories in the sound
space. These pitch differences will not be important in them¬
selves, however, they are merely a necessary condition for
the existence of groups of sounds, the members of which can
be individually identified.
In total, then, the point we have reached is a satisfactory
one in that we have been able to further enrich our sound
model, thereby rendering it more plausible as a valid alter¬
native space or conceptual scheme from the one actual expe¬
rience engenders. That, in the final analysis, this was not
brought about by the marriage of diachronic with synchronic
relations between sounds with synchronic ones is a disap¬
pointment, in that it leaves open the question of whether
this could occur in other experiential circumstances. Mo
formal possibility of such a union has been established. At
the same time, we cannot take the failure in this situation
as establishing the impossibility of such a combination
where other experiential situations are concerned - though
it must lend some weight to such a claim. This issue may
seem significant later on when we come to consider the com¬
bination of material from different sense categories into a
unified view of space or set of objective commitments.
Cviii) STRAWSON AND BENNETT.
We have reached the point where our attempts to fashion the
foundations of a viable alternative to the visio-tactual
space we standardly take ourselves to inhabit have reached
a reasonably mature stage. We have a model of an experience
shaped from sound items which embodies features permitting
certain objective and spatial interpretations. The kinds of
judgements and concepts which are applicable are, in
essence, those we are familiar with in our own space. There
are differences, of course, but these are not sufficiently
major to endanger this formal resemblance. I mentioned, at
the beginning of this chapter, otrawson's version of a sound
space in his book INDIVIDUALS (5; and his appeal tor toler¬
ance concerning its limitations and discrepancies in rela¬
tion to actual space. I have already made a similar appeal,
out I should like to mention at this point a basic divergence
between the model I have developed and the one favoured by
Strawson; one which leaves Strawson's version mere vulnera¬
ble to this particular Line of criticism. Strawson's model ex¬
ploits a device wnich is referred to as the "Master Sound".
This is a sound analogue of space itself. Roughly, it in¬
volves a continuously present sound having varying pitches
so that a subject can move up and down the pitch scale of
the sound in an unbroken fashion. Alongside this master
sound at various of its pitch "locations" are groups of
sounds, which, for Strawson, serve as sound objects. Their
status as re-identifiable particulars derives from their be¬
ing linked to the master sound in a determinate re-experi-
enceable way. Thus the master sound becomes the space in
which sound particulars ("complexes" in Strawson's model)
are "housed". This differs from the model I have favoured, m
that, Strawson's model gives a peculiar status to a subset
of sounds in the sound world and of the total sound experi¬
ence of the subject. In the Strawsonian situation there are,
in effect, sounds wnich are objects and sounds which are
space or points of space. The world I nave developed only
has sounds which are objects. For me, space exists - as it
must in any genuinely objective experience - to house the
sound objects, not as itself a kind of sound but, rather, as
an abstraction or inference from sounds, and from the pre¬
sumption of their being objects. I tried to show how there is
an almost dialectical relationship between objects and
space. The two concepts emerge intrinsically linked: part of
forming an idea of one is forming an idea of the other. The
significance of this difference is in the affinity it repre¬
sents between my model and actual space. Space, in our vi-
sio-tactual experience, is of a different metaphysical or
categorical type to physical objects. We do not see or feel
space; it is what objects exist in, it is entailed by objects
but is not reducible to them.
If Strawson's model were really an analogue of space in this
respect, the fairest visual image would be one where there
was a continuous background, against which ail objects were
set, varying through all the colours of the spectrum. In
other words, space would be coloured in just the same way
that objects are. Obviously, the master sound does not mir¬
ror some kind of "master-image" of this sort. This forms a
criticism of Strawson's model from the point of view of par¬
ity with actual spatial experience. It is a separate question
whether it forms a criticism of the model as a viable repre¬
sentation of some possible spatial scheme. Strawson is not
terribly concerned about this issue in that his purpose in
developing the model is largely heuristic, representing, as
it does, a valuable technique for uncovering the essential
objective features of actual space through the attempt to
map them onto a different realm of sense experience.
However, I should like to mention some possible objections
to the model as a genuine spatial competitor to actual
space.
There are difficulties stemming from the fact that space and
objects in space are supposed to be of the same character.
The obvious problem is that of the spatial background, the
master .sound, merging with the sound particulars where these
particulars are of the same pitch as the master sound at one
of its points. I do not think this is an insuperable problem
for the model, however, though some explication is required.
One area where these difficulties would arise is in cases of
motion, which Strawson does not give any account of, his
sound world being totally static from the point of view of
objects or complexes changing position. Something else not
entered into is the nature of the space envisaged, specifi¬
cally, the question of whether it is finite or infinite.
Obviously, in our experience, the range of pitc.nes we can
hear is delimited. If such a thing were supposed for
Strawso.n's master-sound, the sound space it creates wouid
be finite. There might be problems here of a type similar to
those encountered if we attempt to imagine actual space as
delimited, namely that it is always conceivable that the
space extends beyond the last experienced point. In this
case, it might be that the subject did not experience an¬
other gradation of the master sound after a certain point
but he could not be certain that this was because space had
come to an end at that point, rather than that for some con¬
tingent reason he could not "move" beyond it. Perhaps, it
would be less problematic to opt for an infinite range of
pitches, accompanied, possibly, by a supposition that the
subject could experience them all (in principle; time would
rule it out in practice). These, as I have said, are all diffi¬
culties for the sound model under consideration but not
clear invalidations of it. The final argument I want to men¬
tion seems to me to be more threatening.
Because there are no qualitative or phenomenological differ¬
ences between space and objects, in the Strawson sound
model, potential exists for a reduction of the two to the
I
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same metaphysical level. That is, the radical difference in
status between the sounds which make up the master-sound
i.e. what the subject hears at any given moment and the
sounds which are the sound objects, might break down, such
that the sounds of the master sound become taken as sound
objects themselves. If we consider that the Strawsonian
model involves the subject in question serially experiencing
both sounds at increasing or decreasing pitches and also,
simultaneous with some of these sounds, hearing sounds or
groups of sounds not necessarily related pitch-wise to pre¬
viously heard sounds, we can see that there is greater par¬
ity with my sound model than might initially be supposed.
This has an obvious tendency to erode any distinction be¬
tween the two models. Other than the pitch ordering which
exists between some of the sounds heard by the subject,
there is no essential difference between the two proposed
sound experiences. The subject at any point in time is hear¬
ing a group of sounds one of which is a pitch poinc of the
master-sound, so called. If the subject is able to generate
an objective understanding of all the non-master-sound items
according to the principles we have already explored, then
there seems to be nothing to prevent him from including in¬
stances of the master sound in the process also. If this did
occur, then the master sound would become a succession of
sound objects in a sound space rather than sound space it¬
self. Space would be the imperceptible abstraction we have
already described.
This kind of degeneration of the Strawsonian model is a real
possibility. It is really only the presence of an ordered se¬
quence amongst the sounds which compose the master sound
that provides any possible distinction upon which to base
the interpretation Strawson favours. Whether this distinc¬
tion provides grounds for such an interpretation seems, at
least, doubtful, but I shall not pursue the issue further in
view of the fact that, even if it is a genuine variant of mv
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sound world, it is less satisfactory as a sound parallel of
actual space for the reasons I have given.
Bennett in Chapter Three of his book KANT'S ANALYTIC (6)
identifies some of the weaknesses of Strawson's approach
and prefers a model sound space closer to my own. He does
not, however, see the potential for incoherence in
Strawson's model and regards the master-sound more as un¬
necessary than as a positive distortion of spatial dictates.
This is in keeping with Bennett's tendency to underplay the
truly metaphysical character of notions such as space and
object. He speaks of the language of space and objectivity
as a form of "abbreviation" (5.14 A Theory of Concept
Utility) drawing upon ideas developed by Quine in TWO DOGMAS
OF EMPIRICISM (7). Simple objective statements, he observes,
can contain the same information as subjective reports of
experience many times their length.
Without wishing to deny this, I think such a view does not go
far enough. The transition from pure reports of experience
to objective claims is more than just one of linguistic econ¬
omy. Terms like "space" and "object" are not simply pieces of
shorthand, they introduce a new and distinct kind of thing. A
real conceptual leap is involved in placing the ephemeral
particulars of experience under an objective interpretation.
Consequently, I find Bennett's approach unacceptably reduc¬
tionist.
One further quibble I would have with Bennett's, otherwise
sound, proposals relates to his view that some kind of
"speed limit" would need to operate for the rate of change in
the sound world. This smacks uncomfortably of importing con¬
tingent laws of movement from our world into the hypotheti¬
cal sound world. Additionally, Bennett is, rightly, concerned
that his sound model does not degenerate into chaos. The
"speed limit" notion, however, blurs conceptual requirements
with psychological ones. It may be that, for certain sub¬
jects, rapid re-locations of sensory items proves confusing,
but there are no logical objections to this per se and we
can easily suppose subjects with enhanced intellectual ca¬
pabilities. What is necessary is a certain level of stability
within what the subject experiences. He needs a sufficient
degree of repetition within his experience to build up the
re-identifications which introduce the concepts of space and
object.
(ix) "EMBODIMENT" IN A SOUND WORLD.
One topic Strawson does discuss in connection with his
sound model is that of whether his subject is embodied,
whether, that is, the sound model is capable of providing a
body for the subject. Strawson gives a sketch of how this
might be achieved in his model. I wish to give some brief at¬
tention to this question in terms of the sound world I have
been developing in this chapter. The topic of embodied per¬
ception in more general terms is one I shall be exploring in
the next chapter, in particular, the question of whether em¬
bodiment is a necessary condition of being an observer or
percipient. For the moment, I shall confine myself to the is¬
sue of how an observer (auditory) might be embodied in a
sound-space. Strawson talks of there being a sound which is
constantly heard wherever the subject is in the sound space
- at whichever point along the master-sound the subject is.
That there is some item constantly present to awareness is
possibly a necessary feature of embodied perception (though
this is open to debate), but I am not sure that it is a suffi¬
cient feature. For the key question is, what is it that
causes the subject to regard this omnipresent item as his
body rather than some object that simply moves with his
viewpoint? This may seem like cavilling, but it is the case
that, in actual experience, there are other factors which
cause us to identify one object among the many we are aware
of as being our body.
Two considerations which immediately come to mind if we re¬
flect upon our relationship with the object or part of the
world we call our own body are agency and causality. We have
a sense of direct control over our bodies: control over ob¬
jects is always mediated by control over our bodies, our
ability to affect things in the world is dependent upon our
ability to affect those parts of the world we call our bod¬
ies. Moving to the passive side of the relationship; as well
as our ability to act, we are aware of being acted upon. In
perceptual terms, we know that our bodies are directly re¬
sponsible for 'what we experience. It is because of impinge¬
ments upon or changes within our bodies that we have the
experiences we do and have an awareness of the world at all.
Clearly, in saying these things the whole controversial area
of causality is implicated. In speaking of agency, a certain
notion of power may be suggested which may be offensive to
those who reject the idea of natural necessity and favour
some kind of "constant conjunction" version of causal con¬
nections. The fact that some species of desire inevitably
leads to changes in parts of the world - our bodies - does
not have to be taken as proof t.nat some form of necessity
rather than simple regular con junction is at work. Similarly,
where we are "acted upon" the same qualification can apply.
Accordingly, I would prefer to use a weak version of causal
connection for the causal issue involved in the question of
embodiment. Having said this, a problem arises if we recon¬
sider the formulation I gave of the relevance of causality to
the issue of embodiment. I suggested that the constant pres¬
ence of one item to a subject's awareness was insufficient
to entail that that item be the subject's body in the sense
we normally mean. The idea being that there had to be some¬
thing to distinguish a situation of coincidence from that of
causal agency. Clearly, if we accept a constant conjunction
reading of causality then the distinction just mentioned
seems to dissolve. This, however, is not the case: even sup¬
posing causal connection to be purely constant conjunction,
we can draw a distinction between a case of coincidence and
that of agency in the situation we are talking about.
One notable feature of the situation presented by Strawson
is that what constant conjunction there is between the sub¬
ject's point of awareness or observation point and a given
item of awareness - one of the group he is aware of at any
time. What is missing is a regular connection between the
privileged item and some mental state on the part of the
subject. In other words, some sense of real control over the
item is lacking for the subject. Introducing an accompanying
state of will does something to remedy this situation, but
what we have is still a pale shadow of our actual experi¬
ence. The reason being that we have a much richer set of
possibilities of control where our human bodies are con¬
cerned: we are not just able to move them through space as
single undifferentiated items, we can cause a whole range of
changes within that object which we call our body. This pos¬
sibility is missing where our sound objects are concerned
because they are metaphysical simples; they do not admit of
differentiation and, consequently, cannot be the subject of
internal re-arrangement. This means that there is less scope
for the kinds of relationship between the subject and "his"
body than under actual experience. This, inevitably, has the
consequence that the subject has a more tenuous link with
the item supposed to be his body, from the point of view of
his agency, than we are used to. On the other side of the
causal link, there is a comparable problem for evidence of
the importance of the favoured item for the perception the
subject has of his sound world. Because of the greater com¬
plexity of our world, in general, and of our bodies, in par¬
ticular, there is a more obvious connection between our bod-
ies or parts of them and our sensory experience. What is
particularly crucial is the fact that we know that certain
influences upon our bodies prevent us from having certain
perceptions which otherwise we would have had. Obstructions
to the eyes and ears, for instance, cause accompanying
losses of sight or sound experience. Because we have more
than one sense modality, we are able to monitor such
changes. Although the sense affected will not be providing
information about what is happening in the world and that
part of it which is meant to be the body, other senses may
be recording the presence of outside interference upon the
relevant areas of the body. We may feel the blindfold which
covers our eyes, for example. Also, without relying on an¬
other sense it is possible by inferential means to be aware
of some outside action upon a specific part of the body.
Where sight is concerned, we may see an object moving di¬
rectly towards the eye before we experience the loss of vi¬
sual awareness.
Comparable richness is not available where our sound world
is concerned. There is a problem of differentiation. Sound
objects do not break down into parts which can be identified
as having an intimate causal connection with sense experi¬
ence. Sense-organs cannot be identified. In general, there is
no way in which the actual sound object put forward as being
the subject's body can be acted upon by other objects. The
only way in which sound objects come into contact with each
other is via sequential or simultaneous existence. There is
no way in which they can enter into any other kinds of rela¬
tionships; the space does not have the conceptual resources
for us to articulate ideas such as sound objects moving
closer to each other or coming into some quasi-physical con¬
tact. The relationships between objects are all identical in
form. We are not able to describe a special kind of en¬
counter between the sound object which is putatively our
body and any other object in the sound world which precedes
a loss of sensory experience.
If we abandon such an attempt and merely try to construct
the situation with the available sound world relationships,
then there are other problems. We could suppose that, when
the permanently present sound object encountered some spe¬
cific other object - an object of a certain pitch or loudness
or located at a certain place in the sound space - percep¬
tion ceased. The trouble with this, however, is that if the
entry of this said object causes a blackout of sensation
then how is the subject to become aware of the existence of
this object? He has no other senses to fall back upon for in¬
formation. Also, there seems to be no inferential mechanism
available to indicate the presence and character of such an
object. And, setting this aside, even if the subject could
become aware of the certain sound particular or type of
sound object which caused a deafness in him for the dura¬
tion of its presence, this would still not provide any evi¬
dence that the object put forward as being his body was so
or that it had a causal role in his perception, in other
words. The only object it would confer agency upon would be
the unusual one. No connection is established between such
an object and the permanently present object.
It seems difficult, therefore, to maintain that a subject
could be embodied in any usual sense in such a sound world.
This conclusion may, however, raise a new spectre for the
sound world we have so painstakingly constructed - the con¬
tentious notion of disembodied perception. There are those
for whom (8) the idea of sensory experience of an external
world without the experient being a bodily part of that world
is incoherent. Having been led to the conclusion that our
sound world involves such a mode of experience, we must de¬
cide whether that renders our whole world unacceptable and
functions as a 'reductio' proof against the possibility we
were proposing. I do not believe that this is the case and
the fact that we have been able to describe our sound world
as successfully as we have should do much to support this. I
shall, however, give some consideration to this question in a
more general way in the next chapter.
(1) P.F. Strawson, INDIVIDUALS Methuen, London. 1959.
Chapter 3.
(2) J. Bennett, KANT'S ANALYTIC, C.U.P., London. 1966
Chapter 3.
(3) J. Locke, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
Ed. Woozley, Fontana 1964, esp. Bk. 2. Chapter
VIII.
(4) See E.G. Kant's development of this argument in
the 'First Antinomy' of 'The Transcendental
Dialectic' - CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON N. Kemp
Smith, MacMillan I9'76, P. 396
(5) IBID
(6) IBID
(7) W.V.O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' in FROM A
LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW H.U.P. 1953.
(8) See Eg. T. Penelhum, SURVIVAL AND DISEMBODIED
EXISTENCE. R.K.P. London. 1970, esp. Chapter. 2.
CHAPTER THREE
VISUAL WORLDS
In the previous chapter, we have considered ways in which
familiar sensory material might occur such as to produce un¬
familiar spatial schemes. In the process of restructuring
such sense-experience, we have been able to formulate some
metaphysical prerequisites for something to count as an ob¬
ject or a space. The raw material of this speculative analy¬
sis has been drawn from the non-visual senses. There were
several reasons for this: the content of these senses is
structurally simpler and, thus, more manageable for the kind
of fundamental exploration involved. Also, these senses are
much less wedded to our actual world than visual sense and
the process of imagination .involved in restructuring them in
terms of alternative 'worlds is, consequently, easier. Having,
I hope, laid a foundation using these senses, it is neces¬
sary to turn to the sense most of us are dominated by, vi¬
sion.
In Chapter One we have already directed a good deal of at¬
tention to the phenomenology of this sense and this is,
again, relevant here. Essentially, we extracted colours and
shapes or coloured shapes from normal experience as its vi¬
tal phenomenological elements. We further distinguished the
properties of hue, saturation and brightness as features of
colour. In forming this analysis we were isolating elements
of vision which were objectively neutral. There are, however,
some other aspects of seeing which deserve mention here and
mainly because some of them might be contenders for addi¬
tional phenomenological features of the visual.
Before going any further, though, it is important to indicate
the strategy I intend to pursue in this chapter. Essentially,
I shall examine the visual and its capacity to ground objec¬
tive constructions via speculative models developed out of
two-dimensional visual material. Ultimately, this will feed
into a description of the essential features of a three- di¬
mensional space. This methodology may be slightly contro¬
versial to the extent that it might be felt that a three-di¬
mensional space can only be grounded in some kind of inher¬
ently three-dimensional visual imagery. This is a claim I re¬
ject. Even if it is possible to have genuinely distinct 3-d
images in the sense of having stereoscopic fusions of
binocularly obtained images, it cannot be suggested that a
2-d, monocular experience yields an inferior or radically
different understanding of three-dimensional space. Those
unfortunate enough to lack sight in one eye do not thereby
belong to a different visual world, even though their visual
experience may have changed in some significant way.
In other words, it is a premise of the analysis I shall de¬
velop in this Chapter that it is possible to build up in un¬
derstanding of three-dimensional space and its occupants
from the kinds of images monocular seeing produces. Such an
understanding being equivalent to that arising from binocu¬
lar seeing (or polynolcular seeing in general, for that mat¬
ter). That there are stereoscopic images formed from the fu¬
sion of the differing "flat" images enjoyed by the use of
separate eyes does not mean that there is not a strong rela¬
tionship between the two types of images. The stereoscopic
image does not, strictly speaking possess any experiential
content that is not contained in the monocular images it
draws upon. The crucial extra element consists in the fact
that the separate images are related to each other. They are
united around the notion of a 3-D object; a single spatial
occupant of which they represent different aspects. It is
only because a conjecture has been made about the nature of
what is being presented that the fusion takes place. Let us,
however, pursue the idea that there is some genuine addi¬
tional phenomenological content to stereoscopic images (or
even monoscopic ones) beyond the colour and shape we have
already isolated, in a little more detail. For convenience, I
shall loosely speak o£ the images obtained from monocular
seeing as "2-d" and those derived from the use of two (or po¬
tentially more) eyes as "3-d" images.
One appealing way of explaining what is involved here would
be to talk in terms of the presence or absence of "depth"
according to whether an image is 2-d or 3-d. In a 3-d image
one is said to be aware of the depth dimension that objects
in our kind of space actually have; we have a perception of
the thickness of things or how far back they go.
Unfortunately, an obvious reply to this is that in a 2-d im¬
age we have an awareness of depth also. We do not just see
surfaces perpendicular to the eye. In looking at a scene
with one eye we see lines of surfaces running away from us,
as well as those actually flat to the line of vision. More to
the point, as well as seeing such recessive planes, we un¬
derstand them for what they are; we are able to "read" our 2-
d image in terms of a 3-d space. This capacity is standardly
said to arise from our sophisticated use of collateral infor¬
mation. Our interpretation is meant to depend upon the pres¬
ence of such features as shading and changes of hue as well
as upon our general familiarity with the objects which come
to fill our visual field. In other words, background knowl¬
edge or empiricism is cited as the source of our ability to
use the images provided by one eye for information of a
three-dimensional kind.
We should remember, however, that it is not difficult to con¬
struct situations where a person with stereoscopic vision is
deceived as to the depth of what he sees. Which brings us to
an important point: the underlying idea behind the distinc¬
tion we draw between 2-d and 3-d seeing is, I believe, that
of direct and indirect awareness of depth or three-dimen¬
sionality. The suggestion is that a 3-d image is inherently
or immediately informative of depth, whereas a 2-d image is
only derivatively so. Expressed in genetic terms, a sub¬
ject's first binocular view of anything in worldly space
would bring with it an awareness of the depth or three-di¬
mensionality of that thing; a 2-d image would not. An aware¬
ness of the depth aspect of our form of space for a subject
with 2-d vision would have to be built up from an interaction
with the space consisting of accumulating different perspec¬
tives of it - that is of things in it. This is a bold claim and
we must remember that even as seasoned binocular experients
of our space, we are capable of malting mistakes concerning
the three-dimensional qualities of items in it. Before we
subject this to scrutiny, I think it is worth adducing a fur¬
ther notion which might be a candidate for what is distinc¬
tive of 3-d seeing. This is the idea of a viewpoint or the
idea that in stereoscopic seeing we, as viewers, become part
of, or feel ourselves in some way incorporated into the
scene or the space we observe. A 3-d image is meant to im¬
ply, in some strong, conceptual sense, a viewpoint within the
space it is an image of. Thus, in looking at, say, a tree not
only am I aware of the tree and its dimensions and, perhaps,
also, its three-dimensional spatial relations with other ob¬
jects, I am also aware of observing it from a certain point in
that spatial framework. A physical explanation of what is in¬
tended to be an experiential, conceptual fact might be of¬
fered in terms of the triangulation effect obtained by look¬
ing at something with two eyes slightly apart. We have to be
cautious here, though, and it may be useful to consider why
the use of two eyes should produce the kinds of effects it
appears to do.
Essentially, seeing with two eyes produces two retinal im¬
ages . These images may be quite different or hardly differ¬
ent at all, depending on the distance between the viewer and
the objects viewed and upon the size of the objects viewed.
The retinal images for each eye of an apple two feet away
will be significantly different; those of an apple one hun-
dreci feet awav will not be. (Though the degree to which we
are sensitive to the effect of parallax even at such dis¬
tances is quite astonishing, see Mundle: PERCEPTION, FACTS,
AND THEORIES. CI),) Consequently, we should be obtaining
more information from objects closer up than further away
(unless they are especially large: a skyscraper looks much
the same from two feet away with either eye, though some
small feature on the side of it would not - a case of what we
choose to call our object). Presumably it is at this level
where the full-blooded 3-d image should occur. Yet what in¬
formation could such close-up binocular encounters reveal?
We have two differing images of one object. Somehow, these
images have to be harmonised into images of one object. We,
of course, think of them as "aspects" of a single thing, but
this does not explicate anything by itself: we need to ask
what kind of aspects are involved. The two images might be
linked edge to edge in a two dimensional way - in a situation
where we were seeing only half of the thing with each eye.
However, what we are looking for here is a three-dimensional
kind of aspect, one which exploits the depth dimension to
express how distinct images can be images of the same thing.
Take the example of looking at a book standing upright on
the table in front of one, such that the spine is directly in
front of one eye, the cover as well as the spine being visi¬
ble to the other. Considering each image by itself, one would
have no particular grounds for thinking them other than im¬
ages of two-dimensional items, but, combined, this interpre¬
tation is not possible: both eyes would receive the same im¬
age if the object were truly flat. Taking the image of the
spine and also the cover in conjunction with the other image
of the spine only, it is solely by regarding the cover as ex¬
tending away from the spine and the viewer, in the depth di¬
mension that sense can be made of the two images as images
of one object.
This would seem to carry us right hack to the claim we were
considering earlier that a single binocular glance is suffi¬
cient to conjure up the three-dimensional character of an
object and, by implication, the nature of the space it exists
in. This, I would suggest, does not automatically follow.
What gives pause for thought is the question of whether a
single, definitive 3-d interpretation is dictated by the kind
of binocular encounter we have described. The best way of
approaching this is via consideration of certain alternative
orientations in the visual confrontation. Imagine, particu¬
larly, that the same book is involved, but that the eyes are
further apart, so that the eye which sees the cover and the
spine sees much more of the cover, that is, it confronts it
at a broader angle. Why should this not produce a different
unification of the two images in a 3-d space? Perhaps treat¬
ing the cover as longer than in the first situation.
Obviously, one could think of other modifications where the
eyes were even further apart. More especially, one could
propose a situation where the eyes were located on anten¬
nae-like stalks, such that they could confront opposite or
unconnected aspects of an object, or aspects only
marginally linked (to avoid the objection that the subject
would have to have some common point to take as the basis
for the unification of the images). Here we can see that
there is not an obvious solution to the question of how the
images are to be linked together. Questions of angles and
sices become relevant. We have to see that an aspect is not
equivalent to a facet - in some physical sense. In other
words, the process of unifying separate images into an un¬
derstanding of a single whole is not like that of assembling
a kit of determinedly interlocking pieces. Only when sur¬
faces confront us face-on, do we have a true image of their
size. As they deviate from that plane their apparent size di¬
minishes. Consequently, as in the example of the book, sur¬
faces of an object may appear shorter than surfaces they
are in fact longer than.
Accordingly, in the kind of paradigmatic visual encounter we
have been considering, it is conceivable that some kind of a
priori awareness of 3-d space is present such as to dictate
the way in which sense is to be made of the varying images,
but insufficient information would be present to dictate the
exact three-dimensional spatial character the viewed object
would have. Further experience has to be brought to bear.
Crucially, information relating to the spatial nature of the
subject's own visual equipment and the points in space from
which his images must arise. These are a vital part of the
calculation. From two binocular images of an object we might
produce a 3-d spatial interpretation of that object, but
those images could also be consistent with a different in¬
terpretation, by assuming a different pair of viewpoints from
which those images were obtained.
It is only by a shift of position that the required knowledge
can be acquired and, hand in hand with that, a knowledge of
the characteristics of the observer in terms of the view¬
points his binocular seeing is based upon. A process of
movement or exploration can lead to the separate images of
the two eyes "linking up": what was initially seen by one eye
will come to be seen by the other. One form of movement will
bring the eye which saw only the spine to see the spine and
the cover of the book, as formerly seen by the other eye
(which will have passed on to fresh aspects of the object).
The aspects which separated the two will be revealed and,
simultaneous with this developing knowledge of the spatial
character of the object, an understanding of the two view¬
points behind the original images and their spatial qualities
will develop. Only after such an empirical process, will the
subject be able to determine, from an initial glimpse of an
unfamiliar object, its spatial nature in three-dimensional
terms, because only at that stage will he have determined
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the features of his own visual standpoint and the contribu¬
tion this will make to the images he has of objects from it.
The same point arises in respect of the calculation of dis¬
tance. It is tempting to think that it is the combination of
views from separate eyes which allows us to calculate how
far away things are. We think in terms of obtaining a "fix" on
an item, by "homing in" on it from separate viewpoints, but if
we consider the fact that, in imagistic terms, any two binoc-
ularly obtained images of an object are consistent with a
range of objects of different sizes at different distances
then we start to sense the problem. For example, what we
take as an object of size x at distance y could also be, on
the basis of the same images, an object of size 2x at dis¬
tance 2y. What breaks into this indeterminacy is knowledge
about the viewpoints of the images concerned, but t.nis can¬
not be obtained in a single visual act; the information is
not integral to the images themselves. The evidence sug¬
gests that we are able to feel the angle our eyes are posi¬
tioned at when we are focusing them on an object and, by
dint of experience, we are able to couple these sensations
with the idea of things being at different distances. I am
not assuming, in talking of distance here, that it is a simple
or absolute property of things. Distance here can be a rela¬
tive property, taking its meaning from a given unit of mea¬
surement or from certain familiar objects - "x is the thick¬
ness of so may y's away". I am suggesting that there is a
kind of interdependence between the two elements involved -
the observer and his visual equipment on the one hand and,
on the other, the objects viewed and their distance away. To
determine a value for one, it is necessary to have a value
for the other. Where no such knowledge of either element ex¬
ists, a variety of interpretations of the visual imagery is
possible. Only some process of experience can provide the
knowledge necessary to resolve this uncertainty.
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In the above it is not that the subject must make physical
assumptions about his viewpoints, merely that spatial con¬
clusions must be drawn. He does not have to assume that he
has eyes or a body or any physical or material form of vi¬
sual receptor, only that there are two points in space from
which his images arise.
In terms, then, of the claim we considered about binocular
seeing producing an immediate sense of viewpoint this no
longer seems defensible. An awareness of where one is view¬
ing things from is something which has to be built up by ex¬
perience, by interaction with the objects of sight. In most
cases, our knowledge of the distance between us and objects
will be based on the familiarity of the objects concerned,:
knowing what we are seeing, we will be able to judge how far
away it is by its relative size in our visual field.
(i) DEPTH AND VIEWPOINT
Some may still feel that depth is some special visual element
of an image over and above its colour properties - even
where monocular seeing is concerned. It is difficult to see
what this element might be. One misleading source of this
sense of depth as an intrinsic feature of images (apart from
the presence of shading, which is really a colour feature) is
the operation of focusing. When we regard a 3-d scene not
everything will be sharp, only by exploring the image and
changing the focus of our eye we can experience the whole
thing clearly. It is this more than anything which tells us
that we are viewing a picture or a photograph rather than
reality (where no usual collateral pointers are present). A
painting can be completely in focus, a photograph partly in
and partly out of focus, but unalterably so. Also, in looking
at a picture we will be aware of only having to focus at one
distance, which could not be true of looking at the real 3-d
scene depicted.
Clearly, internal sensations of the focusing of the eye are
used by us as part of estimating depth or distance, but, nei¬
ther this nor the fact that images are a mixture of sharp and
blurred elements provides an a priori element of depth in an
image. In other words, the presence of these factors does
not entail the three-dimensionality of what is seen. It is
only by having established the depth dimension of what is
visually experienced that factors such as blurriness or sen¬
sations such as focusing can be used to infer depth or dis¬
tance. An empirical connection is required. A certain bodily
sensation accompanying a particular image cannot, a priori,
tell us anything about the nature of the world represented
(if any is at all). Only once we have acquired an understand¬
ing of 3-d reality, can we begin to investigate the features
of the visual equipment we use to perceive that 3-d space.
I have already made similar points earlier in connection with
the question of viewpoint and the way in which it may not be
logically entailed by an image, even a 3-d one. That is, in
treating the image as of a 3-d space, it is not necessary, as
a logical consequence of that, to assume a point in that
space from which the image is had or formed. Perceiver-loca-
tion may not be a necessary presupposition of 3-d percep¬
tion. We do not have to assume that the viewer is a part of
the space he views, even in the non-embodied sense of his
being a dimensionless point. Why should one assume that to
be aware of a space one has to be in it?
There are, of course, strong intuitions that a viewpoint is
necessary where visual perception of a space is assumed.
Surely, one might argue we must at least be in front of an
object to have an image of it, even if no particular point in
front of it is entailed? The idea, perhaps, being that we
could not form an image of something if we were not in some
way confronting it or if something else were blocking it off.
This line of thinking is based on specific beliefs we have
about the mechanics of seeing in our world; the fact that it
is light-mediated and that light travels in straight lines.
That this is the case is something we discover about our
world and not something determined by the nature of the im¬
agery by itself.
It may be useful to narrow discussion of this point down to a
consideration of seeing a 2-d space, which is the kind of
experience we are interested in here. It might seem less
controversial to deny a viewpoint for such images. For, if
there is no depth in the space observed, how can there be a
location for a viewer or viewpoint to occupy? Some might use
this, however, as an argument against the possibility of a 2-
d space, because they might think a viewpoint so essential
to an image that a space which had no place for one could
not be a source of visual images. Spelt out in terms of the
proposed 2-d space: the subject is meant to experience a
flat "wall" of colour(s), the space has no depth, it cannot,
therefore, be assumed that the subject views from some point
in front of this "wall". The objection would, thus, run that,
for the subject to experience this wall of colour, he would
have to be somewhere in front of it; otherwise, his having
the image at all would be incomprehensible. Consequently,
There would be not a metaphorical "wall" of colour but a lit¬
eral one: the attempt to interpret the image in terms of a 2-d
space would fail. Images would be taken as entailing view¬
points and thereby entailing a 3-d .interpretation of them¬
selves .
The key question, then, becomes, is it inconceivable that an
image have no viewpoint? There is, of course, one sense in
which this is answerable in the negative. An hallucinatory or
dream image cannot have a viewpoint because there is no
space for it to exist in. Such images are taken as no more
that subjective items, and as only deceptively represents-
tive of space and such a fictitious space cannot imply a
real viewpoint from which it is experienced. A response to
this is to say that an illusory space dictates an illusory
viewpoint. There is a viewpoint in potential where such im¬
ages are concerned: it the image were of real space then
there would have to be a real viewpoint within that space.
Insofar as a subject takes such images seriously, he has to
assume a viewpoint for those images within the space he,
mistakenly, believes them to represent. Just as, when we
make 3-d senses of a picture, we create a viewpoint, a point
the scene would have to be viewed from if it were actual.
If viewpoint is meant to be en tailed by any visual image then
it can only be so in some phenomenoiogical sense rather
than in an objective, optical sense. It is in every way unac¬
ceptable that the simple experience of a visual image dic¬
tates the existence of an actual space. Purely subjective
images do occur. This presents the problem of what the phe¬
nomenoiogical nature of viewpoint is. It is not difficult to
identify other phenomenoiogical features of images such as
colour and shape. Viewpoint, if it exists, is much less con¬
crete. It can only be a feeling which an image engenders of
being at a point in a space, viewing three-dimensional ob¬
jects. This awareness may prove to be subjective in the
sense that, in fact, one is not in any such space at all. A
failure to be able to explore such a space ana to change
one's viewpoint would establish the subjective status of the
perceived viewpoint - in the same way that the objective
status of the experienced coloured shapes might be dis¬
proved by subsequent experience. Just as the phenomenoiog¬
ical nature of the coloured shapes would not be changed by
such a discovery, it could be claimed that viewpoint as a
phenomenological or logical feature of such an image would
be similarly unaffected.
This would entail that, in the situation of a subjective im¬
age, although its subjective status would not be challenged
(viewpoint being treated as a phenomenological feature such
as colour), any attempt to give it an objective reading would
require the postuiation of a three-dimensional space. This is
clearly quite a dramatic claim (bearing in mind that we are
discussing monocularly generated images), and one I believe
to be false. Partly, I would suggest that the belief in a
viewpoint has to do with our, contingent, scientific views
about the nature of seeing and also, that attachment to this
idea stems from the fact that our world is a three-dimen¬
sional one and that we automatically impose a three-dimen¬
sional interpretation upon our images. Someone committed to
Che visual as intrinsically three-dimensional might find this
sort of explanation hopelessly positivistic or empiricist,
but little reflection should reveal the highly elusive nature
of viewpoint as a genuinely phenomenological feature of the
visual. For, can it really be denied that a sense of view¬
point is parasitic upon qualities of colour and especially of
shape? If this were not the case, and viewpoint were really
an independent phenomenological quality (as colour and
shape are) then we should be able to countenance the notion
of any viewpoint being combined with any experienced
coloured shapes. For instance, we should be able to allow
the shapes in an image to change and viewpoint remain the
same.
This separation can be achieved but only to a limited ex¬
tent. It can only be done by revising and, perhaps, radically
so one's understanding of the three-dimensional character of
the shapes seen. One is compelled to assume that, either the
3-d objects which the shapes are meant to be aspects of
have all changes their orientations in space relative to the
fixed viewpoint or, more unconventionally the objects have
actually changed their form, and have evolved into different
kinds of three-dimensional objects. The spatial upheaval iii-
voiveci in this kind of interpretation is monumental compared
with the simple assumption of a change of viewpoint for the
changes in the shapes seen. We can see the total interde¬
pendence of visual shape and viewpoint when a 3-d interpre¬
tation is presupposed for the content of what is seen. In
this relationship, viewpoint will be subjugated to the form
and orientation of objects. This should show the non-phe-
nomenological character of viewpoint.
If one is still in doubt about this, then consider the ex¬
treme possibility which the phenomenoiogical view licenses,
that one could entertain the view of the front of an object
in terms of the coloured shapes experienced yet experience
the phenomenoiogical element of viewpoint as of being posi¬
tioned behind the object. In fact, although a given shape or
collection of shapes is compatible with a range of assumed
viewpoints, by having different interpretations upon the
overall 3-d form or size of the objects posited, it is not
compatible with absolutely any supposed viewpoint.
I suggest what happens when a subject entertains an image
is as follows:- from the shapes seen (and possibly from their
tonal shading) the subject conjectures that he is aware of
certain objects with a 3-d character and orientation, and, in
doing so, ascribes a relative viewpoint to himself. This con¬
jecture will be tested by subsequent changes in imagery
(those which we would impute to a change of position) and
will be either confirmed or revised in the most spatially
economical way, either by modifying assumptions about the
spatial character of objects seen or by adjusting notions of
the original viewpoint. We can make such conjectures be¬
cause we are not approaching our images "cold" but, rather,
equipped with presuppositions gained from previous experi¬
ence. We assume, firstly, that we are in the presence of a 3 -
d space and, secondly, that certain familiar types of ob¬
jects are observed (tables, chairs, people and so forth).
Because of this background experience, we can leap from an
image that can only be of a single aspect of a scene to at¬
tribution of a complete 3-d character to what is seen.
That these kinds of presuppositions are involved is often
demonstrated by cleverly devised visual constructions or
experiments which exploit them to deceive the viewer as to
the real 3-d character of what is presented. Consider for
example the room designed by Adelbert Ames which causes
items within it to look the wrong sizes when the viewpoint
for which it was intended is used. The rear wall, in fact,
slopes away, but we conjecture that we are viewing a normal
rectangular room and judge items inside it accordingly. (2)
What I would want to claim is that, not only is it possible to
be mistaken in the 3-d interpretation one applies to an im¬
age but that, also, it is possible to be mistaken in applying
any kind of 3-d interpretation to an image. In other words, I
am claiming that a single image does not, by itself, dictate
any one spatial interpretation of it. Such an image is com¬
patible with a range of 3-d interpretations or a two-dimen¬
sional understanding of it. Which one is ultimately applica¬
ble is determined by subsequent images with which the ini¬
tial image becomes linked (a process I shall have more to
say about later). This is true whether we are discussing
monocular or binocular situations: for, as was established
earlier, even the pairs of differing images involved in
binocular vision can be consistent with more than one 3-d
interpretation. There may be sequences of images for which a
3-d interpretation is utterly inappropriate; necessitating,
perhaps complex and bizarre properties for 3-d objects, yet
for which a simple, consistent 2-a reading can be produced.
If viewpoint in a 3-d sense evaporates as an intrinsic fea¬
ture of all forms of imagery, as is suggested, then there is
no obstacle to adopting a 2-d conceptual scheme for certain
forms of visual experience. This will be especially true
where monocular seeing is involved.
We do not decide that what we see is three-dimensional be¬
cause we have the primitive visual experience of viewpoint.
Rather, we decide that we are seeing from a certain view¬
point because we have independently attributed a certain 3 -
d character to the shapes in our visual field. Our basis for
making this attribution, will, ultimately, be the relationship
these shapes have with other experienced shapes. The only
caveat that might be inserted at this point is that, from a
phenomenological point of view, we have been considering
the possibility of a viewpoint as a phenomenological feature
independent of other such features such as shape and colour
because this quality of independent, unrestricted variabil¬
ity has been present in all of the phenomenological items we
have considered thus far. It might, just, be possible to ar¬
gue, however, that, although viewpoint is not a feature inde¬
pendent of other such features, it is still genuinely phe¬
nomenological once established. In other words, although
viewpoint is not immediately given in an image, in the way
that shape and colour are, it could, once fixed in the way
just described, become a real, phenomenological feature of
an interpreted image. This seems to me, at the absolute
least, very curious but, even if the case, it only applies in
a situation where a 3-d interpretation of visual imagery is
dictated; and does not affect the proposal of a 2-d visual
space given that we have established that viewpoint is not
an inherent, immediate feature of images, even if it may
arise as a phenomenological feature of visual experience at
a later, interpretative stage.
Perhaps, at this point it should be mentioned that, although
we are concerned with examining the phenomenological char¬
acter of visual experience, we have been unashamedly deal¬
ing in facts about seeing in the actual world. This is justi-
fiabie on two counts: one, it is, in general, necessary to
decompose our developed, theory-laden experience as an ini¬
tial step in the search tor phenomenology. Secondly, it is in
this particular case, necessary to commence with qualities
which, within our actual conceptual scheme, may commonly be
supposed to have phenomenological counterparts. Once
scrutiny reveals that spatial qualities such as depth and
viewpoint do not have their origins in distinct phenomeno¬
logical properties, the whole existence of such properties
is rendered questionable. There may be additional properties
of pure visual experience than those of colour and shape
but these are not ones which form the phenomenological
foundations of any spatial, ontological interpretation. The
only remotely imaginable additions to visual phenomenology
were properties projected out of depth or viewpoint. With the
failure of these to be substantia ted, no other genuinely dis¬
crete properties of the visual present themselves.
Potentially, more than simply visual experience is affected
by this debate. In effect, we had a form of viewpointless
spatial experience where our sound worlds were concerned.
The possibility of embodiment, in auditory terms, gives some
scope for a notion of viewpoint in that we could think of
ourselves as a perceiver located at certain points in the
sound space, next to the sounds we were hearing. I strongly
suggested that the sense in which a sound could serve as a
body was questionable, but even if we accept the possibil¬
ity, there may be other difficulties in respect of viewpoint.
As we presently understand it, viewpoint is dominated by vi-
sio-spatial concepts. It is a very specific notion: we do not
see things from "around about here"; we see them from a spe¬
cific point or points in space. Being composed out of a dif¬
ferent kind of sensory stuff, a sound world does not have
extension and divisibility in the way that a visual space
does, and, consequently, the same kind of specific location
of a viewpoint is not possible, even in principle - setting
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aside the evidential problems involved in identifying it. The
sound-body cannot be broken down into parts some of which
can serve as sense organs. Either the whole body is taken
as the hearing-point for a subject's sound experience or
none at all. This does not give us a close analogy with ac¬
tual experience but the demand for such parallels we have
already deemed unjustified. Accordingly, it may be coherent
to use a particular sound as the auditory equivalent of a
viewpoint, the real question, however, is not is this coher¬
ent, but is this necessary. In other words, is it absurd to
assume the we perceive sound objects but do not do so from
some location (however broad) within that sound space? The
question becomes particularly acute when there is no con¬
stantly present sound which can be identified as a subject's
body. If there is no such sound then there is simply no
space available in the sound space for the hearer to occupy
or be identified with. The prospect of this may make us feel
awkward: how could we hear sounds - a stretch of sound-
space - and not in some way be there? Also, the fact that we
are hearing that particular part of the sound world as op¬
posed to others surely indicates that we are in some kind of
close proximity with it?
The first of these two intuitions is open to greater criti¬
cism than the second. It would not be difficult to argue that
the reason we feel some kind of spatial, bodily presence to
be required, is because we know this to be a necessity in
our world. Essentially, we have well-established causal be¬
liefs about the nature of our perception, the mechanisms in¬
volved and the roles played by our bodies or certain parts
of them. We know there must be a physical, spatial link be¬
tween objects perceived and our sense organs, even if this
is as intangible as electromagnetic vibrations. Given the ne¬
cessity of such a link, we have to consider the nature of
the necessity involved: is it natural or causal, or is it con¬
ceptual? We might be able to suppose different physical in-
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stantiations of the link between observer and object (it
took centuries of science to characterise some of those in¬
volved) but can we accept the idea of no link of any kind? I
would suggest that we can and that to suppose otherwise un¬
necessarily begs the question in favour of causal or repre¬
sentative theories of perception.
There seems nothing inherently absurd about a direct aware¬
ness account of certain forms of perception, a view that a
subject is simply aware of objects in an unmediated way. The
account only seems untenable in the context of our actual
experience, but this is because the facts of our form of ex¬
perience are not consistent with such an approach; not that
it is absurd under all possible forms of experience. If any¬
thing, the causal-type of account generates all sorts of
sceptical problems, which a direct awareness approach
avoids. We have to recognise that nagging doubts of the,
"but if I am here and the object is there, how can I come to
know it or it impinge upon me?" - variety have their origin in
contingent, scientific assumptions rather than philosophy.
If we can dispense with a causal link in a situation where
embodiment is presupposed, then there is no greater leap in¬
volved in dispensing with embodiment. If no physical chain
is needed to link an object to a body for perception to oc¬
cur, then there seems no necessity for a physical instantia¬
tion of the perceiver, for the body is, in any case, only the
last link in the eliminable causal chain. Why does the ob¬
server have to be in space as well as simply aware of it?
The second intuition we have in this context - that some ac¬
count has to be given of the fact that at, any given time we
are aware of one stretch of space rather than another - is
less easily dismissed. In fact, I think we would be wrong to
ignore it. There is an obvious sense in which, in the sound
models we considered and in actual experience, an individual
- 142 -
observer or experient is aware of only limited areas of what
is to be experienced at any time. There is a specific sen¬
sory field, a sort of "window" for each sense which moves
across the world. In the case of our world, we know the phys¬
ical grounds for the limits upon what we can experience, but
just because there can be such grounds, especially involv¬
ing the notion of embodiment, does not mean that there have
to be such. There is nothing to stop us supposing that a
subject's field of sense is restricted yet that he is not em¬
bodied in the space he experiences or is in any way spa¬
tially present in it.
Thus, the question for a given possible form of spatial ex¬
perience of whether the percipient is only aware of a parts
of space at any one time is separate from the question of
whether he is embodied or whether his awareness presupposes
a viewpoint (or whatever equivalent of it is relevant to a
particular space). There seems no good reason why we cannot
assume someone to be aware of particular' part of space or
its contents without postulating a point or an object within
that space from which that awareness is had. In certain
forms of space, all sorts of reasons may arise as to why
some kind of body or viewpoint has to be assumed. In our
kind of 3-d visual space, part of building up an idea of its
objects is the formation of a concept of observer location
or viewpoint. This does not mean that such assumptions are
required in all possible forms of spatial experience. In the
kinds of sound worlds we considered there is no place or
need for viewpoints. Also, as far as this chapter is con¬
cerned, I am claiming that 2-d space is just such a form of
experience.
If we construct a simple 2-d seeing situation where a sub¬
ject is aware of a patchwork of colours, on a two dimen¬
sional understanding, there is no place in such a space for
the subject to occupy or observe from. Some part of the
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coloured patchwork would have to be singled out, because,
given the lack of a third dimension there is no possible
space in front of what is seen for the observer to occupy.
The part of space seen totally comprises the coloured
patches, there can be no empty space between them and the
observer to occupy. The part of space seen totally com¬
prises the coloured patches, there can be no empty space
between them and the observer. Isolating a part of what is
seen as a viewpoint is the only option in this sort of space,
yet, surely, to do so would be senseless. Why should any
part of the 2-d scene be preferred to any other? One might
say that the centre of an image should be picked as the log¬
ical place for the observer to be, but is there any reason
for this other than that, in actual 3-d seeing, the viewpoint
is a point back along a line from the centre of the image?
Further, there is no reason why we should assume that the
image has an obvious centre. The assumption seems to be
that a 2-d visual field would be circular or symmetrical,
much as our actual field is, but it is conceivable that vi¬
sual fields occur in all kinds of bizarre and irregular forms.
At best, the selection, of a part of the 2-d world seen to be
a viewpoint seems perverse and arbitrary: there is nothing
about the nature of what is seen that logically dictates it.
Nor is there any stronger justification for picking some
point in the 2-d world outside of the field in question as a
viewpoint.
Of course the absurdity of trying to find a viewpoint within
what is seen, rather than outside of it but implied by it,
(which is the only available option in a 2-d visual space),
could be taken by an opponent of such a possible space as
an argument against its intelligibility. By doggedly holding
to the notion of a viewpoint one can reject the possibility
of 2-d spaces. I hope to have said enough to make such ad¬
herence to the notion of a viewpoint suspect, but a more de-
- 144 -
tailed working out of the features of a 2-d space might un¬
dermine it further.
(ii) A TWO DIMENSIONAL MODEL
The primary 2-d visual experience is that of a subject sim¬
ply being aware of a coloured expanse. The expanse may be
of one colour or may be broken up into different areas of
colour. The expanse will have limits (we have already dis¬
cussed the problem involved in supposing a limitless aware¬
ness of space). These limits may be "blurry" or well-defined.
Our seeing involves an out of focus fringe around the visual
field, this is produced by the mechanism of seeing we depend
on. There is no reason, in principle, why a subject should
not be free of such limitations, and be aware of things
clearly, in all their detail. Blurred perceptions of things
produce some philosophical difficulties. How, for instance,
does the subject know whether it is his image which is
blurred or reality itself? In the process of exploration es¬
sential to building up an objective understanding of his ex¬
perience, the subject, by employing principles of simplicity,
should be able to decide such questions relatively uncon-
troversially. Because the visual field or window can be
moved across the 2-d space, the items which were at the pe¬
riphery of the image and, consequently, blurred can be
brought into the centre of things and into focus. Of course,
it is open to a sceptic to say that the subject has no
grounds for thinking the item at the centre of the image is
the same as that previously seen at the edge, for, if they
look different then they are different.
Such identifications, are acceptable however. The gradual
unbroken transition between the two images as the field
shifts is an important counter to the idea that one item dis-
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appears and the other leaps into being. This would also fit
into the logical pattern necessary for the movement of
shapes at the centre of the field of vision; shapes, that is,
which preserve their distinct outline. For such shapes the
rational thing would be to see them as the same particulars
through changes of position. As I have indicated earlier, the
rational or conceptually economic judgement to make may not
be the only one and a sceptical re-interpretation may be
possible, but this is something we can come to terms with.
Moreover, the way I have been talking implies that there are
two types of image involved - a sharp one and a blurred one
- as if either could do duty as an object. Really, this can¬
not be true: a blurred shape is not another kind of shape to
a sharp one as, say, a square is to a circle; it is in some
ways an absence of shape. Blurred images are ambiguous,
they are confused, partial images of shapes, they do not
leave us with a definite impression which we can recall or
use to fashion objective particulars out of. For this reason
it is not tempting to wonder whether the blurred fringes of
our visual field show objects as they are or whether the
clear central area does: the latter is the only possible con¬
tender.
For the present model, I shall assume that the whole of the
visual field is in focus. I shall also assume that the field
has a regular shape - basically circular - though this is not
of great importance. Saying that the whole of the field is
distinct or "in focus" (to use what, here, can only be a
metaphorical term) is not the same as saying that the sub¬
ject is attending to or concentrating upon all of it. I have
had occasion before to assert the need for a distinction be¬
tween what a subject is aware of and what he attends to.
This distinction is particularly applicable in our visual ex¬
perience because of the richness and complexity of the
awareness involved. As well as exploration by shifting the
scope of one's visual awareness and taking in fresh objects,
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there is exploration within a single image or act of aware¬
ness by shifting the scope of one's attention. At one level,
one is aware of the whole image (to suppose otherwise would
lead to absurdity) but, at a deeper level, one is only intel¬
lectually engaged by parts of it. The first level we charac¬
terized in Chapter One as a kind of passive or negative ex¬
periencing; the second involves the formation of judgements
and concepts recallable of what is experienced and of im¬
ages. Again, we could incorporate the distinction into the
subject's experience in our model, but, for simplicity, we
can assume him to be attending to the whole of what he sees.
There can be no conceptual objection to postulating crea¬
tures with greater powers of attention or concentration than
our own: the limits involved are contingent.
If we assume the content of the subject's awareness to be an
expanse of coloured shapes, a kind of patchwork (I leave
aside for a moment the question of a single coloured field)
one of the most important specifications wfe must build in, if
this is to be the basis of a 2-d space, is a characterisation
of how the shapes "move" when the subject alters his view
(as we hope to be able to describe it). What cannot occur is
the kind of alteration of shape that would happen in a three-
dimensional world. If the shapes supposed here were merely
painted on a flat surface such as a wall and the subject,
literally, moved past them or changed the angle of his head,
the shapes would alter in accordance with the rules of per¬
spective. They would not remain constant, in pure visual
terms, even though we would know them to be constant in
"real" terms as patches of pigment. (So entrenched is our
idea of the "real" or "actual" shape of what we are seeing,
however, that we are very insensitive to the shapes really
in fact being presented to the eye - witness most people's
difficulty in accurately drawing coins and so forth seen at
an angle (3).) If we assumed that shapes changed in this way
as they changed position in the 2-d subject's visual field
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two problems would arise. The first, less pernicious, diffi¬
culty is that, if the shapes change, the subject, if he were
objectifying them, would have to attribute change to the ob¬
jects themselves. At best, objects would be fluid, constantly
changing items, but it might be that, because of the changes
accompanying every adjustment in the field of view, the sub¬
ject would be unable to make the re-identifications neces¬
sary to create a sense of object (though, this is unlikely).
The more serious problem presented by the suggestion that
shapes change in this way as the field of view is moved is
that the subject has all grounds for assuming that he is in
the presence of 3-d space and objects. The phenomenological
dynamics of the two situations are the same. Consequently,
we cannot jeopardise the conceptual viability of our 2-d vi¬
sual space by building in what are central phenomenological
features of a 3-d visual space, from the very outset. We
have to assume that the subject we are considering here is
presented with a collection of shapes which do not alter as
they move across his field of view and are replaced by fresh
shapes. It may be a little hard to imagine this because in
the only visual experience we have, change or distortion of
image being linked with a change of view is the norm. Surely,
there can be nothing intrinsically absurd, however, about
the notion of an experience where shapes are seen and move
without such alterations? Let us then postulate such an ex¬
perience.
Before going any further, I" think it is important to make a
few observations about the shape aspect of the visual field
itself. I suggested, for simplicity, that, in this model, we
consider it to be circular. I also suggested, in a slightly
different context in Chapter One, that a need to specify
shape in addition to colour as a defining element of the vi¬
sual might be eliminable in that it might be impossible to
conceive of a colour that had no shape; mainly on the
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grounds that our visual field, being restricted, would impose
a shape on the colour seen. Two possible qualifications
could be made to this. Firstly it is not clear that there
could not be experients with very wide visual fields; if God
exists, and space is infinite, perhaps God entertains images
of that infinite space, images which, presumably, could not
be bounded. The question of God and perception is a fasci¬
nating one, but far too complex to enter into here, so I
merely mention this as a possibility.
The qualification I wish to give more attention to is that
concerning the imposition of a shape upon an experience of
an undifferentiated colour by the limits of a visual field.
Prima facie, it seems obvious that if a subject cannot see
the whole of space at any time then the part he does see
must fall under a certain shape. We could map out the shape
of a person's visual field, by considering his position and
the objects or parts of objects he can see and those he
cannot. All this is undeniable: once a knowledge of space
and its contents has been built up, it is possible to deter¬
mine the shape of a visual field (2-d or 3-d) by reference to
which "bits" of reality are included in it. This does not
mean, however, that the visual field or the images a subject
has have a shape in the intrinsic sense. A subject experi¬
encing a simple expanse of colour or collection of colours
forming shapes within the image, does not also have a visual
experience of the overall boundary or shape of the image it¬
self. Seeing, from a phenomenological point of view is posi¬
tive: we do not have an image representing the areas of
space we cannot see. Logically, for a shape to exist it has
to be bounded by something different in colour: the limits of
one shape are where its colour recognisably ceases and
those of another begin. We cannot have a shape that is just
internally defined. Consequently, if the visual field it to
have a shape in visual terms it cannot just come to an end,
it has to be bounded by some, different, surrounding colour.
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This, of course, amounts to an extension of the visual field
and a restatement of the same problem leading to an infinite
regress.
We must recognise that a visual field does not have a shape
in the same sense that items within it do. The activity of
seeing and having a defined visual field is not analogous to
looking through a porthole, where one is both aware of the
scene through the window and also of the shape of the win¬
dow. We simply see things - colours or coloured shapes - we
do not also see the limits of our seeing. These are inferred
from what is seen, or from acquired knowledge of what is not
seen, but are not themselves experienced. Visual fields can,
generally, be said to have shapes, but not in the primary
sense we might immediately assume.
Another important issue, partially raised by the preceding
topic, is that concerning experiences consisting of undif¬
ferentiated expanses of colour. This takes' us into metaphys¬
ical questions about the criteria that have to be met if vi¬
sual experience is to be objectified. The conclusions we
have just drawn about the shape aspect of visual fields
should tell us that, where a subject faces such a blank ex¬
panse of colour, he cannot expect a shape to be imposed
upon it by his visual field, even assuming that he has a
well-defined visual field. As there is no internal structure
to his image - no patchwork of shapes - the subject cannot
build up an idea of shape from the visual data he does have.
The only way a shape could be ascribed to his image is by a
process of shifting the scope of his seeing to include dif¬
ferent items surrounding the initial image. The philosophi¬
cally interesting situation, however, is where the subject
fails to be able to achieve this: where no other experience
is achieved other than the simple colour.
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Ex hypothesi, let us describe the subject as surveying his
visual world thus; he shifts his field of view across differ¬
ent parts of it, yet fails to see anything other than the
same colour. Remembering that we are approaching the situa¬
tion in phenomenological, epistemologically basic terms,
merely assuming a subject having certain sensory experi¬
ences and no prior knowledge or experience to go upon, how,
from such an experience could the subject form spatial, ob¬
jective notions and, specifically, conceive of himself as
"looking around" or "shifting his field or view" to explore
the space around him? Phenomenologically, there can be no
change in what he experiences as between, supposedly, look¬
ing at one area of space and that of another. We, with well-
developed notions of space and of ourselves as bodily per-
ceivers within in it, can use all sorts of collateral informa¬
tion upon which to base the belief that we are looking
around or moving our field of view. The physical sensations
of moving our head or our eyes, for instance, tell us that we
are taking in a fresh view of things. By themselves, such
feelings have no such meaning, they acquire it by a process
of experience connecting with a primary understanding of
views actually changing. From our visual, phenomenological
experience we have to generate a notion of space and of
seeing different parts of it at different times and it is only
from there that we can give recognition to interesting con¬
tingent connections between such views and other non-logi-
cally related parts of our experience. The subject we are
considering does not have this crucial phenomenological
foundation.
In psychological terms, it is doubtful whether the subject
would be aware of his visual experience at all: just as a
constant hum or, even, the ticking of a clock becomes such
an embedded part of our total experience that we cease to
notice them at all. In philosophical and phenomenological
terms, the subject would be aware of it. The distinction be-
- 151 -
tween attention and awareness has application, again. The
negative features of pure awareness would be present, if
colour stopped altogether or changed, the subject would no¬
tice this and not just in the sense of being aware of the
fresh sensory state, but also of having an awareness of what
had ended or disappeared.
What is important, here, is that, as in the previous chapter,
we have isolated a form of experience which is incapable of
being objectively interpreted. This reiteration of the gen¬
eral principle that there are firm criteria for objects and
space and not every possible form of experience will conform
to those. Such species of phenomenology will not break out
of the inner subjective realm. We should turn now, within our
2-d visual model, to consider the ways in which it would have
to be ordered for objective criteria to come into play.
Naturally, many of the principles we established in respect
of possible sound worlds are applicable here. Consequently,
the same degree of argument for some of' these principles
should not be necessary.
(iii) OBJECTS IN A 2-D WORLD
One of the observations we made in the previous chapter was
the somewhat, ironical one in terms of traditional scepticism
that a constant, unchanging slice of experience does not
provide strong grounds for an objective interpretation of it.
Where a subject confronts certain sense-items which do not
disappear from his awareness to return, as qualitatively
identical or strongly similar items, at some later point, the
subject does not have any good reason to think of those
items as having any existence outside of such a situation.
The subject may wonder if he is experiencing an objective
particular or not, but he is incapable of deciding the ques-
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tion on the basis of the evidence he has. The situation is
uncertain, no feature is present in what is experienced to
suggest an objective rather than a subjective understanding
of it. This is interesting given the traditional focus upon
the situation where items disappear from our experience and
upon the metaphysical doubts that is meant to give rise to.
In fact, the situation of constant awareness gives rise to
more intractable doubts. It is only where two items occur in
experience at different times having identical or very simi¬
lar properties that we have reason to entertain an objective
interpretation of them: to see them as being the same par¬
ticular with an existence in a spatial system.
In terms of our 2-d visual experience, how do we create such
a situation? Let us begin with the basic image we have men¬
tioned already: the patchwork of different coloured shapes,
finite in scope, circumscribed by the subject's visual field
(bearing in mind the above caveats). This is a static image
and, if that was all a subject experienced, the difficulties
just mentioned would prevail. Some form of change has to be
introduced. Two basic types of alteration are possible and a
combination of them. The observer can move (that is his field
of view can be altered) or there can be re-arrangements
within the original image. In some ways, these are not radi¬
cally distinct given the relative nature of movement. I shall
consider both, but initially I want to describe a situation
where, in conventional terms, we would say that the subject
or his outlook moves. Let us suppose, that, as far as the
original image is concerned, the right hand side of the image
starts to disappear from view and fresh items appear at the
left hand edge. The process is gradual and continuous and
there are not leaps or jerks, where the whole new shapes
just appear. The situation envisaged is very like that where
an observer faces a large patterned wall, his gaze fixed,
rigidly upon it: any usual effects of distortion and blurri-
ness being excluded.
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In the course of such experience, the subject would acquire
an awareness of certain coloured shapes and their relations
with each other within the initial image and then an aware¬
ness of further shapes (or continuations of existing ones)
and of their relations to those already established. The
kinds of relations involved are synchronic ones, rather than
the diachronic ones that were important in the models dis¬
cussed in the previous chapter. The relations are given in
the single act of awareness, as part of an image had at any
single moment in time. It is, perhaps, conceivable that vi¬
sual experience could occur in a form such as to produce a
spatial scheme embodying diachronic relations. If a subject
first experienced one image - maybe an expanse of red - then
a different image - perhaps an expanse of blue - then, yet
another image and so on, until a sequence of such was pro¬
duced (the images need not be the uniform ones suggested so
long as they are all distinct and unrelated in synchronic
terms) then we would have the basis for a linear space of
colour particulars. As it is, we are interested in the
paradigmatically visual relations which are synchronic in
form. The most basic relations, here, being, "to the left
of..." / "to the right of..." and "above..." / "below..." (in
terms of conceptual economy we can dispense with either
half of these pairs.) A more expressive system of relations
is available in the geometrical system of degrees or the
points of the compass or even numbers on a clock face, but
there is a problem about how these would be applied by a
subject at a rudimentary level of experience. It is, however,
necessary to attribute some kind of awareness of these rela¬
tions to the subject, because they are part and parcel of
having the kind of visual images or awareness in question.
In having an image, a subject cannot be unclear about where
shapes are in relation to each other. He may lack the terms
to express these relations and, more importantly, he may be
unable to measure these relations in such a way as to make
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comparisons between images had at different times. He may,
that is, be unclear about whether shape "a" in image "i" is in
the same relation with shape "b" as is shape "y" with shape
"z" in the later, different image "i'n.
Thus, in terms of our model, the subject has an awareness of
individual shapes and of their relations with each other. His
experience is, also, progressive, in that he acquires an
awareness of new shapes (while loosing an awareness of some
others) and of their relations with existing or disappearing
shapes. As the process goes on, he will lose all parts of the
original image and confront entirely new items - qualita¬
tively speaking. Shapes will enter at one side of the image
and flow across it to disappear at the opposite side. We
could imagine this continuing for any length of time (or num¬
ber of shapes). The only limit on the process, for our pur¬
poses, would be the memory span of the subject. Obviously,
we are at liberty to ascribe any capacity we choose to our
hypothetical subject; one, perhaps, prodigiously greater
than our own. The only thing that is crucial is that the sub¬
ject has some powers of recall. They may be recognitional
rather than imaginative; that is, the subject, may have the
sensation of having already encountered a certain type of
shape in a certain relation with a certain other type of
shape, without being able to picture the previous encounters
after they have ended. This basic sense of having met some¬
thing before (or something just like it) is one of the essen¬
tial building blocks in our metaphysical enterprise. Unlike
most of the features we are discussing, it is not something
that has to be predicated of experience but of the subject
who has that experience. It is important to remind ourselves
that, in general, the subject has to be possessed of certain
intellectual capacities, and cannot be some kind of passive
"sponge" for experience. Of course, sceptical thoughts can
be entertained in respect of memory, as elsewhere, and I
shall not trouble to repeat the same counter-arguments here.
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Suffice it to say then, that it is necessary that our subject
experiences a certain flow of imagery and that he has some
power to remember what he has seen- This is important be¬
cause the next step is to assume that the flow reverses and
that the subject experiences the same sort of shapes in the
same sort of relations, except moving in the opposite direc¬
tion. Shapes appear at the right hand edge of the image and
disappear at the left. Shapes most recently encountered re¬
appear before those more distantly encountered. At this
stage our description is meant to be in terms of shapes and
relations, of qualitative similarities or identities, even if,
at points, it has been difficult not to fall back one more on-
tologically-loaded language. It has only been appropriate to
talk about an experience of coloured shapes and their rela¬
tions and not about seeing objects or parts of space, albeit
a 2-d one. We have reached the point, however, where the
subject would be warranted in making ceftain metaphysical
judgements about the content of his visual experience. Re-
encountering the same types of shapes would invite the ten¬
tative speculation that one and the same particulars were
re-experienced. Meeting them in the same configuration with
other objects, however, shifts the balance firmly in favour
of such an interpretation. It would, quite simply, be more ra¬
tional or economical to treat experience in this way, as
united by spatial particulars rather as just unconnected
repetitions of qualitatively similar subjective items.
At this point, I should like to acknowledge the close simi¬
larity between the model I am developing and that outlined in
A.J. Ayer's THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF PHILOSOPHY (4) in
Chapter V of that work and part C especially. I do not find it
necessary to use his terminology of "percepts" and "qualia"
(the latter borrowed from Nelson Goodman's THE STRUCTURE OF
APPEARANCE). Also, it has to be said that Ayer's model is
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meant to articulate a subject's construction of a three-di¬
mensional visual space. Curiously, however, I believe it to
be more descriptive of a two-dimensional visual experience.
Although Ayer talks about variations in the appearance of
objects, he does not fully get to grips with the potentially
infinite diversity of appearances which is central to the no¬
tion of a three-dimensional object. One feels that there is
something essentially "flat" about the objects, or the "cat
patterns" and so on that move across his observer's visual
field. The force of this comment should emerge later in this
chapter when I consider a 3-d visual world. Ayer's discus¬
sion of the connection between the visually constructed
world and data from other senses is also rather sketchy. A
proper development of this issue will be attempted in my fi¬
nal two chapters.
The metaphysical essentials of Ayer's model I am greatly in
agreement with. The contribution I have to make to it is to
develop it in greater detail adding a level of complexity to
it which strengthens its adequacy as a theory of perception
of the visual world.
To return to our model; we have just suggested a very simple
form of "movement" across the possible 2-d space - movement
and return along a single route. However, just as "branching"
was possible in our auditory space, so it is possible here.
In fact this is one of the most immediately obvious possibil¬
ities of visual experience. All kinds of complex sequences
of shapes can be envisaged, all compatible with a sense of
order and repetition sufficient to ground a spatial scheme.
It is possible to leave an image along one orientation and
return to it from a different direction. Exploring a visual
space in this way is much more demanding on the subject.
Experience is more likely to come over as confused and lack¬
ing in structure if a process of movement and reversals
along the same axes is not employed. It would take the sub-
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ject longer to build up a sense of space and of its objec¬
tive particulars in this way, though, in the end, his grasp
upon that space might be stronger. A more discursive explo¬
ration of the 2-d space would produce a better understanding
of how shapes lock together in all directions not just along
certain axes. A sense of a 2-d space as a network rather
than a linear kind of space would arise more strongly.
There is, perhaps, a question as to whether a 2-d visual
space such as this has to be a network in the way suggested
or whether it could be restricted to a simple "strip" of
shapes. Does a 2-d space have to extend in every possible
direction and does it have to be infinite in scope? Suppose
a situation where a subject finds he can only have a certain
type of visual experience. He simply experiences the same
sequence of shapes, much as in our description of a moment
ago. He may move backwards and forwards along this line, but
he may not "branch out" from any shape in a different direc¬
tion to take in fresh shape-particulars, 'it is difficult to
know how to describe the restriction involved in this situa¬
tion. The simplest thing to say would be that, as a fact, the
subject does not experience anything beyond this linear
stream of images, but, perhaps, we could talk in terms of him
somehow trying to get out of his given orientation into the
potential space beyond, but being in some way prevented
from doing so. At any rate, we assume a situation where the
subject never experiences anything outside the chain of
shapes described. The issue that arises is whether the sub¬
ject here could be said to be experiencing a finite, linear
2-d visual space or whether he is simply confined to an ex¬
perience of only a part of an infinite visual space extend¬
ing fully in two dimensions. The linear and the finite prop¬
erties can, to some extent, be separated. On the face of it,
if the space is linear it may still be infinite as long as
there is no last link in the chain of shapes at either ex¬
tremity.
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This, in itself, however, raises the question of how there
could be such a "last link". How would the subject know that
he had come to the end of the line, that space has come to
an end at a certain point? The final shape would be a shape
much as any other, so what would prevent it from linking up
with a further shape? If the reply is that it just does not
link up, the question would be how the subject could know
this - what experience would reveal this failure to him?
Presumably, he would have to see the proposed final shape,
and then somehow see the blank beyond it. In terms of a 2-d
visual space, in particular, this suggestion produces an ab¬
surdity. In seeing something beyond a given shape, one is
still seeing something: calling it a blank does not do any
work here. A blank must still be a visual item, and in the
form of space we are discussing there is no means if distin¬
guishing between coloured shapes which are objects and
those which are not. All visual items are to be objects or
none are. Even if a blank were properly expressible within
this form of 2-d space, it itself is a spatial notion and rep¬
resents the continuation of space, not the end of it. It is
merely empty space. Thus, there is, also, the question of
knowing that the empty space, if pursued far enough, would
not lead to more shape objects.
There is, decidedly, a problem about trying to incorporate
boundaries into the actual experience a subject has of a
space. There is the problem we have raised in respect of the
limits of our visual field: an infinite regress arises if we
try to have a visual boundary to what is seen. The proposed
final shape-object cannot be seen to come to an end, be¬
cause this would raise the question of what it ended in or
was terminated by. Awareness simply comes to an end; not
what one is aware of. One would simply be aware of so much
of a certain shape and not be aware of any more than that.
One would not, that is, be aware of a certain shape and also
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aware of the nothing beyond that shape, or the point where
the shape ended, in the sense of being aware of a limit. By
itself, such experience cannot ground a conclusion that
space is finite or bounded. The fact that one is only aware
of a part of space at any time is the norm and uncontrover-
sial. The subject's experience constantly involves situa¬
tions where his awareness of space is partial owing to the
limits of his visual field, but ones where he goes on to
achieve a greater awareness of space by a change of posi¬
tion (as we might want to term it). All of this is true in the
situation described as regards what we might call the verti¬
cal dimension, also. The height, as it were, of the linear
shape sequence will not be experienced by experiencing lim¬
its along a vertical axis, it will be experienced in the nega¬
tive way already expressed of not being aware of more than a
certain amount of visual material.
This means that the limits imposed upon a spatial experience
cannot be internal or logical (taking either of the dimen¬
sions of our 2-d space) they can only be based upon certain
contingent limitations. Space will be finite to the extent
that a subject is only able, as a fact of his experience, to
experience so much space. The question has to be whether
this is sufficient to declare the space itself finite. It
might be true that as a consequence of such a well-contained
experience, the subject is not tempted to think of space be¬
yond that which he experiences and is able, for all intents
and purposes, to think of space as being exhausted by what
we experience, but this leaves open the theoretical question
of what is the correct judgement to make of the space in
question. Even if finite or bounded spaces are possible it is
arguable that the subject cannot be certain that his experi¬
ence reveals such a delimited space. Surely, it is always
conceivable that space extends beyond what the subject is
assumed to be aware of, and that the limits imposed upon his
awareness derive from some contingent source, rather than
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the limits of space itself? Much has been said to cast doubt
upon the idea that a finite, bounded space is a conceptual
possibility. If it is not possible to articulate what form the
limits could take then, surely, it is doubtful that there
could be such limits.
In some ways, we are taken back into an issue we gave some
attention to in the previous chapter: this is the question of
the particularity of space and whether this entails more
than certain possibilities of objects. If empty space is just
the unfilled possibility of objects, then, in the situation we
have here, it is an admitted possibility that space extends
beyond what is perceived. Here, we have a situation where
what is conceivable is spatial. If one can conceive of an ob¬
ject existing, then there is space for that object to exist
in: space is implied by the possibility of that object. So, in
the present situation, if one can imagine there being some¬
thing - some further coloured shapes beyond those experi¬
enced - then the space for such an object to exist in must
exist, even if the object does not, in fact, exist or there is
some other object occupying that bit of space.
If one takes a more concrete view of space, then one might
take the view that its existence was more a question of fact
than logical possibility. This might, in the present context,
incline one to see what space there is as determined more by
what objects one experiences rather than what objects one
can imagine. In the past I have spoken of the close logical
relationship between objects and space. Objects exist in
space; it is the notion of space which makes sense of how
something one experiences might disappear from experience
yet still continue to exist. Space is the possibility of cer¬
tain sorts of objects, it has a definite character: not any
kind of object may exist in a given space, although, in a
sense, becoming aware of something as an object involves
seeing it as belonging to a space; it is a reciprocal pro-
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cess. There is an implication in this that, somehow, objects
define space, that the character of a space emerges from
what we find in it. If one took such a view, then, in the pre¬
sent case, it would not be legitimate to extend the limits of
space beyond areas that were known to be occupied by ob¬
jects, even if it is conceivable that space extends beyond
them. This might seem to be of a piece with taking space se¬
riously as a particular, as a contingent thing which might or
might not have existed. For, if we start defining space ac¬
cording to possible, rather than actual objects, then we will
end up in the situation where all possible spaces are ac¬
tual, even if most are empty, which is, surely, counter-intu¬
itive.
This, however, is not a position we are compelled to accept.
It is possible to give weight to conceivability as regards
defining space without actualizing all possible forms of
space. There is an important connection between experienc¬
ing objects and establishing what spaces exist, but that
does not mean that the nature of a space is wholly decided
by what objects are found in it. What spaces exist may be a
contingent matter, but the character of those which contin¬
gently do exist is not entirely a matter of contingency. A
priori or conceptual considerations come into play. The ex¬
istence of a certain type of object establishes the exis¬
tence of a certain type of space and a particular space. A
particular object exists in a particular space, this particu¬
lar space, as it were. Yet, consequences are introduced
thereby which go beyond the reality of the object in ques¬
tion.
The existence of an object does not just establish a space
for itself and, at most, objects of the same character or
size as itself, it forms a fragment of a wider, complete
space. We can project (literally, we might say, in visual con¬
texts) a whole space from a single part of it, its character
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is logically dictated by it. It is here that conceivability
acquires its legitimacy. If, from an experience of a part of
space we can conceive of unexperienced areas of it, then we
have every reason for committing ourselves to the existence
of these. The consequences of not doing this are conceptu¬
ally much more problematical: for, on arbitrary grounds, we
would have to think of possible areas of a known space not
existing. We have already highlighted the problems of ex¬
pressing how a space comes to an end, the question of limits
or boundaries that are final ones and do not lead to an infi¬
nite regress. An even greater problem is involved in making
sense of the idea of a part of space, to which everything
else points, not actually existing. In 3-d terms it is like
being presented with a box which is not said to be empty,
but said to contain no space at all and, not in the sense
that one is physically unable to get into it. In general, I am
suggesting that there is a difference between entertaining
the idea of a possible space not existing (I do not believe
any of the possible sound spaces of the previous chapter to
exist for instance) and entertaining the belief that parts of
a possible space exist and other parts do not.
If this line of argument is rejected, we still do not have an
overwhelming reason in the situation envisaged for denying
existence to certain areas of possible space. Although the
subject does not gain experience of these areas, that they
exist as possibilities cannot be denied - it would not be at
all peculiar if he suddenly had access to them. There is as
much reason to suppose that he, contingently, does not get
sensory access to them as to assume that they, contingently,
do not exist. Coupled with the undeniable problems of articu¬
lating the non-existence of such areas of space, it is, ar¬
guably more sensible to assume that such areas do exist,
even if unperceived.
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This does not quite dispose of the question of whether vi¬
sual spaces can be restricted or not. In Chapter Two, we
spoke of cyclical spaces, spaces where, pursued in any di¬
rection the particulars would repeat. This is a possibility,
here, also. The analogy of the surface of a sphere is partic¬
ularly apposite. If we imagine that the network of shapes
which the subject is free to explore is cast upon a sphere,
then he will be able to move in any direction he chooses
without coming up against any form of limit, yet a finite
number of shapes or an area of space will be perceived. Such
a space would be finite but unbounded. Naturally, this is
still a metaphorical device: we cannot, literally, assume the
2-d visual space to be "bent" around a sphere, this would
contradict its 2-d character and present us with the per-
spectival problems I strove to exclude from our model. It is
certainly possible to take the type of sensory situation I
have described and build in the feature that explorations in
any direction eventually lead to the same shapes or images.
Obviously, saying that shapes are "the same" is somewhat
controversial from an ontological point of view. The same
doubt that it was possible to raise of proposed cyclical
sound spaces can be raised here also. Perhaps there is a
repetition of types and not particulars: the subject perceiv¬
ing fresh tracts of space but occupied by objects which are
qualitatively the same, both as regards their internal prop¬
erties and their external relations, as those found in ear¬
lier parts of space.
Although this latter interpretation is coherent, there is no
particular reason to employ it. It involves an avoidable mul¬
tiplication of entities. There is no limit to the number of
times a subject might perceive the same set of shape types
and relations; and each time he identified a shape of a
given type he would have to treat it as a fresh particular.
Thus, we could have a plethora of individual items identical
to each other in qualities and relations. This would be very
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unwieldy: the only way the subject would know at any time
which particular he was seeing would be by referring to a
strict system of counting. From his first encounter with the
shape sequence in question, he would have to count through
all the subsequent different instances of it to distinguish
them from each other. There is nothing else, other than this
ordering, to pick out any given shape-object and identify it
with any one previously experienced. This, obviously, pro¬
duces practical complications, but, moreover, there is no
reason why a subject should feel obliged to adopt this in¬
terpretation of his experience. It is perfectly possible to
describe a situation where the same objects are perceived at
different times yet without a reversal of the sequence they
are in. We do not run up against any of the difficulties pre¬
sented by attempts to make spaces finite by postulating
boundaries for them. It is metaphysically much simpler to as¬
sume re-encounters with the same particulars than to assume
fresh encounters with particulars of the same type.
Qualitative criteria can be used to determine whether one is
confronting the same particular as at some earlier time,
rather than an extraneous system of counting. The only real
stimulus to adopt a cumbersome system of assuming all repe¬
titions to be repetitions of types and not individuals, could
be that a finite space was incoherent and it is not at all
clear that this is so.
Returning to the basic visual model we are developing, we
have assumed an experience by a subject of a certain se¬
quence of shapes and an ability to re-experience that se¬
quence in reverse order. We also supposed the possibility of
a more complex form of observation where the subject can
start from one image, experience a whole sequence of other
images and re-experience the initial image, without a repeti¬
tion of the sequence in between. This was due to the 2-d
character of visual experience. Shapes are linked in a net¬
work not simply along a line. We discussed the possibility of
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a restricted kind of 2-d space, a "strip" of images possibly
bounded at either end and found there to be major difficul¬
ties in this. Let us then for present purposes suppose a vi¬
sual experience which is fully 2-d, where the subject can
move in any direction and not simply backwards and forwards
along straight lines.
(iv) CHANGE IN A 2-D WORLD
With a fairly basic set of assumptions we were able to create
a foundation for a visual space, for the subject's objectifi-
cation of his experience. The model at this stage lacks many
familiar refinements. Most significantly, it is completely
static. The subject experiences and re-experiences the same
sorts of shapes in the same sorts of configurations. In some
ways this is a strength: the subject is not presented with
any ambiguities or puzzles about whether a' shape is the same
particular as one experienced earlier - everything is just
where he left it, as it were. On the other hand, it is only in
a more changing form of experience that a deep grasp upon
the notions of space, particularity and re-identification is
really called for. It is in these situations where the lati¬
tude in these notions is elicited: the subject has to be cre¬
ative in his application of them.
The same parallels apply, as earlier, with the sound models
we considered. Objects may come to change their position,
that is, enter into different relations with other objects,
subject to certain constraints. A wholesale, instantaneous
re-ordering of space might be so radical as to plunge expe¬
rience into the chaos upon which objectivity can gain no
purchase. All points of reference would be lost and, conse¬
quently, a sense of the underlying space also. The difficul¬
ties might not be so great if a finite form of space were in-
- 166 -
volved. If the subject were familiar with all the objects in
his space then a kaleidoscopic re-arrangement of them, al¬
though initially disorientating, might, after a period of
careful exploration become comprehensible. Even this possi¬
bility depends upon an original state of stability. The sub¬
ject needs a period in which to establish the particulars his
space contains. This cannot be achieved if everything is in
a state of flux: one has to pretty much find the same things
in the same places to know that they are one and the same.
In a non-finite space a radical re-ordering might pull in
items from outside the subject's past experience and put
certain familiar items outside the scope of his future expe¬
rience. This would, clearly, put a much greater strain upon
the subject's grasp of space and objective particulars.
In reality, it is the space - so called - in a constant state
of flux, where the subject has no framework in which to build
up a sense of particular objects and spatial locations, that
is unacceptable from the perspective of objective interpre¬
tation. There has to be some means of determining, of items
experienced at different times, that they are identical. The
idea of providing a spatio-temporal link between the items,
is prominent. If item "x" experienced at time "t", can be
shown to have persisted through to time "t2" when item "y"
with the same qualities as "x" is experienced and there is a
continuous spatial link between the two, then "x" and "y" are
one and the same particular. Of course, the problem is that
it is often not the case that a particular is constantly ob¬
served over such periods of time. Other criteria are pressed
into use to determine such questions of identity. These we
shall consider in a moment. Spatio-temporal continuity is
considered important in terms of identity because it repre¬
sents a means of dealing with the possibility of two or more
items with exactly the same internal qualities. In a situa¬
tion of dispute - "is a or a'" identical with an item exactly
the same as these experienced at some earlier time?" - the
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test of continuity through space and time can be brought to
bear, to uniquely distinguish between the contending items.
This idea of spatio-temporal continuity, although still im¬
portant, does not have the same prominence in a static
world. The criteria that establish the identity of objects
perceived at different times where they have not been con¬
tinuously observed are relational in origin. Deciding that an
x is "this" x and not "that" one is a matter of seeing where
the respective items are in terms of the total pattern of
shapes the space. In a space where objects can move, this
question of maintaining the same relations with other ob¬
jects cannot be paramount. The assumption being that an ob¬
ject can enter into different relations with other objects
and remain the same particular. Here, where a space includes
two or more qualitatively indistinguishable items, deciding
which, if any, are identical with items experienced at an
earlier time may not be a question of inspecting the rela¬
tional patterns the items fall into. All may have moved be¬
tween the two times in question. What, then, becomes deci¬
sive is the spatio-temporal history each has. For an item,
"a'" observed at time "t2" at location "12" to be identical
with an item "a" observed at time "tl" at location "11", a
must have been in existence throughout the time-span be¬
tween tl and t2 and moved in a continuous -line of spatial
locations between 11 and 12. In the simplest case this two¬
fold continuity could be observed, but the interest is in
situations where this does not occur, especially in view of
the fact that we have noted that constant experience of the
same phenomenological items is inimical to the process of
building up a sense of the objectivity of what is experi¬
enced. In the situation where first hand experience of con¬
tinuity through change of position cannot be obtained, cer¬
tain inferential assumptions can be employed.
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A simple instance of this is where an item "a" with a set of
properties "p" is no longer experienced at a spatial position
it had previously been experienced at, yet an item "a"' with
the same set of properties is encountered at a different lo¬
cation. If it is known that there was not, previously, a p-
type item at the location where one is currently to be found,
then these are grounds for inferring that a' is in fact a. If,
further, at various intermediate times a p-type object was
observed at one or a number of locations between the loca¬
tion of a and that of a' then this lends additional weight to
the inference in question. Knowledge of the latter variety
could, also, be important in a contentious situation where
there was more than one candidate for identity with a. If at
tl, there were two known objects with p properties and at t2
neither was still in its tl location, yet there were two ob¬
jects with the same properties in different spatial positions
then, armed only with the first sort of assumption, we would
not be able to decide which later object was identical with
which earlier one, even if the situation provided grounds for
thinking that some kind of identity held between later and
earlier items. Having an awareness of intermediate
"movement" of the items involved would do much to reduce
this uncertainty insofar as it would suggest spatial routes
linking up the respective earlier and later perceived items.
Sceptical doubts are always possible, of course, and doubts
of a less radical kind will arise in many possible situations.
Where the subject does not have intermediate "sightings" of
disputed items this will be the case, or where the routes
taken by objects clearly cross in such a way as to make it
unclear which will have departed from the convergence along
which line. This is not a problem confined to our model
space, it is something we encounter in the actual world.
Although we are greatly aided by a battery of empirical laws
about the physical properties of space and the motion of ob¬
jects in it, there are still situations where we cannot pos-
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sibly attain certainty about which identities hold between
items experienced at different times. Imagine trying to track
grains of sand being churned over amid millions of others.
It might seem unquestionable that we have, in the foregoing
remarks, provided a satisfactory outline of how our basic
visual model could incorporate change or movement among its
shape objects. There are, however, certain awkwardnesses
generated by this form of space, flowing from its 2-d charac¬
ter. We have spoken of changes in position - an object of
type p leaving one set of relations with one set of objects
and coming to occupy other relations with other objects.
This is unproblematical, given certain provisos. We could
imagine a blue square at one point in the spatial pattern
coming to occupy the place of a red square of the same size
at a different point in the scheme of shapes. What raises
difficulties is if we start thinking in terms of an object of
one shape coming to occupy the place of an object of a dif¬
ferent shape or of a larger object occupying the place of a
smaller one. These presuppositions present a clash between
the transferred object and those it is meant to fit in with.
Not all of the existing shapes can be maintained: something
must be excluded or "blotted out" by the new arrival. This
may not be conceptually unacceptable in itself: we could as¬
sume that parts of objects are destroyed by other objects
moving in upon them (an overlap is unacceptable because
there is no third dimension to accommodate this). It is, how¬
ever, a fairly radical suggestion and if movement were as¬
sumed to be thus the wholescale disappearance of objects
would occur which might seriously reduce a subject's capac¬
ity to make objective sense of such an experience in the
first place. Potentially, the number of objects would be
falling all the time as more and more were destroyed - this
might compel one to assume some mode of objects coming into
being. In addition, as it stands, this account gives no at¬
tention to the spaces left behind when an object moves. This
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is the aspect which presents problems of a more general sort
in terms of our 2-d space.
The simplest way to account for objects changing position is
in terms of them moving out of their original relations with
other objects and moving through fresh sets of relations un¬
til they reach their final resting point. Other objects would
move out of the path of the travelling object, changing their
relations with each other, somewhat, in the process. To
change position objects would "push their way through" the
other objects not impinging upon their shapes in doing so,
but modifying their positions relative to each other. Such an
account requires spaces or "gaps" within the spatial scheme.
If objects are not to be intrinsically altered they must have
space to move into to allow another object to pass by them.
This creates a new kind of motion within our visual space as
presently described, the 2-d space represents a kind of
plenum: it is entirely filled by shape objects, they fit
flushly together like the pieces of a completed jig-saw, so
there is no scope for re-arrangement of the sort needed. The
only possible form of motion here is like that proposed by
Descartes in his PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY (5) where he
speaks of the movement of objects in actual space as involv¬
ing a "circulation" a view dictated by his disbelief in the
notion of a vacuum. The situation is one of continuous dis¬
placement. If a circle or wheel or ring composed of different
coloured shapes is imagined, it is possible to conceive of
this being rotated without disturbance being caused to any
other items than those in the circle or etc. Genuine move¬
ment occurs - the position of shapes in the circle are dif¬
ferent vis a vis those surrounding it, yet the notion of
empty space does not have to be involved. Many more complex
versions of this can be envisaged for our 2-d space using
continuous chains of shapes of the same thickness - some
operating within others. Clearly, however, this is a re-
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stricted form of motion compared with that made possible by
empty spaces.
The obvious response would seem to be to include some gaps
or spaces in our visual model, but this brings its own prob¬
lems. From a phenomenological point of view, a gap must ap¬
pear the same as an object in such a 2-d space. We cannot
have invisible gaps, if they are to exist in the network of
objects they must have a visual presence. Even if we could
imagine such a thing as a non-colour in such a context, a
shape would be given, negatively, by the configuration of
shapes around the space. The first difficulty this presents
is that, from an initial visual encounter with such a space,
a subject would not be able to distinguish objects from
spaces between them, visually they would be equivalent. So,
we would have to suppose that an understanding of what was
space and what was an object would have to be built up
through experience of the movements of the shape objects.
Perhaps, for instance, the subject comes ' to see a certain
shade of blue as being empty space. Initially, he sees this
shade as being a normal part of the patchwork of shape ob¬
jects, but later, as certain other coloured shapes move
around, he notices that they always move into these blue ar¬
eas, thereby impinging upon and reducing the blue shapes in
question. At the same time, he might notice fresh blue
shapes appearing between the moving shape and the shape-
object it has moved away from. Perhaps it is also observed
that shapes of no other colour are affected or created by
changes in the position of shapes.
Such a scenario certainly gives a plausible account of how a
distinction between objects and empty space might be estab¬
lished. There are metaphysical difficulties which persist,
however. There is a basic problem about objects and what
they occupy - space - being the same sort of thing from a
phenomenological point of view. In Chapter Two we spoke of
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the dubiety of the "master sound" in Strawson's sound model
because it involved the representation of ontologically dis¬
tinct entities in a phenomenologically identical way. Space
and objects are separate but inextricably linked notions;
objects are perceived, space is not. The existence and
character of space is inferred from an awareness of objects.
At least, this is the pattern we are familiar with. In our ac¬
tual 3-d world, the idea that empty space is visible leads to
incoherence, for it is essential that empty space be trans¬
parent in order for anything to be seen at all. If empty
space were visible in its own right we would effectively see
nothing but empty space given that there is always a gap be¬
tween us and objects. One could go so far as to say that en¬
tertaining the idea of a visible 3-d space, qua space, is a
contradiction of the nature of a 3-d space. In fact, such a
suggestion, insofar as it could be given content at all,
might generate the phenomenology for a 2-d rather than a 3-d
visual space, given that we could be constantly presented
with a coloured expanse of space itself.
Of course, it is not that we see nothing when we experience
the empty spaces in a 3-d space. I have argued that a 3-d
form of perception is based upon primary 2-d imagery. That
is, there cannot be invisible parts of our visual field in 3-d
perceiving anymore than for 2-d. Every part of our images of
3-d space is occupied by some coloured patch. When 3-d ob¬
jects change position they must visually encroach upon
other objects in just the same way as described a moment
ago in our 2-d model. Visually, parts of what is seen will
disappear and other items appear, as objects move. The cru¬
cial difference here is that the assumption that the space
observed is three-dimensional allows one to account for
these disappearances and creations without reference to
empty space. When one part of what is seen comes to be oc¬
cupied by another part of what is seen (where one object
moves in front of another) what disappears is only taken to
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disappear visually, not objectively. We are not witnessing
space being filled and a fresh space being created. An empty
space is filled and a fresh one is created simultaneously
elsewhere, but that is not what is seen. What one sees is
one part of physical space - objects - being obscured and
another part - other objects - being exposed by the movement
of a nearer object. The necessary empty space in this pro¬
cess is not a part of the visual field. In the situation we
sketched for the 2-d model, space itself was taken to be a
visual element in what is seen. Is this, then, a completely
unacceptable situation? After all, we have already stated
that there must be significant differences between a 2-d and
a 3-d space.
What was problematical in Strawson's model and its use of
the "master-sound" concept was, firstly, that there was a
tendency for space and objects to blur into each other be¬
cause of their being experientially the same. Secondly, the
master-sound was actually redundant from 'the point of view
of creating spatial or quasi-spatial relationships between
sounds. The first of these difficulties does apply to the
proposal we are considering at present. There is potential
for space and shape objects to become confused, though we
have suggested that experience could provide a means of
distinguishing between the two. The issue in point does not
arise at all, however. It has not been assumed that space it¬
self be visible in order for 2-d objects to be located in it.
A sense of location and of particular parts of space is gen¬
erated by a framework of relatively unchanging objects -
shapes - rather than by the fluctuating colour spaces be¬
tween them. This corresponds to actual space, in which we do
not build up a sense of location from empty spaces, for one
space is very much like another, but from objects which are
usually very different from each other. The present proposal
does not face the same level of criticism as the master-
sound spatial model, but difficulties remain.
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The crucial issue is whether the intelligibility of our 2-d
model is destroyed by the assumption that empty spaces and
objects can be phenomenologically identical. Once a subject
has become familiar with the dynamics, if you like, of his vi¬
sual world, of the way in which shapes move and the empty
space colour is affected, there seems no reason why his
grasp upon the enduring shapes as objective particulars
should be jeopardized. They still seem to meet the criteria
for external objects. The controversy has to centre upon the
changing shapes; of the colour we have designated for the
empty spaces, that is. If objects are not threatened, how¬
ever, half the battle is won; the issue simply becomes one of
how exactly to categorise the changing gaps between ob¬
jects. It is possible for the subject to see these as empty
spaces, that is, an entirely different sort of thing from ob¬
jects. The only problem with this is accounting for the fact
that what is essentially the absence of objects should have
a visual presence - equivalent to that >of objects them¬
selves. A way round this would be a version of the account I
discussed earlier where motion was achieved by the destruc¬
tion of certain objects and the instantaneous creation of
others. In this case, only objects of a certain class - the
given shade of blue - would be subject to this process. Such
an account involves all the awkwardness already mentioned,
but is not, essentially, absurd. It seems to me that, as long
as the model contains sufficient order to ground an objec¬
tive interpretation of items within it, then the details of
how motion is to be accounted for are, relatively, unimpor¬
tant.
The only practical difficulty that could arise is from the
possibility of there being objects having the same colour as
empty space because, obviously, there is the problem of such
objects being mistaken for empty space and there is, also,
the difficulty of such objects moving through space them-
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selves for they would completely merge with it. If certain
patches of the blue in question retained their integrity,
never becoming smaller or disappearing then this would be
reasonable grounds for assuming them to be objects rather
than spaces, but doubt would always be possible. It would,
however, be wrong to assume that doubt, uncertainty and am¬
biguity never occur in real 3-d space or our perceptions of
it.
I implied earlier that, for certain areas of a visual image to
be regarded as empty spaces other areas would have to re¬
tain their shape under re-arrangements at the expense of the
first areas. In general, this kind of distinction must pre¬
vail; the shapes which are to be objects cannot be as muta¬
ble as those which are to be the empty spaces. At the same
time, it is possible for a measure of change to apply to
shape-objects. There is no reason why they should not alter
their shape or their size. There is also no reason why they
should not break up into smaller objects or more interest¬
ingly, enter into composite objects with other shapes. The
norm in our visual world is objects which are composed out
of many, visually distinct elements and are complexes of
colour patches. What causes us to treat such disparate ele¬
ments as if they were all aspects of one object is the
strength of the bonds they exhibit between them. In cases of
movement, they all move together retaining the same configu¬
ration. A similar situation can be envisaged for shape ob¬
jects in our 2-d world. There could be collections of shapes
which moved around as a unit, and demonstrated the kind of
dynamics we associate with parts or aspects of a single ob¬
ject. Again, what is called for is a rigidity in general; vari¬
ation is still possible. "Parts" of objects could become de¬
tached, to be free-floating or part of other conglomerate ob¬
jects. Naturally, there is much more scope for all of this in
a model which incorporates empty spaces, but it is still pos-
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sible to a limited extent in the more restricted kind of
model we considered.
One other form of motion or re-arrangement remains a possi¬
bility in our 2-d model. This is a version of the "jump" or
"leap" based form of transition discussed in respect of
sound spaces. Here, one would envisage instantaneous sub¬
stitutions of shapes for each other. Thus, shape "a" at one
location in the shape scheme might exchange with shape "b"
at some different location. Or, more complexly, shape "a"
might replace shape "b" which, in turn, replaces shape "c"
which perhaps fills a's location. These substitutions would
be simple and sudden and involve no displacement of other
shape objects. No process of motion, in the sense of a con¬
tinuous transition through a line of points between origin
and resting place would occur; what is located at one point
would simply come to be located at another. Some constraints
might need to be imposed: if empty space is unacceptable,
then only objects of the same shape and size could exchange
places. There does not seem to be any great problem about
describing such a form of movement, though, as ever, we have
to assume that such rearrangements happen on a manageable
scale; unintelligibility would set in if all objects were ex¬
changing places from moment to moment. It is still open to
question, however, whether such a process is metaphysically
acceptable.
The difficulty with such a mode of transition is that it,
clearly, breaks with one half of our principle for identity
i.e. spatio-temporal continuity. Objects start off in one
place and end up somewhere else without there being any
spatial link. This presents several puzzles: one is the ques¬
tion of how the object got from A- to B without there being
any occupation of points between. One response to such a
query is to say that it is mistakenly based upon assumptions
derived from actual experience. In our world, objects cannot
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just dematerialize to reappear elsewhere, but this might be
considered a contingent feature of our world with no concep¬
tual ramifications. Essentially, an object at one point in
space is found at another point in space an instant later;
we do not have to assume any temporal break. The qualities
of the object remain exactly the same. Surely, it is ontolog-
ically gratuitous to assume that a fresh particular has come
into being? Even if we do take such a strict line, no essen¬
tial damage is done to the notion of the space itself. We
still have a framework of other objects which remain con¬
stant. What is important, in general, is that we can have a
range of experiences structured in a certain way, and that
it is possible for these experiences to repeat. We need the
ability to re-encounter certain configurations of objects, to
be able to build up a belief that certain things not being
experienced at a given time can be experienced. It is from
such regularities and dependabilities, that a sense of ob¬
jects enduring outside of experience arises and, more impor¬
tantly, the idea of a space with a character defined by such
objects. It is the commitment to a space, a potential for
certain configurations of objects/experiences that is cru¬
cial. This can only occur by a repetition of certain experi¬
ences; by re-encounters with things filling and defining
space. This can be achieved by less than perfect persis¬
tence or regularity. Not everything must endure between or
during perceptions nor need the same relations between
things persist. The notion of the sudden re-arrangement of
particulars spoken of does not radically break with the ba¬
sic requirements of consistency.
The issue of identity remains: what are we to say of shapes
which occur in this way? Are they one and the same or dif¬
ferent? Simplicity would demand that we treat them as identi¬
cals and maintain the idea of shape-objects moving around
their world, albeit in a rather dramatic fashion. The one
consideration which goes against this treatment, however, is
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the question of discrimination in a situation where two
shapes, exactly the same, move at just the same moment.
Where we have qualitatively identical shape objects "a"' and
"a'" at one moment, and then objects "b" and "b'" with the
same qualities as a and a' in the places of other objects
which have taken the places of a and a', a moment later, who
can say which of b and b', a or a' is identical with? Of
course, uncertainties can arise in our world, but there is
always a fact of the matter, a difference in principle, be¬
cause spatially distinct histories would apply to the dis¬
puted objects. Here, this cannot be the case: no possible
difference can be attributed to the objects to allow identity
to be traced. Perhaps, this is enough to rule out the pro¬
posed exchanges as a mode of exchange of particulars. As it
is, alternative acceptable modes are possible for our 2-d vi¬
sual space.
We have said quite a lot about the possibility of a 2-d vi-
sual world, and tried to show how an experience involving 2-
d images could conform to the basic requirements necessary
for an objective interpretation of it. Possible sophistica¬
tions of the most basic model of 2-d space have been out¬
lined. What it is important to do now is to consider the rela¬
tionship between 2-d and 3-d visual experience. Given that I
have claimed that an awareness of a 3-d world can be
achieved purely from 2-d images, it is important to see how
this process operates.
(v) A 3-D MODEL
From what has been said earlier, the difference between a
visual experience of a 2-d world and that of a 3-d world is
not encapsulated in a single image. On an image by image ba¬
sis, there is nothing to tell us whether an image is that of
objects in 2-d or in 3-d space: any given image could be part
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of a 2-d or a 3-d experience. What, therefore, is decisive is
the context a single image exists in, the sequence or net¬
work of images to which it belongs. What was noted as char¬
acteristic of the sequence of images for a 2-d space was the
unchanging shape presented by the shape objects as the
field of view passed over them. Objects could move from one
side of the subject's visual field to the other and remain
constant in shape throughout. What is characteristic of 3-d
space is that its objects do alter in shape as the subject's
visual field moves (apart from certain exceptional circum¬
stances where the objects are rotating in synchronization
with the viewer). The alteration is fluid and constant: the
subject does not have a set of different images in an obvi¬
ous sense, because a finite number of images is not in¬
volved. At arbitrary points in a sequence, the subject will
be aware of different images, but generally, what he will be
aware of are images evolving through a series of infinites-
simal variations. The seamless quality of the change in¬
volved is important because it precludes the division of the
image flow or sequence into separate items. It is not possi¬
ble for the subject to review a finite collection of distinct
images. This is important because it "welds" the images in a
subject's visual experience together and prevents it from
being fragmentary. When we walk around an object we are not
presented with a broken sequence of differing images,
rather, we experience a continuum of images, a seamless
flow.
Thus, in our world, the subject's experience would change
from an initial image which could be of either a 2-d or a 3-d
image, to an image that was a modification of that image,
where all the shapes of the first image had changed to some
degree, but this transition would not involve a leap or a
sudden jump from one image to a differing one. One image
flows or evolves from another. A continuous sequence of im¬
ages is involved in a 2-d experience, of course, but there
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all that alters is what is seen and what is not seen, not the
shapes of the things seen. In an exploration of a 3-d space,
we will still expect the phenomenon of items leaving or en¬
tering the visual field: it is the alteration in the shape of
items remaining within the field of view that is distinctive
of an experience of 3-d space. Of course to talk of "items"
changing or altering within the field of view is controver¬
sial at this point in a reconstruction of the epistemological
process involved. From the perspective of a naive subject,
all that is untheoretically experienced is a change in the
shapes within his visual field. It is a further step to think
of the shapes that change being the shapes of particulars or
individual objects. Because of the "flow" that is involved in
these shape changes, it is not possible for the subject to
regard his experience as a succession of unrelated images.
One shape clearly becomes another and, to that extent, a ba¬
sic kind of order exists in such an experience.
The fact that shapes evolve, however, does not amount, by
itself, to those shapes being objects in a space or their be¬
ing the same particulars through change. One could envisage
all kinds of shape evolutions within an image which bore no
relation to those characteristic of an experience of a 3-d
space. Think of an image consisting of shapes in a constant
state of flux, in no way would this correspond to the visual
experience of walking past or around three-dimensional ob¬
jects .
Consequently, to put our subject in touch with a 3-d space
in any sense at all, we must assume a certain kind of flow of
images; a continuum which conforms to a certain ordering.
This does not mean that there is a finite number or pre-de¬
fined set of image sequences. The possibilities are infinite
but not unrestricted: certain patterns or criteria have to be
conformed to. Characterizing the exact way in which a given
image or shape within an image has to alter in order for that
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image or shape to be treated as belonging to a 3-d space is
no easy task in terms of producing a geometrical definition.
It is not necessary for our purposes. As visual experients
of a 3-d world, we all have an intuitive grasp upon what
fluctuations in images are consistent with an experience of
a 3-d space and which are not. The understanding involved is
an impressive one given the infinite range of sequences
available for any image.
In our 2-d model the subject could "move" or his field of
view could change along any number of flat axes; the world
is two-dimensional and the possibilities of exploration are
the same. In a 3-d world these possibilities are infinitely
enhanced. There is the kind of exploration which can be con¬
ducted in a single plane, as in a 2-d world, but producing
different sequences of images. There is, also, exploration
which involves movement in both planes. If we think of con¬
fronting a single object, the possibilities of movement
around it are potentially infinite, as are the images avail¬
able thereby. Consequently, in terms of our theoretical sub¬
ject confronting his first image, we must make available to
him ranges of images flowing from that image that are of the
sort obtainable by viewpoint changes in 3-d space. In a way,
we are thinking of strings of images, and an infinite number
of such, leading off from a single image or shape, each one
to represent movement along a certain 3-d spatial route.
Naturally, these sequences are not all separated from each
other, there are infinite possibilities for their interconnec¬
tion. If one thinks of an object being surrounded by an infi¬
nite galaxy of observation points at all different angles and
distances from the object each affording its own distinct
image of the object then it is clear that these points can be
linked up in any number of ways, though not in any way at all
(unless we allow a subject to jump from point to point - al¬
though that may not be an unintelligible option.) In actual¬
ity, many of these observation points are not available to
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an observer, even in principle, because the space involved
is tilled by other objects. If our model is not to consist of
a space occupied by a single object, this feature would have
to be incorporated which, of course, demands further visual
possibilities in itself; namely those connected with the vi¬
sual appearance of the obstructing object.
Although a given image or shape determines what further im¬
ages or shapes it can be linked to, under a 3-d interpreta¬
tion of it, it does not do so absolutely. Because a side of
an object seen at one point does not disappear with an imme¬
diate change of position, though a part of it may disappear
from view, the later image will have to incorporate it al¬
though in changed form. The fresh shape that this side pre¬
sents from a new position is subject to the kind of rules
characteristic of a 3-d space that we have spoken of. Not
any new shape is possible. At the same time, however, the
change of position may have brought a part of the object
into view that was not previously visible, and what this is
and the image it presents is not something that could be
predicted from the previous image. A given image, if it is
taken as a view part of a 3-d object, pre-determines how that
side will appear in later images assumed to be had from dif¬
ferent viewpoints, but not the character or appearance of
other, unseen sides or parts of the object, in detail.
From a sceptical point of view, one might want to argue, at
this point, that although we have provided our subject with
an initial image and then, perhaps, an experience of images
which involve variations of that image which are of the type
we have in our visual experience and which we have just
been characterising, it is still possible for the subject not
to treat his experience as of a 3-d world. There are two pos¬
sibilities: one, traditional, total scepticism about the ob¬
jective nature of what is experienced, the other, a 2-d in¬
terpretation of what is experienced. I shall not consider the
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first of these, because it is a topic we have discussed
elsewhere, but it is worth mentioning that in a form of expe¬
rience where things vary constantly, as they do in 3-d expe¬
rience, the scope for scepticism is, perhaps, greater. The
second possible re-interpretation is more interesting. What
would be required would be a notion of a 2-d space filled
with very volatile objects. In the 2-d model we have already
outlined, the possibility of objects changing yet re-identi¬
fication remaining feasible has been established. Thus, the
shape modifications an object undergoes when we think of
ourselves as moving around it, could be interpreted as a 2-d
object evolving or altering its character whilst we remain
static. This might not be entirely the case, some combination
or alteration in the character of the objects and movement
of the observer or the scope of his visual field might be re¬
quired, given that objects would still disappear from and re¬
enter the visual field.
Is this a viable alternative to a 3-d interpretation? I think
that are several serious obstacles to such an approach. One
immediate problem is that of deriving a firm sense of space
from such an experience, that is, achieving a sense of
places or particular "bits" of space. In the earlier 2-d model
it was possible to acquire a sense of the underlying charac¬
ter of space from the shape objects occupying it, because,
in general, they remained static during an exploration of
space by the observer. Here, every movement of the visual
field, i.e. every time a part of space leaves or enters the
view, produces a change in the shape of the object. This
makes it difficult, if not impossible to form an understand¬
ing of the permanent properties of the 2-d space; the prop¬
erties that endure through the fluctuations in the objects.
Without this concept of space, the alterations in the shapes
are meaningless in objective terms; all we have is a subjec¬
tive sequence of images. What, possibly, prevents this re¬
duction occurring is the fact that it is possible to re-lo-
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cate shapes and earlier configurations. Some kind of route
can be traced through experience by the observer, he can
move back through familiar images and find previously en¬
countered shapes. This at least allows a facility for re-
identif ication, even if an understanding of the space in
which objects have persisted is uncertain.
A further, possible, difficulty is the fact that objects, in
such a spatial scheme, change in ways which are completely
ordered yet inexplicably so. A subject can move his field of
view along a certain stretch of the supposed 2-d space and
objects will be constantly changing before they leave the
visual field and others enter it, and at any point, the sub¬
ject can reverse the direction of his observation and re-ex¬
perience the same shapes. The shape-objects can be made to
flow back through all of the shapes they have passed out of.
That this is the case can only be taken as a completely ar¬
bitrary feature of such a world. A 3-d interpretation, how¬
ever, gives a rational explanation of this fact: such
changes in appearance and their reversibility derive, neces¬
sarily, from the nature of 3-d space. This, takes us to the
heart of the difference between adopting a 2-d as opposed to
a 3-d interpretation of the same experience. A 3-d under¬
standing makes the phenomena intelligible in a way that a 2-
d reading cannot. One source of perplexity in a 2-d account
is the fact that objects alter their shape every time the
field of view is moved. It is surely strange, if the items ob¬
scured are meant to have an existence independent of the
observer, that every change of his observation point is ac¬
companied by a change in the shape of objects.
One of the most important features of the difference between
the two accounts lies in the area of the predictability of
future experiences. If we consider another problematic as¬
pect of a 2-d interpretation, we can see an illustration of
this. It is possible for a subject to move so as to return to
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his starting point without simply reversing the direction of
his observation and this is true for the 2-d interpretation
as well as the 3-d one, given that both are taken to share
the same phenomenology. Expressed in 3-d terms it is possi¬
ble to approach an object from an unfamiliar aspect. One can
leave an object having seen one side of it, travel through
space, viewing different objects and circle round it so as to
re-experience the object from another side.
Considering this situation in 2-d terms the first problem
would be to state what reason the subject could have for
thinking the later experience an experience of the same ob¬
ject given the fact that the shape seen would be different
from the earlier one and not one that had been seen to
evolve out of it. As it stands, the subject would have no
reason, on the basis of a 2-d interpretation of his experi¬
ence, to think the later shape identical with the earlier one
as an object. A reason could be obtained if the subject went
on to experience the intermediate shapes or modifications
existing between the later shape and the earlier one: if he
moved his visual field over the object until he reached the
initial image. Only by linking up with former experience in
this way can a re-identification happen.
This is not necessarily the case under a 3-d interpretation
of the same experience. Here, a subject would have two rea¬
sons to treat the later shape as an image of an object expe¬
rienced in the previous shape. Firstly, in his movements or
as the sequence of images went by, the subject would be
forming a conception of himself as moving through different
locations in 3-d space. The subject would treat his changing
visual experiences as those of moving past objects (fixed in
character, rather than in a state of flux) in a certain direc¬
tion through specific parts of space. Thus, by the time he
re-experiences the original object, he should already know
that he is approaching the same point in space, but from a
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different direction. He should not need further experiential
data to determine this, it is implied by the experience he
has already had, coupled with a 3-d interpretation of that
experience. Even if the object looks quite different from a
different side, the subject has every reason to be sure that
he is seeing the same spatial particular. He is, indeed, com¬
pelled to assume so by the logic of the assumptions he has
already made about what he has experienced.
A second reason for a subject, operating with a 3-d spatial
interpretation, to make the re-identification in question is
the fact that the earlier image does, to some extent, dictate
the form the later image- must take. We have already discused
this when we spoke of how the appearance of the object from
one aspect has consequences for the appearance of the ob¬
ject from other aspects. The closer the aspects are to¬
gether, the more this is the case, but the effect is always
present in some measure (primarily in shape terms rather
than those of colour). Having.seen an object from one point
of view, we have a reasonable idea of what it will look like
from a different point of view in that not just any shape is
possible. Consequently, in the present situation, the sub¬
ject has grounds, in the character of the shape he sees, for
thinking that he is viewing the same object, irrespective of
any other spatial considerations that apply of the sort just
mentioned.
It has to be conceded, however, that it is possible to give
an account under the 2-d interpretative scheme of how a sub¬
ject could have these predictive or anticipatory powers. By
an empirical process a subject could build up an understand¬
ing of the shape transformations that are possible for 2-d
objects. A set of geometrical laws or regularities could be
established from the behaviour of objects in the 2-d world
which would allow, perhaps, the same sorts of predictions to
occur as those we have just judged to be available under a
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3-d interpretation of the visual material. The system would
be immensely complex, but this is not an objection in itself.
The crucial difference between this mode of prediction or
anticipation and one based upon a 3-d space is at a concep¬
tual and explanatory level. The system that is based upon
the assumption of a 2-d space and continuously fluctuating
objects is essentially one of laws or regularities which are
contingent. Patterns are discerned in the experiential phe¬
nomena, shapes are related to shapes under laws, but no
deeper explanation of these regularities can be given.
Whatever necessity is involved is a contingent one of con¬
stant conjunction. It is a simple fact that 2-d shape objects
behave as they do, other patterns could be envisaged with¬
out detriment to the notion of a 2-d space being present.
In the case of a 3-d interpretation of the same experience,
the surface laws are the same, but there is also an underly¬
ing explanation for the existence of such regularities. A
metaphysical structure which grounds the laws in question is
present, namely that of 3-d space. The geometrical regulari¬
ties are no longer contingent ones; they are necessary,
given the commitment to a 3-d space. This does not mean that
a 3-d space exists necessarily; that such a space exists is
a matter of contingency. Experience might have been differ¬
ent and the grounds for a 3-d space absent from it. Given,
however, a phenomenology which allows for a 3-d interpreta¬
tion of it, the assumption of such a space necessitates the
kinds of regularities - connections between appearances -
that we have spoken of. In this situation, it is inconceiv¬
able that things had turned out otherwise: relationships be¬
tween aspects of objects have to be as they are; to assume
differently is to contradict the 3-d spatial interpretation of
the experience given - in direct contrast with the freedom
allowed by a 2-d interpretation.
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What is being invoked, here, is the fundamental concept of
3-d space itself, the essence of what it is to conceive of
experience as revealing objects in a 3-d space. Even if the
net effects of both interpretations are the same in phe-
nomenological terms, it should be seen that, at a conceptual
level, the 3-d interpretation unites experience in a much
more radical and powerful way. It is quite a different thing
to comprehend experience in 3-d terms as opposed to 2-d
ones. The weight in favour of a 3-d interpretation given by
considerations of simplicity and greater intelligibility is,
of course, significantly added to by the conjunction of our
form of visual experience with our form of tactual experi¬
ence. Coupling the two together leaves no room for a 2-d in¬
terpretation.
It is in the notion of an aspect that the difference in ques¬
tion, importantly, reveals itself. What would have to be ac¬
counted for as alterations in the shape and size of an ob¬
ject in a 2-d scheme, can be explained in terms of different
aspects in a 3-d interpretation. The essence of the idea of
an aspect is that items in space present more than one image
or appearance. This is achieved in one of two ways: by a
change in the orientation of the spatial items or by a
change in the position of the observer relative to the item.
Thus a two-fold concept is involved: objects do not just
present different aspects, they do so in accordance with a
change in position relative to an observer or a viewpoint. In
making three-dimensional sense of the changing appearance
of a visual object, a subject has to assume a complex visual
character for the object and also alterations in the rela¬
tionship between the object and the observation point. It
can be seen that the key 3-d spatial concepts do not arrive
piecemeal but as a complete package. If changes in visual
imagery, (i.e. the shape evolutions we have been consider¬
ing) are to be given a 3-d understanding, then it is not just
a conception of these shapes which is extended, for an inte-
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gral part of understanding those shapes along 3-d lines is
developing the full range of 3-d spatial notions. The rest of
the space the object exists in and the spatial relationship
between the subject and the object must arrive at the same
time (6).
Perhaps, the most significant notion that is involved in a 3-
d conception of experience is that the nature of an object
or occupant of space cannot be exhausted by a single per¬
ceptual encounter with it. This is a radical departure from
previous spatial schemes we have considered. Sound objects
and 2-d visual objects could be known completely in a single
perceptual act - to experience them at all is to experience
all of them, they have no hidden qualities. Here, it is possi¬
ble to experience an object but only have a partial aware¬
ness of its qualities. In fact, it is actually impossible to
be aware of the full nature of a 3-d object at any moment.
That this is so follows directly from the nature of 3-d
space. It is a contradiction of the notion of a 3-d object
that it be apprehended in a single perceptual image. One
reason for this is that there must be an infinite number of
different aspects to any item extended in 3-d space - albeit
minimally different in many cases.
I have spoken as if a viewpoint is logically entailed by a 3-
d interpretation of items in visual experience; this may not
fully be the case. What is required is that some account be
given of the changes in shape an object is supposed to un¬
dergo. The basic situation is that of a subject experiencing
a shape within his visual field which subtly changes into
different shapes. Under a 3-d interpretation, a subject must,
in such a situation, assume himself to be continuously view¬
ing the same object and also an object which remains the
same and does not change its qualities. This presents the
difficulty of explaining the undeniable visual change in the
object - its shape alterations. I suggested that there are
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two ways of achieving this, one is to attribute a change of
position to the object, the other is to attribute a change of
position to the viewer. Perhaps, all that is required is an
assertion that a different side of the object is being seen.
This may avoid any suggestion that the viewer is observing
from a particular point in space and rather, that he is sim¬
ply aware of different sides of objects at different times.
This may not be successful, for it could be argued that it is
necessary to be in different positions to see different
sides of things and that the idea of seeing a different side
of something necessarily involves the idea of seeing an ob¬
ject from a different point or perspective. In seeing a fresh
shape, one is seeing what an object looks like from here or
what is looks like when it turns away from where we are. If
we accept that this is a part of the entailments of a 3-d
space, this does not mean that we are committed to physical
embodiment of an observer; seeing can be mediated by points
in space without the observer having to, spatially occupy
those points.
The idea of a single perception or perceptual act is defi¬
nitely entailed by a 3-d visual theory. This cannot simply be
defined as what one sees at any single moment because
binocular vision is a fact and the possibility of seeing from
a multitude of points (or of seeing many sides of an object)
at once is a viable one. A visual perception in this case has
got to be logically related to the notion of a 3-d object.
Going along with the idea of an object in 3-d space is the
idea of that object having an infinity of distinct aspects.
Having these aspects involves giving rise to separate im¬
ages for a viewer. The notion of an aspect and that of a
single view or perception are interlinked: it is not possible
to explain one without reference to the other.
The situation is complicated, somewhat by the possibility of
perfectly symmetrical, regular objects, objects which pre-
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sent the same shape and appearance from any perspective.
Here, although what one sees does not change in imagistic
terms (although the background may do so) one is seeing dif¬
ferent spatial parts of the object. A 3-d spatial understand¬
ing dictates that one assume, in spatial terms, that differ¬
ent parts of space or different bits of an object are being
seen, even if they appear qualitatively the same. The poten¬
tial exists, in such objects to be irregular: one cannot know
in advance, from an initial glance, that an object is uniform
in appearance. Discovering that an object is the same from
all sides (and this is something one can never be absolutely
certain of) is as contentful concerning the 3-d character of
that object as the more usual discovery that an object does
not present a uniform appearance. Of course, there are pos¬
sible epistemological difficulties where there are no back¬
ground clues as to changes in the observer's view - if the
object continues to look the same how does he know whether
he is seeing a different part of it or not?i One could expect
such situations to be exceptional.
The question of spatial surroundings or background objects
is, generally, an important one and one which has been ne¬
glected so far because of the rudimentary approach we have
been following in focusing upon the individual object. In
fact, most of our understanding of 3-d space comes from ex¬
periencing collections of objects. Part of building up an
idea of space is, not just experiencing the different as¬
pects of individual objects, but seeing how those objects
visually interact with other objects in space. If we consider
an initial image, prior to a spatial interpretation, it will
consist, let us suppose, of a collection of shapes. Even if
the subject speculates that these shapes are 3-d objects,
he cannot know exactly how they are related to each other
spatially; he can have no idea of which object is in front of
which, for instance. As the image changes (as the subject
moves) and the individual shapes start to change, in the
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characteristic ways we have been discussing, so, too, the
relationship between the shapes will change; some will get
nearer to each other, some will get smaller as others get
larger; nearer objects change more than those further away.
The forms these alterations can take are manifold, as many
as there are ways of moving through a spatial scheme, but it
is by experiencing such changing patterns that a subject
builds up a full sense of 3-d space. The exact process in¬
volved being, of course, very complex.
To sum up, as far as 3-d space is concerned: what is vital
to it is that there be a visual experience where shapes
evolve continuously into different shapes and do so in a
particular kind of way (not any flow of shapes will do). It is
this seamless quality of change which allows for the postu-
lation of continuity of particulars. Also, relationships be¬
tween shapes will change in certain types of ways. Upon this
changing experience is imposed a 3-d interpretation which
unites the changing appearances under an assumption of sta¬
bility at the objective level. It does this by introducing the
metaphysical notion of a 3-d object. One of the central fea¬
tures of this concept is the aspectival one. This provides
for an object enduring without a change in its nature (or,
possibly, position) while presenting a multitude of distinct
appearances. By means of this metaphysical structure a
whole range of predictions about the form of future visual
experience is possible.
The aspectival character of 3-d objects is probably the most
conceptually taxing one. It represents a departure from pre¬
vious assumptions about objective particulars. It is harder
to think of there being an essence to objects, some well de¬
fined character, that is, which can be experienced in any
encounter with these objects. Rather, an object is some kind
of aggregate of a multitude of different possible appear¬
ances. More than one perception is needed to arrive at an
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awareness of the full nature of an object, and there is al¬
ways an element of uncertainty, given the infinite number of
possible perspectives. This is something we are prone to
forget at a conscious level (though not intuitively) and we
have a welter of conventional images of worldly objects. A
penny, for instance, is always thought of as round and not
as an ellipse or an oblong. Prima facie, it might seem a prob¬
lem that 3-d objects are like this; surely an object must be
one thing and not an infinity? There is no reason why this
should be so. The fact that an object has a massive even in¬
finite number of qualities does not mean that it is not de¬
terminate for it has its own characteristic infinity. Also, we
must remember that an object fills a determinate part of
space. The aspects or sides are not just piled up on top of
each other, they are linked together around a given part of
3-d space. The different aspects of a thing give us an un-
»
derstanding of how a particular part of space is occupied,
they are harmonized with each other.
What is interesting about this is that the terms in which we
think about objects can no longer be simple or straightfor¬
wardly imagistic. We cannot, as was possible earlier, iden¬
tify an object with any single experience or phenomenologi-
cal encounter with it. Nor is there a definite totality of
such images which captures the nature of an object. Our be¬
lief in the existence of a particular object commits us to
the possibility of certain perceptual experiences, and we
can test the validity of our belief by the occurrence or ab¬
sence of these, but what an object is is not strictly re¬
ducible to these phenomenological experiences. This is a
good example of the way in which elementary sensory experi¬
ences can ground or be subsumed by theories or ontological
commitments which are not simple summaries of those experi¬
ences but intellectual extensions of them. Where 3-d space
is concerned, one is moving suddenly from concrete phe¬
nomenological roots to sophisticated abstractions. I think it
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is important to note that, even in terms of a basic model
such as ours, lacking in any of the physical phenomena and
qualities of actual, material objects, a significant level of
theory and conceptual complexity is involved. This will be
seen to be of importance later.
Another sophistication of our visual worlds (mentioned al¬
ready in connection with 2-d spaces) lies in our individua¬
tion of objects. In a sound world, an object is a simple
thing and, possibly, the same would be true in a taste or
smell world also. There is not, in general, a difficulty about
deciding where one item stops and another begins. This is
not nearly so true in a visual space. Metaphysical simples
do not occur to visual sense. Visual space is occupied by
matter; by something which is impervious to sight, which pre¬
sents a particular colour to an observer on its surface.
Large tracts of the space we experience are occupied in this
way, if they were not we would have no experience of space
at all, although it would still be there. These areas of
space are not filled by some kind of uniform material, how¬
ever. There is great diversity in the visual appearance of
matter and, most importantly, this applies within spatially
continuous occurrences of it. It is not just that spatially
separate areas are separately coloured but, within those ar¬
eas themselves, a variety of colours can be presented. The
simplest way of dividing up the visual into particular ob¬
jects would be on the basis of colour: continuous areas of
the same colour would constitute single objects. In a 2-d
space, such an approach might be reasonably successful,
but, even there, we noted how such coloured areas might
break up and move in conjunction with areas of a different
colour. It is the exigencies of a world that changes which
dictate what is to be treated as an object. Movement in a 2-d
world decided what collections of coloured patches should
be treated as objects. If, during a process of re-arrange-
ment, certain coloured expanses maintain their relations
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among themselves, then this provides grounds for treating
them as comprising some kind of single unit. The motivations
for this are ones of practicality and convenience and not
essentially ones of metaphysics. In such a world, there can¬
not be some deep or ultimate unit which is to constitute an
object. There has to be a sense in which divisions are arbi¬
trary or relative to a particular purpose.
All of this is especially true in the case of 3-d experience.
The fact that space has depth means that anything occupying
space presents more than one aspect and can be viewed from
different positions. This means that what we tend to treat as
a single object is a continuous piece of matter which is de¬
tached or easily detachable from other areas of matter,
something, in other words, which can be inspected from all
sides. The property of moving as a unit is, of course, impor¬
tant here also. Colour becomes largely irrelevant to the in¬
dividuation of objects. In a 3-d world this is particularly
pronounced because of the fact that any spatial occupant is
very unlikely to show a uniform coloration from all perspec¬
tives; if only for the reason that light and shade will al¬
ways be relevant factors.
It should be clear to us that objects are defined by our
purposes and activities. We may unite all kinds of disparate
things to create something of use to us, but having done so,
we see ourselves as possessing one kind of item. The naming
process, clearly, has much to do with the "objectification"
of matter and reveals the importance of context and purpose.
Often we will have hierarchies of names centered upon a sin¬
gle spatial occupant. Thus we might have "chair" but also
"legs", "spells", "seat", etc. and perhaps below that "wood
fibre" or "cellular structures" and below that, perhaps,
molecular names. Thus, according to our interests, the same
area of space can be referred to in a variety of ways: one
implying that it is occupied by a single object, the others
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suggesting that it is occupied by many. Of course, in a world
with such seemingly boundless possibilities of demarcation,
there has always been a desire for some ultimate constituent
of physical reality, some absolute unit out of which all
other, nominal objects are built. A moment ago it may have
seemed surprising that I did not extend my list of names to
include atoms and, particularly, sub-atomic particles. For, in
some ways, science could be said to be striving towards a
kind of "building-block" of the universe. I do not think it is
appropriate to include such items in this discussion. We are
still considering physical space as visually experienced,
and when we move into the realm of "theoretical entities" we
have moved outside the realm of what can be experienced.
This does not mean that such entities are illegitimate in
general, just that they cannot be included at a stage of our
analysis which is still phenomenologically orientated. The
whole question of scientific postulates and scientific revi¬
sion of our ontology is one I hope to address myself to in
the final chapter.
Suffice it to say, at present, that, even assuming a very lim¬
ited form of visual experience, one concerning a 3-d world
which is not particularly rich either in terms of its objects
or their interactions, the question of what is an object may
not admit of a single or final answer. The issue is an arbi¬
trary one in a way that would not be the case in a sound
space or some of the other alternative worlds we considered.
This difference stems from the inherently separate character
of the sensory material involved in these different cate¬
gories of experience - a diversity we shall need to remind
ourselves of in the next chapter.
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At this point we have reached a position where we have con¬
sidered the basic phenomenology of experience and consid¬
ered the ways in which that phenomenology can be structured
so as to form the basis for an objective scheme. We have
done this in terms of a sound-based space and then 2-d and
3-d visually based ones. The first two of these are specula¬
tive in character; we do not inhabit or experience such
worlds and have no reason to believe they exist for anyone.
The purpose of proposing them was to establish their possi¬
bility and to challenge any tendency to treat our particular
world as if it were uniquely intelligible. Also, the elemen¬
tary and artificial nature of these sensory constructions al¬
lowed us to cast direct light upon basic metaphysical issues
and principles which have an application to actual experi-
»
ence.
The 3-d model we have just left, naturally, had a direct
bearing on actual experience; in that our experience does
include 3-d visual awareness. However, we left our model at a
fairly undeveloped stage by comparison with the experience
that is familiar to us. This is defensible to the extent that
a full structural outline relevant to actual experience was
given even if much detail was absent. The important discrep¬
ancy between this model and the experience we actually have
lie3 in the fact that the model treats the visual in isolation
from other forms of sensory input. This has been in keeping
with the sort of revisionary analysis we have pursued thus
far, where the possibility of worlds based upon a single form
of sense has been explored. It is necessary now to consider
subjects possessing more than one form of sense.
Preparatory to this, we need to remind ourselves of some of
the phenomenological conclusions we arrived at in Chapter
One. The important lesson of that chapter was that there is
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every reason to believe that there are strong divisions
within what we normally experience. These divisions may not
be as many as, or along exactly the same lines as the com¬
monly accepted five senses, but the evidence that cate¬
gories do prevail within our sense experience is strong and
I propose to take this claim seriously. I suggested earlier
that, believing that there are areas of experience which in¬
volve radically different phenomenological content, has im¬
portant consequences for perception as a process of forming
an understanding of an objective world, I now wish to spell
out what these are.
The issue has already been hinted at in remarks I have had
occasion to make about touch. I have commented on the phe¬
nomenon of touch and vision sharing some of the same prop¬
erties. I have, also, mentioned the difficulty of identifying
a phenomenology for touch because of the fact that it
shares its objects so closely with visual sense. Shape terms
such as "round" and "square" and so forth and also ones of
texture (which might be considered a species of shape prop¬
erties) like "rough" or "smooth" are to be found amongst the
vocabularies of both senses. Despite this close connection,
I have argued that there is all the difference in the world
between seeing that something is round and feeling that it
is. Phenomenologically, the experiences are distinct; if they
were not that would provide one major ground for saying that
not two senses were involved, but one. What we have is a
particular kind of harmony between the experiences achieved
under the two senses. This connectedness is present also,
but to a less pronounced extent, where the other senses are
concerned. Sounds, tastes, smells do not just occur uncon¬
nected with the rest of what we experience, invariably they
are closely associated with other things in the visual
sphere. The difference is that experiences from these
senses are not so strongly linked with visual qualities. It
is not the norm to be able to tell what shape a thing is from
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the sound it makes. Empirical connections can be estab¬
lished, of course (we can be pretty sure of the visual ap¬
pearance of what we hear when we hear bagpipes being
played! ) Also, we are quite good at recognising different
materials by the sounds they can make: metal, wood, plastic,
and so on. But these senses, especially taste and smell, are
very poor at providing us with a visual understanding of
things which we have had no prior visual encounter with.
Touch, however, does involve a capacity to anticipate the
visual appearance of things unseen. The potency of this ca¬
pacity should not be over-estimated, however, (many familiar
blindfold games exploit the visual confusions and distor¬
tions touch produces).
The general point it is important to make is that, if we as¬
sume that the phenomenology of the different supposed sense
modalities is radically distinct then, in one sense, we can¬
not experience exactly the same thing .through different
sense modalities. Some kind of account has to be given of
how there is a sense in which the same thing/property is ex¬
perienced via different modalities. That we can see and feel
roundness should, prima facia, be a mystery to us, because
the proper, phenomenological objects of these senses, sen¬
sations, if you like, are distinct. Essentially, it is because
of contingent connections that we can take ourselves to be
experiencing the same thing through different senses. There
is no logical connection between an experience belonging to
one sense and that of another. The sensations involved in
looking at a sphere and in moving one's hands around it are
quite different and there is no reason, per se, why they
should be connected with each other. This may sound strange
or counter-intuitive. Because we are so used to there being
such a connection, it is difficult to think of there being no
stronger link than that of contingency. If we consider the
consequences of making such a claim this difficulty will,
perhaps, deepen. The implications are two fold: firstly, it
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should be the case that a given tactual sensation could
have been coupled with a different visual experience/image
from the one it actually is. Secondly, the realm of tactual
experience might have had no connection at all with that of
visual experience.
Taking the first of these, is it really conceivable that any
tactual sensation could be mated up with any visual one?
There seem to be strong objections to such a view. Central
among these is the importance of some kind of isomorphism
between the two realms of experience. Tactual and visual ex¬
periences which are linked may be different in terms of phe-
nomenological content, but they will be formally or struc¬
turally similar. Thus, in the case of the sphere, the visually
symmetrical appearance is matched by the regular feel of the
object to the touch. Just as there is nothing in the image of
the sphere which marks out one part of it from the rest,
there will be nothing that stands out as different in the
tactual experience of it. Consequently, to suppose that
something with the visual appearance of a sphere could pro¬
duce the tactual sensations of, say, a cube seems incoher¬
ent. Yet, is this really the case? Let us describe to our¬
selves the supposed situation where, looking at a sphere, we
sweep our hands across its surface to feel, not the usual,
smooth unvarying sensations, but the angular tactual pattern
of a cube. We watch our hands: they hug the surface of the
sphere, there is no visible variation in the surface of the
thing, yet, tactually, it feels as if there were. Such a situ¬
ation is bizarre, but is it unintelligible? If we allow that
there is a genuine domain of tactual sensation then we must
be committed to such a possibility. Absurdity would only
arise if we assumed that to feel an object were just like
looking at it, because, then, in the above situation we
would, effectively, be saying that the object presented the
appearance to the senses of being both round and square, in
the same phenomenological sense of these terms.
- 202 -
Maybe there are those who would want to bite the bullet here
and declare that there is no real difference between the
content of touch and of visual experience and state that
shape terms such as "round" and "square" relate to just the
same kinds of experience when used in tactual and in visual
situations. If such a view has its advantages, it also faces
difficulties. Primarily, there are many unignorable differ¬
ences between touch and visual experience. Tactual sense
gives us no awareness of the colour of things. Perhaps one
could argue that touch provides its own analogue of colour,
in that, in feeling the surface of something the tactual sen¬
sations occurring - possibly ones of texture - "block in" the
shape of the object much as colours do in seeing. This view
is tempting until we think of how shape is generally per¬
ceived by touch. In most cases, the amount of an object we
can feel by touch is very limited. We are largely working
with our hands and we are exploring the edges of things as
much as their surfaces. It is the sensations of the move¬
ment, orientation and separation of the hands - largely felt
in the arms - which are crucial to deciding the shape of an
object, not the tingles and so forth felt where the skin is
in contact with the object, for, these are only really infor¬
mative of the textural qualities of the thing, not its overall
shape.
Of course, there are a few situations where an awareness of
an object's shape could be obtained in the way described
above: where an object is small enough to have a large part
of its surface in contact with a part of the skin. A coin ly¬
ing in the palm of the hand ought to present a tactual image
like the one described. Its circular shape ought to be
"shaded in" by the sensations its surface generates upon
the hand. Yet, in reality, I strongly suggest that people
would be hard-pressed to determine the shape of such an ob¬
ject resting on the flat of the hand. We are not tactually
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sensitive enough in this way. Characteristically, a process
of "exploration" would be necessary before the shape of the
coin began to be apprehended. In contrast to the passive
process described, the coin would be "squeezed" in the palm
of the hand or, more likely, explored by the finger tips;
again, revealing the importance of the edges rather than the
surface of an object for determining its shape and the im¬
portance of an awareness of the movement and orientation of
the contacting parts of the body as opposed to the actual
sensations of contact.
This leads us to another major difference between touch and
sight. In vision one can form an instantaneous image of a
large tract of space and its contents, myriad shapes can be
perceived at once. With touch, however, a laborious process
of exploring the surfaces and edges of objects would be re¬
quired to arrive at the same understanding; if it could be
achieved at all. If we take any one of our, visual images and
think of the task of producing the same awareness purely by
tactual means, we should sense the near impossibility of the
task. Of course, whole areas of our visual experience are
passed over by tactual sense, anyway: shapes that depend
solely upon colour, rather than physical outline are invisi¬
ble to touch, as, for example is the writing on this page. A
persistent adherent of the views I am questioning here might
want to present touch as a very restricted form of seeing
with a tactual analogue for colour which only registers out¬
line and not surface patterns. His tactual "viewer" is like
someone with a very extreme form of tunnel vision, he has to
get right up close to what he observes and sees only short
stretches or fragments at a time. If there is any plausibility
in this view at all, it is overridden by the previously men¬
tioned fact that the colour analogue account does not fit
with the actual way we tactually arrive at the shapes of
things, which is essentially by following the surface of an
object.
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Another problem facing anyone supporting the view in ques¬
tion is that of marking off those tactual experiences which
are visually relevant from those which are not. We have al¬
ready spoken of the variety of tactual experiences and of
the way in which it is normally taken as covering tempera¬
ture perceptions, pain sensations, kinaesthetic awareness
as well as awarenesses of physical objects. Presumably, the
person we have in mind would have to claim that there is a
significant difference in content or phenomenology between,
so called tactual sensations which represent "images" of ob¬
jects and those which do not. In a way, the view that touch
breaks down into more than one sense category would be be¬
ing argued for here. I have already indicated that there may
be good reasons for suggesting this, but I am not sure that
this is because the difference between tactual sensations of
physical objects and the rest is one of quasi-imagery.
It seems to me that there are many physical tactual sensa¬
tions which do not involve what we could call a "tactually
coloured image": a jab in the arm by a compass point, itching
powder down the back of the neck, total bodily immersion in
water, none of these obviously gives rise to the kind of
phenomenological item we are looking for. Also, there are
many bodily sensations of a piece with the archetypal tac¬
tual ones of pressure applied across a well-defined area of
the skin which do not give an awareness of a visual item at
all. A sensation of air striking or moving across the skin is
an obvious case in point. Here one can be said to be aware
of something physical, but non-visual. Of course a proponent
of the approach we are considering might take this as an ex¬
ample of the superiority of touch over sight in some re¬
spects. It would, perhaps, be on a parallel with being visu¬
ally sensitive to infra-red or ultra violet light or other
parts of the electro-magnetic spectrum we are not actually
attuned to. Once this step has been taken, however, it is
- 205 -
hard to see an objection to further extensions of tactual
awarenesses of physical and non-visible states. In the case
of the temperature sensations, these could be said to be
awarenesses of the molecular state of things. Certain tin¬
gles and shocks might be said to be perceptions of electri¬
cal activity. Pains might be taken as awarenesses of biolog¬
ical states and activity in the body. The problem with these
is that, although they are all sensations which are informa¬
tive about the physical state of things they cannot in any
sense be said to be images of those states. In many cases
the idea of an image being achieved is senseless in itself -
what appropriate image (along coloured, shape lines) could
there be for a flow of electrons? I shall argue later that
tactual sense is a genuine source of perceptual awareness
of such diverse and sophisticated physical happenings but
not by being a quasi-visual sense.
I wish to return now to the second implication arising from
the purely contingent relatedness of the experiential con¬
tent of touch and vision. This is the possibility of no con¬
nection at all between what is experienced visually and what
is experienced tactually, rather than just alternative con¬
nections from those at present. Here, we would have a realm
of visual encounters and a realm of tactual ones but no link
between the two. What would be required is a 3-d visual ex¬
perience of the sort outlined in the previous chapter devel¬
oped to the point, say, where the subject had an awareness
of a world of objects as rich as our own. The important point
being that his whole awareness of those objects would be
based upon visual experience of them - he would have had no
encounters with them mediated by any other sense and, no¬
tably, not touch. It has been my contention in Chapter Three
that it is perfectly possible to build up an understanding of
3-d objects and space much as our own solely through visual
experience; though I do not claim that understanding is not
deepened and extended by sensory experience from other
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sources. What we need to add to this situation (although we
would expect it to arrive at the same time as visual experi¬
ence) is a realm of tactual experience, but not of the type
we are used to. Visual objects would provide no tactual sen¬
sations, they would have no tactual dimension. We could
imagine this being the case in one of two ways: one where we
assume observer embodiment and one where we do not.
Taking the first of these: this would be a situation where a
subject had reason to think himself embodied because of the
omnipresence of a certain visual object in his experience.
In "moving" though space in a visual sense, obtaining differ¬
ent views of space and seeing different objects or aspects
of them, the subject would find that, in amongst the chang¬
ing scene, one object was constantly present. He might also
notice a connection between the experience of seeing and
the state of a particular part of that object. He might in
other words realize the causal importance of something like
eyes for seeing ("if blocked off then a loss of image", and
so on). Additionally, the subject might identify some ability
in himself to control or influence that object, to re-arrange
its parts, as we have discussed elsewhere. These, however,
would be the extent of his grounds for thinking himself em¬
bodied in the sense we usually understand. For, in the situ¬
ation we are developing, he would have none of the tactual
cues for thinking that a particular object was his body. He
would not be able to obtain sensations by placing parts of
this object in contact with other visible objects. We can
imagine such operations occurring but being blank from a
tactual point of view.
Perhaps the question of solidity arises: touch is often
taken as being particularly informative of the solid nature
of physical things. I think this is often misleading. Imagine
the following situation: a person sweeps his hand towards a
stone pillar, it reaches the surface of the object, the per-
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son feels absolutely nothing at all yet his hand comes to a
stop at the pillar. Perhaps, he tries to move his hand
through it, that is, he performs whatever mental or voli¬
tional operation was successful in moving his hand towards
the pillar, but simply nothing happens. He does not feel the
familiar sensations of contact or resistance he just wit¬
nesses the failure of the hand to make any further progress.
Surely such a situation is a non-tactual experience of solid¬
ity. That solidity is not an essentially tactual quality can
be demonstrated if we consider the opposite situation where
the hand does pass through the pillar. Imagine this progress
accompanied by all the feelings of strain and resistance
which are normally attendant upon pushing against a solid
object and of failing to make any impression upon it. Would
the fact that all the tactual sensations of solidity were
present make us judge the object to be solid? I think it is
obvious that they would not. Rather, if this were our normal
experience of "contact" with objects, the sensations in¬
volved would be interpreted/reinterpreted as informative of
the act of moving a part of the body through an object.
The situation just described is another form of deviant con¬
nection between the visual and the tactual; there is still a
correlation between the visual objects and tactual experi¬
ences. The state of affairs we are looking towards is one
where such connections are absent. We can, perhaps, utilize
one important feature of the above example, however. This is
the idea of visual objects imposing no limits or structure
upon tactual experience. We could suppose that a subject
whom we can still assume to be embodied in the sense de¬
scribed, could move anywhere in visual space, even into
parts occupied by objects and experience tactual sensations
at any of those points. In other words, a subject could have
tactual sensations in a way which is arbitrary or random
from a visual point of view: sometimes having them in open
space, sometimes where his body is in contact with, or actu-
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ally inside other objects. We have spoken of the possible
diversity of tactual experience, (although, as we have
noted, this might be open to challenge) so the question,
perhaps, arises as to what tactual sensations the subject is
assumed to have in this example. For the moment, we can as¬
sume that the subject has any at all: tickles, twinges,
pains, sensations of contact with different textures, com¬
pressions of areas of the body and so on. A first model is
where they just happen without order or pattern. In this sit¬
uation a subject's touch experience would be objectively
meaningless: it would neither relate to the objective scheme
of visual objects nor be constitutive of some alternative
scheme.
Alternatively, we can conceive of a second model where the
touch sensations occur in a certain ordering, not just ran¬
domly but in a sequence of such sensations. We could think
of any combination of sensations from the range indicated
above or we could limit the sequence to a certain type of
tactual item. We could, for instance, think of the sequence
as drawn from sensations of texture. Accordingly, we could
have touch sequences which went along the lines of "first,
the feel of bare wood, then a sensation of silk, then the
touch of sackcloth, then rough granite" and so on. We could
,envisage such a sequence fulfilling all the conditions we
have already discussed for spatial schemes. The question of
whether such a space would be synchronic or diachronic in
the relational nature of its sensations would be raised.
Given the fact that more than one texture can be felt at
once - a hand could experience silk and sackcloth juxta¬
posed - there would be grounds for saying that the rela¬
tional basis was synchronic. Thus a situation very like our
2-d space could be achieved: textures could enter, travel
across and disappear from a tactual field. The only doubt
that attaches to this is whether a kind of intrinsic relation
of the left/right, above/below type exists for touch, which
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instantly creates a spatial ordering of textures on an anal¬
ogy with visual items (not the same as, though) or whether
the relationships between textures have to be learnt as in
the sound-model (diachronically). I merely leave this as
something to consider, given the fact that it does not have
direct importance for present purposes as, whether syn-
chronically or diachronically, some kind of spatially rele¬
vant ordering seems possible using touch sensations.
Another possibility worth mentioning in passing is that of
"branching" effects in a tactual scheme; we do not have to
suppose a uni-linear progression. We can entertain the no¬
tion of a network arrangement of the sort we have discussed
previously. Perhaps, again, the 2-d visio-spatial model pro¬
vided the best paradigm for a tactual scheme.
So far, I have sketched out a form of touch experience which
is the basis of an objective scheme and one which is inde¬
pendent of that based upon visual objects.* Before going any
further, there are two possible objections to things I have
said which need to be considered. The first relates to the
feature I have proposed of a subject being untrammeled in
his movements in visual space, specifically, the capacity to
pass through visual objects. This might cause conceptual
problems, problems of expressing just what this is meant to
be like. Clearly, I do not wish to suggest that this happens
by accepted accommodations in visual terms. I am not sug¬
gesting, that is, that visual objects be in some way hollow.
Even in a world of objects deprived of their tactual impact,
there would still be a visual difference between objects
which are solid and those which are hollow: they would look
different if sawn in half, for instance. The proposal is that
visual objects retain all of their visual qualities but that
it is possible to move through them as an embodied observer.
The questions that arise here are those concerning what
happens to each body when this happens and, possibly what
kind of visual experience would be involved. We cannot sup-
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pose that both items, the body and the other object persist
unchanged through this: logical, conceptual laws would be
breached. We cannot see in the same part of space, say, a
hand and a part of a pillar. Thus, we need to assume some¬
thing like that the part of the body disappears as it enters
the outside object and reappears when it reaches the other
side. To deal with the situation where the part of the ob¬
server's body that is involved is the head, or specifically,
the eyes, we could imagine that the visual experience was of
the colour of the material immediately in front of the eyes
(this might change as one progressed through the object).
Clearly, this account cannot be made to conform to scien¬
tific beliefs about actual objects - I am assuming the ob¬
jects of this possible world to be only superficially the
same as ours. The internal structure of objects proposed
here would have to be different, and the importance of light
to vision ignored completely. These I take to be contingent
features of visual objects anyway: no mediating force had to
be involved in seeing, from a conceptual point of view. One
can easily adopt a "looking-out" rather than a "taking-in"
view of seeing where one supposes seeing all one normally
sees but not on account of some force linking the eye and
the world. A naive realist approach can be adopted. That
light is important for seeing is something which we discover
not something which is logically dictated by the nature of
images or by the fact of being aware of objects. Queries of
the "but, if I am here and the object is there, how can I have
experience of it?" - variety are misconceived in that they
beg the question in favour of scientific principles which
have to be empirically established rather than taken as nec¬
essary truths. Thus, it should not be unintelligible that, in
passing through an object, a visual experient perceives
colours.
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A remaining objection to this kind of dematerialization would
be one we briefly encountered in Chapter Two concerning
loss of particular identity where one item disappears into
another. We have had occasion to question very rigid notions
of identity already and this might be another relevant point
at which to do so. Considerations of economy and simplicity
would seem to dictate that the re-emerging bodily part be
treated as identical with the disappeared one. I shall not
pursue this issue further, however, as the possibility of the
objection being conclusive is not devastating to the general
line I am proposing. One way of dealing with it is to abandon
embodiment for the subject. I have indicated, already, that
occupation of a part of space is not entailed by being aware
of objects in that space. So, what one could imagine is a
subject who sometimes sees the outside of objects and some¬
times the inside of them without problems arising about bod¬
ies disappearing and reappearing.
At this point, it is important to say what is meant by
"unconnected" as far as the visual and tactual schemes go.
An obvious objection to their unconnectedness would be
that, even if one did not get tactual sensations by contact
with objects in the usual way, one would always be at some
point in the visual scheme - observing particular aspects of
space - and that the tactual sensations could be linked with
these points. Suppose, for example, that one walks down a
path passing various trees, bushes, flowers and so forth and
that, continuous with this visual progress, one experiences
a flow of tactual sensations and that re-tracing ones steps
produces a reversal in the tactual experience, these would
be grounds for saying that the two spatial schemes were
clearly linked to each other. Moreover, one might want to say
that the tactual sensations in some way qualified parts of
visual space, that they were tactual perceptions of those
visio-spatial situations. It is not this kind of scenario that
I had in mind in proposing separate visual and tactual spa-
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tial schemes. The intended situation is more radical.
Crucially, it is envisaged that one could move in one form of
space independently of movement in the other. Thus, whilst
remaining at the same point in the visual space (observing
the same scheme) one could be moving in the tactual space
(pursuing a sequence of tactual sensations) or vice versa.
Also, one could be moving in both spaces, but at a faster
rate in one than on a previous occasion from the same start¬
ing point in both schemes.
Both of these possible situations would produce a separa¬
tion or re-structuring of relationships between the two spa¬
tial systems. Essentially the two worlds would be floating as
against each other, and there would be no basis for the kind
of link-up of experiences outlined above.
The idea of occupying or being in two unconnected spaces at
once may be a difficult one to come to terms with. Perhaps it
would seem that some kind of fragmentation of the subject is
entailed, so that a person can be in two places at once, or
stationary in one world and moving in another. All of this
only seems necessary if we base our thoughts too strongly
upon our actual visual space and, also, if we cannot free
ourselves from our visual beliefs about embodiment. If we
remind ourselves that two radically different forms of space
are involved here, one with visual objects and one with tac¬
tual ones, then contradictory notions such as "being in two
different places at once" do not arise. The different places
that one is "in" belong to different spaces, they are quali¬
tatively different. Also, it may not be the case that one is
"in" space at all, in the sense of being a bodily occupant of
either space. A subject might be a disembodied observer of
both spaces. So, here, all that could be said to be moving in
either space is a subject's awareness: the subject is vari¬
ously aware of different points in each spatial system. Of
course, embodiment could be presumed in both spaces. As
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well as a usual sort of visio-spatial body for the visual ex¬
periences, some kind of tactual body could be suggested for
the tactual realm, along the lines suggested in Chapter Two.
If the bodies are made from different kinds of metaphysical
substances no logical problems are generated. We have to
take on board the notion of having two different bodies at
once, but this does not amount to any more than being able
to experience different types of sensation at the same time
and this is an ability we already know ourselves to have.
The logical possibility of being aware of existing in two
separate, unrelated spaces is persuasively argued for by
A.M. Quinton in his paper SPACES AND TIMES (1). The argument
is developed somewhat further by T.E. Wilkerson in his book
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (2). (Interestingly, both
writers draw a distinction between space and time in this re¬
spect, finding the notion of existing in two separate and un¬
related times to be incoherent (3)). These writers are pursu-
ing slightly different purposes to my own and structure their
arguments around a different model. Neither contemplates be¬
ing simultaneously aware of two distinct spaces, both think
in terms of an alternate awareness of these different spaces
(though there would be a bodily presence in both spaces at
the same time). Also, the kinds of spaces they consider are
of the same metaphysical type; they are not structured out
of the categorically distinct phenomenological material of
separate senses. Rather, the two worlds are both much as our
own; they draw upon all senses and do not postulate radi¬
cally new kinds of objects (4). Despite these differences,
the general point made reinforces my own (in fact my model
avoids some of the problems of personal identity which these
writers encounter).
I shall return to this idea of rival spaces shortly, but be¬
fore doing so, I think it is necessary to consider a final
line of objection to the tactual possibility being proposed
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here, in general. In many ways this challenge is just a con¬
tinuation of a familiar objection to the whole notion of a
genuine tactual phenomenology. So, although remarks have
already been addressed to this issue, I shall consider a
more specific formulation of it.
We have spoken of tactual sensations being linked together
so as to form a spatial scheme and one unrelated to visual,
physical objects. This whole programme might be objected to
as logically incoherent, on the grounds that tactual experi¬
ence cannot be separated from beliefs about a visible, phys¬
ical world. The tactual sensations we have spoken of, it
could be argued, are not ontologically neutral items that
can be used as building bricks for an alternative non-physi¬
cal space, they have an inalienable content which binds them
to a physical interpretation. In other words, we do not have
bare tactual sensations we have sensations as of a pointed
item touching the leg or a tingle in the back of the neck and
»
so on. The argument would thus run that physical, perhaps
visual, notions are part of the essence of touch experience.
Just as we could not imagine a re-arrangement of visual ex¬
perience that divested it of its basic formal properties of
left/right and so on, it would be supposed here that there
are essential properties of touch sensations which are of
the same order. This does not necessarily mean that touch
would be presented as an incorrigible form of sense. It would
not mean that every touch sensation implied the existence of
some physical object or state, just that, if any objective
interpretation were to be placed upon such a sensation it
would have to be of a physical kind. Sensations would have
to be understood along the lines of; "if this experience is
of anything objective at all, it is of a pointed object touch¬
ing my leg". Thus every tactual sensation (except, perhaps,
ones of temperature) would literally be a sort of image of
physical things in three-dimensional space, which, according
to other evidence, a subject could treat objectively or not.
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Maybe these "images" are meant to be of the peculiar non-
coloured variety we have already considered for touch. If
they are, then the difficulties which we decided attach to
such an idea apply again. These I shall ignore in order to
progress to other problems that are thrown up by such an
approach, however.
One consequence of the view under consideration is that, a
priori, one has an idea of one's body from touch sensations.
For, imagine the following situation: we have a subject who
is blind and has had no sensory experience of any kind at
all, this subject then receives a touch sensation - let us
suppose that the sensation is of a pointed object digging
into his leg. If the theory under examination is correct, the
subject will instantly have an image of the situation de¬
scribed, just as if he were flashed a visual picture of it,
because the content is the same except for the colour as¬
pect of the scene. The subject may not choose to treat this
sensation as of something real at this stage. What we have
to query, however, is what the sensation contains. A pointed
object pressing into the leg is actually a very information-
laden description, particularly as far as the "leg" part of it
is concerned. Does the sensation of a part of the leg being
touched give the subject the idea of the whole of the leg? In
having the idea of a leg is the subject not also given the
idea of the rest of his body? Surely it is a contingent mat¬
ter what the precise character of a person's body is and it
seems absurd to suggest that a sensation in one part of it
could provide an awareness of the whole thing. Thus, we must
be forced to assume that the touch sensation here would
only provide a picture of the restricted part of the body af¬
fected and only of the part of the object actually in contact
with it. Even here questions remain: does the subject have
any awareness of the nature of the material the part of his
body involved is made of - any notion of skin, flesh, muscle
and so on? There is also a question as to whether the sensa-
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tion in question provides any kind o£ awareness of where the
part of the body and the object are in space. Presumably,
the idea of space would go along with the awareness of the
particular items. So, it should be possible to form an under¬
standing of space, its contents and their relations with
each other by piecing together such tactual fragments as
the one under consideration. It would be possible on this
account for a subject to instantly gain an image of his
whole body (or "a" body - the question of ownership not nec¬
essarily being decided thereby) by, say, taking a shower (an
impression of the water also being generated at the same
time).
We have to consider how such an image of the body would
compare with that obtained via sight. Significant differences
would have to be allowed for: all of the information that
colour provides would have to be left out. This may not in¬
validate things in itself; touch could still be said to relay
shared qualities of shape and surface. The problem with this
account seems to be not so much that it is incoherent
(although there are problems if we think of touch as belong¬
ing to a different sense category from vision), but that it
does not conform to the actual nature of touch. Tactual ex¬
perience does not suggest that we could build up this kind
of specific knowledge in the way described. One reason for
saying this is that we often have tactual experiences which
do not arrive complete with the sort of bodily and spatial
"labelling" we have been speaking of. There are the occa¬
sional tics, tickles, twinges which are uncertainly placed; a
process of exploration or experimentation is required to lo¬
cate them. Also, there are the many pains and internal sen¬
sations we experience which are often indefinitely located
and relate to unknown states or processes. If touch were so
intrinsically spatially informative, these sensations should
be as revealing as those relating to the surface of the body
and what touches it. There are, also, sensations which are
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partially informative such as those of temperature. We may
know whereabouts we feel heat and what the heat is in, but
the sensation does not tell us anything about the internal
molecular activity of the object, a priori.
What I suggest goes on in these situations where a sensation
becomes located by an empirical investigation, or where a
process or a structure is discovered as the basis of the
sensation is that an otherwise spatially or physically neu¬
tral item takes on just such a meaning. The sensation be¬
comes the sensation of heart murmurings, appendicitis, or
whatever. The connection is an empirical one and not a logi¬
cal one. It is my contention that this is the essence of all
tactual awarenesses of physical and visio-spatial states.
Some qualification is needed to this: I do not mean to sug¬
gest that all tactual sensations have to be laboriously re¬
lated to some physical state by empirical investigation.
Some general properties of touches can be discerned which
»
allow a subject to interpret previously unexperienced sensa¬
tions. Thus, if I have experienced a line of jabs moving up
my arm and, have determined, by observation, that this is
what they are, I should be able to tell that a further jab is
higher up the arm still, because this later jab possesses
some property that the previous jabs displayed in relation
to each other. Also, we may have a genetically dictated sys¬
tem of reflexes which relates our movements to stimulations
of parts of the body. The fact that our body behaves in this
way does not reveal any intrinsic spatial content in the
sensation itself as an item of consciousness. It would be
possible for our reflexes to make mistakes; a tap on the
knee could produce a jerk of the arm. A subject can only use
his reflexive behaviour, once he understands it, as a guide
to the spatial locations and nature of his tactual sensa¬
tions .
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As a final source of criticism, I should like to mention what
seems to be an implication of the view under scrutiny which
it is difficult to embrace. Touch is a peculiarly restricted
sense: it only directly relates to one object in space namely
our individual bodies. I am tactually aware of other objects
by their coming into contact with my body and causing aware¬
nesses of changes in it. This is one of the features that
links our consciousness with our bodies, it reinforces the
other features we have noted elsewhere which create a sense
of a particular object being our body. We constantly witness
objects in the world being altered and physically impinged
upon, but it is only when the object we call our body is af¬
fected that we experience tactual sensations. This is,
surely, a contingency just as the fact that I see from and by
means of my eyes. I could easily conceive of my vision being
mediated by some other spatial thing, say two of the leaves
in a tree across the road. Similarly, if touch is an intrinsi¬
cally physical-spatial sense, as is argued, then it should be
conceivable that my tactual awareness be shifted out of my
body into, say, that tree. I should be able to make immediate
sense of what it would be like to perceive the spatial nature
of and influences upon, that tree. I would not have to sup¬
pose any process of relating my sensations to the visually
observed character and movements of that tree. If I know
what it is like to have immediate, explicitly spatial, tactual
images of my body then I should be able to conceive of what
it is like to have such images centered in that tree. The ba¬
sic, formal content is there, the spatial vocabulary of
touch, if you like, it is just a question of it being used to
express the character of a different physical object - the
tree as opposed to my body.
I do not seem able to make this kind of imaginative leap yet,
as I said, this is quite easy for the sense of sight. It might
be argued that touch is a more complex or sophisticated
sense than sight, but if anything, all the evidence suggests
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the opposite. The informative content of visual experience
far exceeds that provided by touch.
I think I have said enough on this topic. Touch should not
be regarded as an alternative form of seeing, it has its own
distinct phenomenology. It is the case that our tactual ex¬
perience links up with our visual experience, just as the
experience obtained via our other senses does, but this is,
from a philosophical point of view, a contingency. The two
senses might have been unrelated and have grounded inde¬
pendent spatial schemes. Support for this derives, essen¬
tially, from the fact that it is possible to imagine or de¬
scribe the divergence in question. We would not abandon our
commitments to visual objects if we ceased to have tactual
experience of them or if we had tactual experiences uncon¬
nected with them (and we can still make sense of having tac¬
tual experiences in this way).
I have tried to establish the possibility of divergent spaces
being represented within a single subject's experience by
using tactual and visual sense. This is probably the most
demanding combination to use because of the difficulties
touch gives rise to. The advantage of this is that, if it is
successful, it should clearly render combinations involving
other senses unproblematical. Even if, pace preceding argu¬
ments, it does not succeed it should still not be difficult to
see how a case could be made out in terms of the remaining
sense. The simplest approach, would be to combine one of the
sound models we developed with a visual space: a subject
could have experience of both in the ways described, yet
there be no connection between the two. Of course, we need
not confine ourselves to just two concurrent spaces, there
could be as many as there are modes of sense (and the pos¬
sible number of these we have been unable to delimit).
Keeping track of several spaces may be psychologically im¬
plausible but it does not present any problems in principle.
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All of this represents an interesting speculation, but the
relevance it has for actual experience might be questioned.
Its significance lies in two areas; firstly, it highlights the
fact that up till now we have been constructing spaces for
single-sense subjects and, secondly, it makes the point
that, where we assume a subject with more than one mode of
sense, these senses do not have to harmonize in the way
that we are familiar with. Moreover, there should be some¬
thing puzzling about the fact that disparate senses cohere
in the way that they do. If there is anything genuine about
the notion of the senses as categories at all then there
should be some question as to how such divergent material
can relate to or represent a single space and set of objects
in it. In particular, attention is drawn to the issue of what
the essence or nature of objects is under such circum¬
stances. Are objects complex items drawing their qualities
from all the senses? Or, are some senses to be taken as giv¬
ing only indirect awareness of objects as they objectively
are (perhaps in a Lockean Primary/Secondary sense)?
In the next chapter, I intend to consider actual experience
and the way in which it involves a combination of senses.
Prominent in this discussion will be the question of what is
an appropriate understanding of space and objects and of
our perceptual contact with them.
(1) A.M. Quinton SPACES AND TIMES in Philosophy Vol. 37
1962.
(2) T.E. Wilkerson KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
Clarendon, Oxford. 1976 Chapter 2. See also R.G.
Swinburne SPACE AND TIME MacMillan, London. 1968.
(3) M. Hollis, however, in his article "TIMES AND SPACES" in
Mind 1967 thinks even this is a possibility.
(4) Interestingly Bennett (see end-note Chapter 2, at





(i) COMBINING THE SENSES
To summarize the results we have attained so far: we have
from a consideration of basic sense-experience been able to
propose simple spatial schemes formed from one mode of
sense. We have also considered the situation where a sub¬
ject is endowed with more than one category of experience
and, in keeping with the models developed in Chapters Two
and Three, we decided that one natural version of this would
be where the subject is simultaneously aware of several dis¬
tinct spaces at once. This is a novel suggestion in terms of
our own multi-sensed experience, but, from a speculative
point of view, it is the most straightforward way of handling
the situation ontologically. The kind of single-space under¬
standing of categorically divergent material that we operate
with poses many more conceptual problems. So let us now at¬
tempt a fundamental review of this experience.
Being granted experience from more than one form of sense,
the possibilities of interpretation are essentially fourfold:
an experience of no spaces at all (an entirely unstructured,
subjective experience); an experience of a space and also
an experience of non-spatial sense material; an experience
of one space drawing upon material from all the categories.
Where our experience is concerned, some significant level of
order prevails and it is possible to create objective
schemes from it. Yet order is not significantly present in
each sense category sufficient to found five (or more) sepa¬
rate spaces. At the same time, all the areas of sense seem to
have some degree of spatial significance; none deserves to
be treated as a purely subjective domain. The question of
permanence is relevant however: the "items" perceived by
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smell, taste, and hearing are very largely ephemeral and
sporadic; they do not slot into a scheme of similar items
drawn from the same category. We could not close our minds
to all other senses and confine ourselves to a smell world
that is a world of related, re-identifiable smell particulars
and a spatial system of smell locations they exist in. Nor
could we do this for taste or hearing. These senses do not
provide material enduring, or ordered enough for such self-
contained interpretations of them. Having said that, they do
bear a relation to items occurring in the senses of vision
and, to some extent, touch, so they are not completely free-
floating and insignificant from an objective point of view.
Our visual sense provides us with an awareness of many
fairly enduring items (as well as a number of transient
ones); items which have clear, enduring relations with each
other and which, consequently, can be easily identified and
evoke a general sense of spatial location. Sight is an im¬
pressive sense: in a single perceptual act we can be aware
of a great diversity of visual objects, we can be in no doubt
as to where they stand in relation to each other and, be¬
cause of the permanence that most of these objects have, it
is easy to relate them to other objects seen in further per¬
ceptual acts. Large collections of objects can be explored
very quickly, relationships between them discerned and land¬
marks established: it does not take long to have a fairly de¬
veloped awareness of a visual space. By comparison, the
other senses are piecemeal and disjointed. Touch is some¬
thing of an exception in that it tends to deal in fairly en¬
during and repeatable experiences (in those areas where it
overlaps with visual sense) but it is still a fairly re¬
stricted and piecemeal mode of objective awareness.
Consider the time and difficulty involved in forming a tac¬
tual awareness of what can be experienced in a single
glance. Where taste and smell are concerned, there is a ba¬
sic physical handicap to exploiting their objective poten-
- 223 -
tial. It would be hard to taste our way around the world,
building up the requisite taste sequences, even if all mate¬
rial had a significant taste identity. We can exercise our
related sense of smell with greater facility, but it is not a
particularly developed sense in human beings and we spend a
good deal of our time unaware of any smell at all. The diffi¬
culty with sounds is that they are very ephemeral and do not
really occur in fixed relations with other sounds.
It is not difficult to understand how sighted people become
dominated by their sense of vision. It is the sense upon
which most reliance is placed and, more importantly, the
sense which tends to be the basis of spatial ana objective
commitments. Space is visual space and objects are visual
objects. This at any rate is the tendency, a tendency in
terms of the way we think about things. If you like, what
could be said to happen is that a basic spatial, objective
understanding is built up from visual experience and then
the experiences gained via the other senses are related to
this scheme (though this is a conceptual view of things and
is not meant to be a genetic or psychologically accurate ac¬
count). Why should there be any stimulus to incorporate the
other senses in this way? The motivation stems from the fact
that, although for the reasons I have just mentioned there
is insufficient structure within the senses in question for
an independent spatial reading of them, there is a discern-
able link between them and the visual realm (and the tactual
domain as well - which would be particularly important for
the visually handicapped). It is this link which provides the
basis for ascribing some kind of spatial/objective signifi¬
cance to these senses.
The link resides in the fact that smells, tastes, sounds do
not simply occur, they happen in connection with or are
caused by items which have a visual and tactual presence.
There are rarely simply tastes, smells and sounds, rather
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there are the tastes, smells and sounds of things; of physi¬
cal objects. There is an interesting difference between
sounds on the one hand and tastes and smells on the other
in that the latter are related to states of things; they are
like inherent properties of objects whereas the former are
associated with changes of state, with actions of objects,
events or occurrences. At the same time, there is a similar¬
ity between sounds and smells in that both are spatially
pervasive experiences and are not tightly restricted to the
objects which could be said to cause them. A taste is an ex¬
clusive property of an object in a way that a sound or a
smell is not for it is only experienced by direct contact
with the object. Smells and sounds may be experienced over
a wide spatial area, though they may vary in quality accord¬
ing to where we are in relation to their physical source.
In this context, we do need to say something about the rela¬
tionship between touch and sight. I have drawn a distinction
between it and taste, smell and hearing in that I believe our
tactual experiences contain sufficient order and complexity
to found a tactual space. One could, as we and the world are
physically constituted, have a purely tactual experience
and, from this, form a conception of a touch space. What has
to be emphasized, however, is that this space would be an
inherently tactual one, it would not be a quasi-visual space.
This is for reasons that we fully explored in the last chap¬
ter and which derive from the categorical status of touch. It
would be an implication of this that a blind person does not
form the same spatial conception of physical objects that
the sighted do. In one sense, such a person could be said to
occupy or experience a different world from those of us who
structure their objective notions in terms of visual experi¬
ence. What prevents this from being a totally bizarre state
of affairs is the fact that there are strong links between
the tactual domain (as we think of it, ignoring possible
doubts about sense demarcations expressed in Chapter One)
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and the world of visual objects. These .links are richer than
those with tastes, smells and sounds and it is because of
this that one can derive a full-blooded spatial scheme from
touch experience and also one which forms an analogue of
visual space and, in some sense, can be said to constitute
an awareness of the same objects. In keeping with the spirit
of the last chapter, we have to stress that the existence of
such links is a contingent feature of our experience. What
is important about these links is that they involve an iso¬
morphism between tactual and visual experience. From a phe-
nomenological point of view, the content of touch and sight
experiences of the same occupants of physical space is
quite different yet, in abstracted, structural terms, the form
of the experiences can be said to be the same. There is
something in common between a tactual exploration of the
chair opposite me and my visual appreciation of it. Where
there is a change in the visual appearance of the thing
there is a corresponding change in the feel of the object.
As I run my hands along the top of the chair I get one, iden¬
tifiable kind of sensation and as they reach the corners and
move down the sides this changes and another type of feel¬
ing arises. For most visible variations in the surface shape
of things, there is a corresponding touch sensation - right
down to the minimal variations we call "texture". That there
is this correspondence is notable in that we did much to
show in the last chapter that visual and tactual experiences
might have been discontinuous, to the point, even, of being
conflicting.
Of course, there is not a complete correspondence between
the experiences obtained under each sense. Significantly,
colour has no tactual representation: touch does little to
help us enjoy a picture, for instance. There are visible
items imperceptible to touch: certain optical effects such as
mirages and rainbows or holograms (though it should be noted
that these do not behave visually as other objects do) or
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shafts of light in dusty air. Also, there can be items which
have a tactual presence but are invisible, glass under water
or in low-light conditions can take on this quality, the best
example, however, would be the air, the physical properties
of which are constantly brought home to us. Already, in
these examples, we have reached an important feature of the
relationship between touch and sight. Touch does not just
act as a back-up to sight, as a kind of auxiliary awareness
of objects; it actually extends the sense of sight and has
its own ontological contribution to make. Our world experi¬
enced by a creature without the sense of touch would, in
certain respects, be metaphysically different for him. A phe¬
nomenon like wind would be as mysterious as gravity or mag¬
netism, not a force with a reality akin to the visible objects
it moves. This is not to say that such a creature would not
be able to build up an understanding of air equivalent to
our own in scientific terms, but that the route by which the
knowledge was acquired would be different. The awareness
would be obtained by empirical or scientific but, above all,
inferential means, rather than by direct sensory acquain¬
tance. A subject with a sense of touch gets used to the feel
of objects as well as their appearance and, because of this,
can find himself in situations where similar sensations are
had but no visual item is present. Conversely, he may find
himself in situations where there is a visual stimulus but no
corresponding tactual one - as in some of the optical situa¬
tions we mentioned.
Naturally, it is a question why any weight should be at¬
tached to these tactual sensations or the lack of them. They
could be dismissed as some form of tactual hallucination, as
with "phantom limb" sensations. The reason they are treated
as indicative of the presence or absence of some physical
thing is because they do not formally contradict the visual
evidence and, also, they are supported by other visual in¬
formation. In the case of invisible items, like air or glass,
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the visual evidence is only to the effect that nothing is
there, not that some other kind of object is where the felt
item is sensed to be. The observed behaviour of other visual
items is consistent with the belief that some physical object
is present. For they behave as they would if some sort of
visual object were there. In the alternative situation where
the physical reality of a visible item is doubted, a good
reason for believing the absence of touch sensations to be
significant is that the item in question does not have the
effects upon other visual objects that one would expect if
it were solid. In the phantom-limb situations, other visual
objects are seen where the tactual item is felt to be and
other visual evidence points to the absence of the limb in
question, accordingly, there is good reason to reject the
tactual sensations and to give authority to the visual data.
What should emerge as a key term in the above discussion is
the notion of a physical object. It is a term I have had to
use several times already in exploring the relationship be¬
tween our senses and our ontological commitments. A back¬
ground understanding of it can obviously be pre-supposed,
but it is necessary now to give an account of it in terms of
the analysis we have been pursuing throughout. One point
that should be made right away is that the physical is not
an exclusively tactual quality. I tried to make this clear in
the previous chapter where I demonstrated that one's tactual
sensations could be irrelevant to the question of an ob¬
ject's solidity. Also, it should not be assumed that the re¬
marks I have just made indicate that the physicality of ob¬
jects, in the sense of solidity, can only be obtained through
a sense of touch. A direct awareness of the material or solid
nature of certain items can only be obtained via touch, just
as a direct awareness of the visual qualities of certain
other things can only be gained via sight. That these aware¬
nesses are direct does not mean that they are incorrigible,
as the examples just discussed should prove, simply that,
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where they are representations of physical properties, they
are immediate, sensory ones and not inferential or derived. A
purely visual understanding of the material nature of ob¬
jects is perfectly possible and is capable of embracing in¬
visible items. What makes an object solid is its tendency to
resist other objects. It is a quality of impenetrability, and
one which has consequences for the way objects behave when
they come into contact with each other. It is important to
point out that it is a contingent feature of visual objects
and one independent of their three-dimensionality. In the 3-d
model developed in Chapter Three, it should be an open ques¬
tion whether the objects proposed are material or not. It is
something that is determined by the modes of behaviour as¬
sumed for them. Approached from the world that we are famil¬
iar with, these claims may be difficult to accept. But a lit¬
tle reflection should reveal that, considered from a purely
visual point of view, it is not an a priori truth about visual
objects that they resist one another or react when combined
in just the ways that we are familiar with. Objects might in¬
terpenetrate, some might disappear into others, some might
pass through other objects, objects might combine without
becoming bigger than the larger of them and might instead,
for instance, alter their colour properties. All kinds of pos¬
sibilities exist for visual objects without supposing that
object resist each other. That moving one object at another
one tends to cause the second one to move rather than ab¬
sorb the first or that, for one item to breach another the
latter must break up or its parts be rearranged or it in¬
crease in its size are matters of contingency. As it is,
those sorts of things do happen and they are all actions or
dispositions which can be visually determined. Solidity is
primarily a feature of the way objects interact with each
other and not a tactual sensation they give rise to in us. As
I said in Chapter Four, the fact that I had all the character¬
istic sensations of resistance or of my hand not moving
would not mean that an object I observed my hand to pass
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through was solid and especially not if other objects were
seen to pass through it and if all subsequent experiences
were inconsistent with my hand having moved into the ob¬
served new position. Not that this would be other than a
highly deviant and disturbing occurrence.
I do not mean to suggest, of course, that there are no limits
upon what is possible for visual objects. There are concep¬
tual constraints dictated by the very nature of colour. We
cannot imagine two objects combining to remain just as they
individually were (where they have different appearances).
The same part of space cannot be occupied by two different
colours. There are restrictions stemming from the supposi¬
tion of visibility but these do not rule out every form of in-
terpenetration for objects.
Touch, then, does not exercise a monopoly over the solid or
material aspect of objects, it is a property we can articu¬
late in visual terms and visual evidence may take prece¬
dence in a clash with tactual experience. But, that touch
can give us sensations of solidity is important, it extends
our capacity to form an immediate awareness of physical ob¬
jects and the contents of space. It gives us reason to be¬
lieve that physical items are present even when there is lit¬
tle or no visual sign of it. It may cause us to form a common
conception of visible and invisible items because of their
tactual similarity - being pushed by a strong wind feels like
being pushed by other, visible entities.
Setting aside the question of its origins whether in tactual
or in visual sense, we arrive at the notion of the solidity of
objects or visual things. This is an important step, because,
unlike a property such as extension, this property is de¬
tachable from the visual qualities of objects. It is possible
to conceive of there being instances of physicality or mate¬
riality where there is no visual correlate and, as we have
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mentioned, our experience includes actual occurrences of
this. If we are approaching things from the point of view of
a construction of space and objects out of visual sense
then this is a significant ontological step because we are
beginning to include in our view of the world things whose
intrinsic nature cannot be expressed in visual terms. As well
as having physical things which can be seen, we also have
physical things which in themselves lack visual qualities,
although they may have visible effects. Thus our ontology
has begun to outgrow the sense experience or phenomenology
it is rooted in. Once this point has been reached, objects
can no longer be understood as reifications of sensations or
parts of sense-experience. Perceiving objective items, that
is, cannot consist of taking parts of what one is experienc¬
ing and projecting them into the world or of treating them as
direct awarenesses of things as they actually are. Or, at
least, this understanding cannot be applied to these invisi¬
ble entities. One could suggest that the sensations which
are reified for such objects are tactual ones, but, as we
have just established, commitments to such items can arise
from purely visual experience. What we have the potential
for here is the situation of a subject building a spatial
scheme out of his sense experience, investing the objects
thus generated with properties directly from that experience
and then, on the basis of further experiences, coming to
form a commitment to other objective occupants of that
scheme which do not possess properties found in his sense
experience. These items will not be directly represented in
experience. Just such a process is involved in the develop¬
ment of our objective commitments. This is a further example
of a phenomenon we have already had occasion to mention,
the way in which, by a rational, interpretative or judgemen¬
tal process one can move from an awareness of pnenomenolog-
ical particulars, to enduring objects in a space and to items
which are not simply identifiable with any part of our phe-
nomenological experience. Commitments can arise out of the
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experientially given and be evidentially rooted in it, yet, in
a real sense, transcend these origins.
Of course, we have discussed forms of experience which give
rise to ontologies which could be understood in a straight¬
forwardly realistic way. The sound models we developed in¬
volved objects whose nature could be exhausted by a single
perceptual act, phenomenological particular. A subject in
such a world could take his experience to be a direct aware¬
ness of external objects: he could take the relevant phe¬
nomenological items .- sounds - and directly identify them
with objects in space. His experience of these sounds would
be an experience of objects as they are in themselves. A
similar identification could be made in the two-dimensional
visual world we discussed. Where, however, this simple mode
of understanding a perceiver's contact with objects in a
space is inapplicable is where spaces such as three-dimen¬
sional visual ones ar concerned. Here we discovered that the
nature of objects cannot be exhausted by any single percep¬
tual act or by any phenomenological item. This is a concep¬
tual impossibility; the nature of images (the phenomenologi¬
cal input) does not allow for the representation of the 3-d
objects we become committed to, by any given image. Nor is
the nature of such objects expressed in any given number of
images Can infinite number are required) and, even if this
were the case it, arguably, would not be possible to combine
the relevant images into one comprehensive image. What we
come to understand by a 3-d object is not simply reducible
to imagistic terms, even though we become committed to the
existence of such objects by having experience of individ¬
ual images. This should serve to remind us that, prior to
commitments to things such as invisible objects or sub¬
stances, by the very nature of a 3-d space, subjects commit
themselves to items which defy direct location in the phe¬
nomenological scheme they are derived from.
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It is worth mentioning in this connection that there is an¬
other area in which this feature arises in our understanding
of visual objects. Our experience of shapes and how they
vary but are related to each other causes us to subsume
them under the notion of a 3-d object. Similarly, our experi¬
ence of the colours these shapes or objects bear and the
way they vary but in a structured way causes us to unite
these different colours under that notion of a nominal
colour which is not reducible to any single phenomenal
colour or collection of them. Colour variation as a phe¬
nomenon of appearance - the way things look in the sense an
artist would be interested in - is familiar to all of us, yet
it is also something we are strongly inclined to forget, un¬
der the influence of the nominal or abstracted system of
colour descriptions just referred to. The railings outside
the window present a striking collection of contrasting
colours from near whites to near blacks through a range of
intermediate greys yet I should not hesitate to describe
them, if asked, as simply "light grey". Moreover, it is not
just that I would readily use this single-colour description
but I also tend to see the railings as more uniformly
coloured than they actually are in pure, visual terms. This
is part of the effect psychologists call "colour-con-
stancy"(l) a tendency for objects to be perceived as the
same colour under changing light conditions - a sheet of pa¬
per carried from the window to in front of the fire is not
perceived (judgemental) to change from white to red. Of
course, we all sense the colour variations of items we speak
of as uniformly coloured, to some extent, but it takes a good
deal of concentration, even training, to accurately identify
them for the purposes of , say, depicting them.
How does it come about, then, that objects which display a
variety of colours, at the same time - through shading - and
over time - through changing light conditions - are spoken
of and thought of as being one unvarying colour? The answer
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is that, to say that something is the same colour all over is
to say that all parts of it would look the same (appearance-
wise) if placed in the same situations, the same light condi¬
tions. Furthermore, there is a specific range of colour vari¬
ations for each colour term. These sequences we can, in good
measure, become quite familiar with. Obviously, a degree of
relativity is important also, as there is a potential for cir¬
cularity in references to specific light conditions. "Yellow
light" might mean no more than "that light which makes white
things look yellow". The problem is that all sorts of non-
white things can be made to look yellow (not including yellow
ones!) Also, our only actual awareness of the state of the
light is by the way things appear in it - we know that the
light is failing because things generally start to get
darker. What becomes important, then, in the question of
what colour (nominal) an item is how other items appear at
the same time as it or in what we can be sure is an un¬
changed lighting situation (how this would be determined
needs to be elaborated in itself). A piece of paper is white
if it looks yellow when something else appears brown and if
something else had appeared grey when the piece of paper
had looked white! A whole range of other comparisons would
be necessary too, the system behind our apparently simple
colour judgements being surprisingly complex. Obviously, we
are aided by experience and can surmise the colours of many
items by knowing what kind of things they are.
To say that two things are different colours (nominal) is to
say that they do not look the same colour (appearance) in
all the same circumstances - there may be some situations
where both appear the same and it may be that either item
can be made to look a colour the other one has appeared at
some time, but, in the light conditions necessary for this
the item imitated will be looking a different colour. Thus, to
say that something is a certain colour in the nominal sense
we have been talking about is an informative thing to do.
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Objects may appear many different colours (possibly an infi¬
nite number) but where we attribute a specific colour to them
this is done on the basis of the particular range of colours
they exhibit and how this range relates to those ranges dis¬
played by other objects. It is not surprising that we think
of there being an underlying unwavering property which de¬
termines the colour changes an object will undergo under
changing light conditions, a something which yields one par¬
ticular sequence rather than another and makes, for in¬
stance, one object appear yellow when another appears
brown. Practical concerns dictate the colour instances we
select for the nominal colour descriptions of things: if we
spent most of our lives in blue light our choice of direct
white light as our reference point would be perverse.
Although it is not difficult to understand why we choose a
particular colour from the many an object appears, to do
duty for its colour determining property, it is unfortunate
to the extent that it blurs the essential conceptual distinc¬
tion which exists. We are identifying a property which is
stable yet we are doing so by reference to something which
is changeable. The semantic import of these descriptions is
clear from their use, however; my railings are still solidly
"grey" despite their great colour variations now or when
they move into a uniform blackness with the onset of dark¬
ness. That our visual world gives rise to such concepts is
interesting, in that it represents another example of moving
from phenomenological particulars to higher level notions
which subsume those particulars but are not reducible to
them. Our experience of the different colours objects appear
gives us every reason to believe that there is some common
property of objects underlying colours and which accounts
for them. But this property is not something which itself ap¬
pears in our sense experience, it cannot be identified with
any of the instances of colour we experience, rather it is an
inference or an abstraction from them. It is something we be-
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come committed to on the basis of our sensory experience of
colours. The use of colour names is not even a shorthand for
definite collections of colour appearances, there may be a
range of colours a given colour property appears which is
usual or familiar but, however wide it is, it is always capa¬
ble of expansion. There are as many colours as there are
light conditions - although our understanding of these and
their potential for variation is an empirical discovery. We
know that we do not close off the range of possible varia¬
tions for a named colour; we are always prepared to accept a
new instance without saying that an object has changed its
colour. The individual character of a colour is determined by
the particular sequence of colours it can give rise to and,
moreover, how this sequence relates to the sequences pro¬
duced by other, proposed, colours. As we have noted in other
connections, the fact that a range is infinite does not mean
that it does not have an individual character, or that it is
indistinguishable from other such ranges.
We can say, then, that our visual experience gives rise to
two important interpretative or theoretical ontological no¬
tions: that of a three-dimensional object and that of a
colour as a non-phenomenological property. These concepts
occur in addition to those, now familiar, ones of an objec¬
tive particular and a space, and they can be said to be of a
higher order of inference or interpretation. Also, beyond
those developments we have mentioned the emergence of a no¬
tion of spatial, physical objects which have no visual prop¬
erties. That is, although our commitment to and understand¬
ing of objects and space can be entirely based upon having
visual experiences, it is possible at a later stage to become
committed to spatial entities that do not have all the prop¬
erties of the primary form of objects, to become committed,
that is, to entities which have shape and solidity but no
colour. These items have partial phenomenological reality in
that they can give rise to tactual sensations, but our pri-
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mary conception of them can be derived from visual experi¬
ence, inferentially, as described, a fact which is borne out
by the possibility of becoming aware of them by purely vi¬
sual means and by the overriding influence visual evidence
may have in respect of them. Given the claims we have made
about visual and tactual experience as distinct senses, it
is already established that the character of space and ob¬
jects, for us, is fashioned from visual phenomenology, there
is not such an intrinsic connection between the content of
touch experience and these objective notions. Tactual expe¬
rience has a contingent connection with the space and ob¬
jects derived from visual sense, though as we have said, a
nonetheless informative one, both in terms of the shape and
solidity of objects (as visually conceived) but also in terms
of adding a distinctly tactual dimension to objects. Touch,
as we have established, is an independent phenomenological
sphere and, although it correlates with the visual and can
be thereby informative of visual properties of objects, it
can also be taken as a source of additional qualities of ob¬
jects. A distinctly tactual "colouring" can, potentially, be
attributed to objects, over and above whatever essentially
visual qualities they may be taken as having. This possibil¬
ity should emerge more clearly from a discussion of the non-
visual metaphysical contribution the other senses have to
make, which I now wish to commence.
We have reached a useful position from which to review the
remaining senses of taste, smell and hearing. Already cer¬
tain features of the way they figure in our experience have
been noted. That they do not produce the experiential basis
from which to construct spatial schemes independent of each
other and of visual space is clear, yet they cannot be
thought of as entirely subjective. A connection exists be¬
tween them and visually-based objects, though a weaker one
than that between touch and these objects. Unlike touch, the
spatial significance of these senses in terms of providing
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information about properties such as shape and colour is
negligible. Hearing does give some awareness of distance
and location, but could not claim to be as rich as touch in
this respect. If anything, these senses appear to add new
qualities to objects rather than provide alternative means
of experiencing existing ones. Perhaps the best analogy for
the material generated by these senses is with colour. Just
as we can think of objects as being shaped physical things
with colours added on to them - an object can take on any
colour - so we can think of tastes and smells and sounds
also being "added onto" or qualifying such objects. The
analogy works particularly well with tastes as these are en¬
countered only directly upon the objects. Just as colour is
restricted to the spatial area of an object (we do not move
through a kind of haze of colour as we approach an object)
taste is similarly confined. If we think of sounds and smells
as properties of objects then, here, there is a sense in
which we move through an ambience of sound or smell before
we reach its objective source. Knowing that the dispersed
sound and smell experiences are related to certain objects
has to be achieved by a process of discovery, of causal in¬
vestigation, or of measuring intensities of sound, it is not
immediately evident in the way that it is for taste.
In recognising this, it becomes arguable whether sounds and
smells can be taken as properties of objects at all: should
they not, rather, be treated as separate entities which are
caused by or emanate from physical objects? In the case of
sound we seem to adopt this approach: we do not ask what
sounds things are or have, but what sounds they make. It is
also understood in this that what is being asked for is the
sound things make when they are being used in some charac¬
teristic way. Sound is rooted in activity, so the sound a car
makes is not the sound of a garaged car but of a car with
the engine switched on or being driven. The same cannot re¬
ally be said of smell, it is not so event based; if smell is
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caused by some activity the odoriferous object is involved
in, it is rarely clear to us what this activity is. Objects
usually give out smell in a passive, continuous way that is
not true for sounds. Accordingly, we tend to talk of the
smell things have as we would for tastes. On the other hand,
smells do have a claim to be independent of their sources,
as do sounds, in that they can be experienced over a wide
area away from these sources. We frequently identify sounds
and smells in themselves, without reference to a physical
object - "there is a nasty smell in there" or "it's noisy in
there". It may well be that we assume that both these appar¬
ent entities have physical causes and would find the sug¬
gestion that they did not absurd, but there is nothing inco¬
herent about thinking of smells and sounds as items with an
existence separate from objects. It would not be difficult to
imagine our world as it is, but with sounds and smells occur¬
ring unconnected with physical objects and events. We might
have to suppress the feature of rising intensity as certain
objects are approached - as this is one ground for linking
them to objects (though not the only or, most important one).
We could go further and imagine tastes unconnected with ob¬
jects, either experienced in a very specific way or else dis¬
persed over an area of space - i.e. experienced whilst one is
at various spatial locations. One interesting response to
this line of thought might be that such experiences would
not be as of distinct entities but of properties qualifying
space itself, properties of empty space.
Our world seems to have potential for both the attribute and
the object interpretations of sounds and smells, so, as a
prelude to deciding which approach is appropriate, let us
consider them from an abstract point of view. Pursuing the
above view that smells and sounds could be their own kind of
object, we have to consider just how they would be con¬
ceived of. We have established that they do not occur in
such as way as to form their own alternative space, so, in
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order to have any objective status at all, they must be re¬
lated to an existing space. In our situation, this will be the
space essentially derived from visual experience. One imme¬
diate problem is how a relation can exist between such
things. Our sense-category analysis entails that sounds,
smells and images are phenomenologically distinct. This
means that there cannot be a direct relation between a sound
or a smell and visual objects: we cannot place sounds and
smells in the visual scene in visual terms. Yet we can at¬
tribute spatial properties to sounds and smells - properties
which are also shared by visual objects and which can be
said to have their own origins in visual experience. These
are properties of shape or location. Sounds and smells have
these ascribed to them empirically. Sounds and smells have
no intrinsic shape or distance properties: an initial en¬
counter with either does not tell us the spatial area the
item occupies, in relation to physical objects. That is, the
spatial area a sound or smell covers, the area it can be
heard/smelt over, and it is this that is of relevance here in
terms of contemplating sounds or smells as spatial objects.
It is possible to argue that there is an intrinsically spatial
dimension to sounds in that, in hearing a sound, one is al¬
ways aware of the direction or location of its source. I be¬
lieve the claim that auditory or olfactory experience, sim-
pliciter, brings with it an awareness of visio-spatial fea¬
tures is a questionable one and arguments could be deployed
against it along similar lines to those used in the previous
chapter against the putative three-dimensionality of touch
experience. This is irrelevant to present purposes, however,
as it could not be claimed that any individual contact with a
sound or a smell determines the spatial area over which that
item extends. A sound or a smell acquires its shape and lo¬
cation by our visually noting the places we are in as bodies
(or sense-organs) when it is experienced. We have already
found a place for the notion of entities which have spatial
qualities but not visual ones, these also had physical prop-
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erties which registered to the sense of touch. Here, we have
items with basic spatial qualities but without colour or so¬
lidity; in their place are properties of sound or smell, which
have no visual representation - unlike solidity. Like the
shape and location of invisible objects the shape and loca¬
tion of smells and sounds is determined by indirect means.
This would seem to give us an acceptable basis upon which
to make sense of the notion of sounds and smells being a
distinct kind of object in space. For sounds and smells to
be construed in this way, certain other features might have
to be presupposed, however.
Stability or regularity are important for establishing the
objective existence of something. If sounds and smells oc¬
curred in an erratic and transient way our willingness to ob¬
jectify them would be doubtful. If I have a headache for the
duration of my walk into town, I am not inclined to make the
headache a spatial object extended over tthe route I have
taken and which I have thereby perceived. A major reason for
not making such a judgement is the fact that I do not expect
the experience to be repeatable: if it happened to me in just
that way every day I might be inclined to form such a view.
Another important factor, of course, is the testimony or be¬
haviour of other perceptual subjects; if other people report
the same experience, then this might be grounds for objecti¬
fying the headache (2). (There are other obstacles, stemming
from the nature of pain sensations.) This source of evidence
is of enormous importance, generally, in terms of our onto-
logical commitments, but it is not something which can be in¬
troduced at this stage in our analysis. A commitment to other
experients occurs at a later level of interpretation of expe¬
rience and a semantic interpretation of another's behaviour
even later. Ultimately, justification for objective claims
based upon the behaviour of others is rooted within our own
experience.
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If we move on to consider the attribute approach to such
sense items, we are faced with the same difficulty as men¬
tioned for the object account, namely that they cannot be
visually incorporated into the spatial scheme. Taste may be
very analogous to colour, but it is still categorically dif¬
ferent from it. Discovering the taste something has adds
nothing to our image of it, yet, as with items experienced
over an area of empty space, tastes are clearly connected
with physical and visual objects. We are able to precisely
relate taste to physical things or parts of them. Do we have
any conceptual means of making sense of things like tastes
as real properties of physical objects? It seems to me that
we do. Again, we can enlist a notion we have already found a
use for, the notion of what we might call an invisible prop¬
erty. Somewhat ironically, we discovered that our colour at¬
tributions involve this notion. The property of being a given
colour (in the non-appearance sense) is not one that can be
identified with any experienced colour the object gives rise
t
to. Yet we feel that the particular colours an object can ap¬
pear can only be explained by the existence of a property
that underlies or causes them all. It seems to me perfectly
possible for taste to be such a quality, we have no diffi¬
culty determining its spatial location and extent, it is just
that, not being coloured, it cannot be seen, but only experi¬
enced in the gustatory domain. Also, in keeping with smell
and sound, taste has no visual effects or consequences - we
cannot infer the taste of something from its visible be¬
haviour. There does not, then, seem to be anything inher¬
ently absurd about attributing to physical objects objective
properties which do not appear to visual sense - not least
because physical objects do not, themselves, always have to
be visible.
Returning to our actual experience, we have to ask ourselves
which is the correct interpretation to apply to our experi¬
ence of sounds, tastes and smells. In the case of tastes,
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the attribute approach is obviously the most fitting one and,
in so far as we do not treat tastes as objectively existing,
we take them to be qualities of physical things. The situa¬
tion is not so clear for sounds and smells. If we take smell,
it is a property firmly rooted in objects: we can trace a
smell back to its physical source and locate it quite pre¬
cisely in something. Smell is not typically event-based, so
its relatively fixed nature contributes to its being taken as
a property. On the other hand smells can be detected over a
wide area away from their physical sources. Moreover smells
can be detached from their sources, they do not always lead
up to them. If I switch off a paraffin stove and remove it
from a room, the room will still be filled with the smell of
paraffin. So the objective approach seems to have its appli¬
cation also. Similar ambiguities apply to sounds. They are
strongly related to physical things; we can trace them back
to a physical source and be quite precise about what gives
rise to them, but they cannot straightforwardly be made
properties of physical objects. This is largely because of
the event-based nature of sounds which creates two obsta¬
cles for the attribute interpretation. Their sporadic, tran¬
sient quality makes it difficult to treat them as a property
of things, but more problematic is the fact that it is not
clear exactly what physical thing should be taken to bear
the property. When a hammer strikes an anvil" what is the re¬
sultant clanging sound meant to be a property of? The anvil?
The hammer? Both? Perhaps just the clashing surfaces of
hammer and anvil are to bear the property? It can be seen
how it is simpler to think of the sound as something created
by the activity of the hammer striking the anvil and which
extends over an area of space outwards from this origin.
This, of course, is to adopt the object approach.
It is not clear to what extent this approach is followed,
however. Although we can hear sounds over a wide area, it is
questionable whether we treat them as spatial entities ex-
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tended over this area. In hearing a sound our attention is
constantly drawn towards the physical origin or cause of the
sound. This is largely because it is these physical things
and their actions which are of interest to us. Sounds are
frequently of little importance to us in themselves, their
significance lies in their being informative of physical
things as a result of their well-established connections with
them. It would only be fair to say that there is a good mea¬
sure of vagueness and inconsistency in our everyday con¬
ceptions of items like sounds, smells and tastes, and we
could include in this things like tactual sensations of a
non-spatial kind like temperature and possibly, pains, tin¬
gles and so on. One reason for this is the fact that our or¬
dinary conception of things is heavily infected with scien¬
tific beliefs. We know that sounds are vibrations in the air,
that smells are fumes and gases, that tastes are to do with
the chemical identity of substances, that temperature has
something to do with the molecular state of objects. In other
J
words, a part of us has reduced these items to non-phe-
nomenological physical items and activities, yet, at the same
time, we give some kind of reality to the phenomenology of
sound, smell, taste and temperature. The development of sci¬
entific concepts and entities is something I wish to examine
in a moment. Before doing so, I should like to mention a gen¬
eral difficulty we experience in trying to interpret the ex¬
periences obtained through separate sense modalities.
Although, as I have tried to demonstrate, it is not incoher¬
ent to think of tastes, smells and sounds as objects or
properties with spatial qualities but not visual ones, psy¬
chologically there is something puzzling about the situation.
This derives from the radically distinct types of phenomeno-
logical items which are involved, coupled with the tendency
for our conceptions of the world to be dominated by visual
experience. Because of the scope and richness of vision, for
the sighted, objects become visual objects, everything that
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is real is thought of in visual terms. The ideas we carry
around with us of what the world comprises are visual ideas
- pictures. Consequently, it becomes difficult to interpret
non-visual existents into these thoughts. Sounds, smells,
tastes (and pure touch sensations) start to seem anomalous -
how can they be real and a part of the world in the way that
visible objects are? The problem is that we are being influ¬
enced by our images of objects not by our concepts of them.
Three-dimensional visible objects are just as recalcitrant
to the mental process of picturing just referred to as are
invisible occupants of space. There can be no single image
of a 3-d visual object; what we do when we think of such an
object and picture it is to select one of the many possible
images it gives rise to or a limited collection of them. As we
have established, what we come to understand by a 3-d ob¬
ject transcends any of our visual experiences of it. The
picturing process that accompanies thoughts about 3-d ob¬
jects may be psychologically inevitable or even useful but
it is essentially irrelevant to having a concept of the ob¬
jects in question. Our concepts of such objects are not re¬
ducible to images of them, to the phenomenological material
they have developed out of. In a simpler form of experience
this might not be the case. In our sound models, a given
sound object is more straightforwardly identifiable with a
subject's experience of it; concept and phenomenological
given are more strongly linked and the properties of such
objects are exhausted by any single sensory encounter with
them. This still does not mean that the phenomenology and
the concept are one. The concept of the sound object in¬
volves the belief that the sound is an object, that it exists
in a space independent of any experience of it.
This is a basic, yet crucial point to grasp. Doing so pre¬
vents us from answering the question "but what is an object,
really?" by pointing to a particular experience of it; by sim¬
ply introducing a piece of phenomenology. If we recognise
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that purely within a 3-d visual experience objective con¬
cepts arise which cannot be translated into imagistic terms,
remembering also the possibility of commitments to invisible
physical objects and a non-visual basis to colours, then we
cannot object to the reality of sound, taste and smell and
the rest simply on the grounds of their having no visual
presence and on the impossibility of incorporating them into
a mental picture (3).
Even at the basic, non-scientific level we are talking about
here, there are further ways in which 3-d objects give rise
to experiences which heighten the complexity of our concep¬
tions of these things. We have spoken of the way in which
the colour appearance of objects varies under different
light conditions, but added to this are the colour and shape
variations that accompany observations from different dis¬
tances. We have already mentioned fluctuations in the size
of objects relative to our visual field and also relative to
other objects: an apple two feet away may well look far
larger than the tree it has come from standing half a mile
away. Such variations in perceived size become part of our
system of judging how far we are away from things. This fea¬
ture of overall size variation with distance is extended by
the phenomenon of observed variations of the surface detail
of objects over distance. At this distance the bark of the
tree outside the window presents an even, brownish appear¬
ance, yet, if I were closer to it I should start to notice
variations of colour and texture in the same surface. The
closer I got, the more detail I should see and the less re¬
semblance there would be between these later views and my
original one. One could think of a sequence of views of what
I should undoubtedly take to be the same part of the tree -
the same bit of space - obtained at different distances from
the tree, all of which would be visually incompatible with
each other. The possible range of such images is, as else¬
where, potentially infinite.
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Moreover, the limits upon such imagistic variations are not
determined by the powers of the naked eye; in this context
optical devices become relevant. Magnifying glasses take us
one level deeper and then there is the huge range of magni¬
fication available via microscopes. There is, of course, the
question of why we should place any faith in the images pro¬
duced by such devices; why should we assume that the images
these methods produce are images of the same part of space
as seen without them? The answer lies in the fact that there
is an evidential connection between some magnified images
and those seen with the naked eye. There is a close resem¬
blance between what is seen with the unaided eye and what
is seen through weak forms of magnification, perhaps, virtu¬
ally the same details can be seen by each means, but more
easily so with magnification. Also there may be non-visual
corroborations of the features magnification reveals - tac¬
tual sensations, or physical behaviour on the part of the
object concerned which would only be explicable on the as¬
sumption that it had the structure the magnification sug¬
gests. If we come to trust weak forms of magnification then,
by having some understanding of the physical basis of mag¬
nification and also by the way in which higher levels of
magnification are related to lower ones through the feature
of image similarity already mentioned, we can have rational
grounds for treating magnified images as images of familiar
parts of space.
What in objective terms are we to say of this enormous range
of possible appearances? Which image depicts the tree as it
really is - one where it is a barely visible speck on the
horizon or one obtained via an electron microscope or one of
the infinity obtainable in between? Perhaps most people
would feel compelled to opt for an image or understanding of
the tree based upon the ultimate degree of magnification (it
should be remembered that three-dimensionality is a compli-
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eating factor still operating here). It has to be said, how¬
ever, that in having an understanding of how an instrument
like an electron microscope produces the images it does we
also have an appreciation of its limitations. Such an instru¬
ment does not afford an ultimate level of magnification; it
cannot produce an image of items smaller than those it itself
uses to detect things. It cannot give a picture of electrons,
even; because to do so, it would have to bombard them with
particles finer than themselves. This is as much a logical
limitation upon its powers as an empirical, physical one.
Also, it has to be said that, by the time we reach the point
in the development of our understanding where we can con¬
struct and explain such devices, we are already committed to
the existence of more basic constituents of reality than
those they reveal. These items could not have a visual pres¬
ence even in principle. Their character is elucidated by
models and analogies, but is only really captured in mathe¬
matical descriptions. What then do we say of all the visual
experiences these abstract ultimates give rise to? Are they
all figments, or subjective "seemings"? I see no reason why
we should conclude this. It is not logically absurd to sug¬
gest that something like a tree is all of the various appear¬
ances it does and could give rise to, as well as a good deal
more besides, (although many thinkers have found this im¬
possible to accept, Bertrand Russell and Arthur Eddington
being two of these (3)). We have noted that many of the im¬
ages available are visually incompatible, but all of these
images are obtained under specifically different conditions
and, if our objective claims are relativised to these condi¬
tions, no contradictions need arise. The tree can be both as
it is to the naked eye at twenty feet and also as it is at
1000 times magnification. The tree is appearance x when
seen by human observer h from point p and the same tree is
also appearance y when seen by human observer h at point p2
or z by h at magnification m (5).
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It is important to relativise in the human observer because
the kind of visual equipment used to observe the tree will
make a difference to the experience of it. We could imagine
creatures with more wide-angle vision which would produce a
distorted variation of our images (though no less faithful
for that). Or, we could think of a creature sensitive to dif¬
ferent areas of the electromagnetic spectrum from ourselves.
Consider the bats that frequently fly round trees; we have
every reason to expect their experience of a tree to be phe-
nomenologically quite different from ours (6), yet we believe
that they are sensorially in touch with the same spatial ob¬
ject and that their understanding of it corresponds to ours
in important ways. What are we to say of possible conflicts
in the appearances each being experiences via their own
distinct forms of sense? Are we right and the bats wrong?
Surely it is better to say that both are right in different
ways. Bats and humans pick up some of the nature of physi¬
cal, spatial objects via their respective perceptual equip¬
ment, but neither detect all of it by those means. Thus we
can see that hand in hand with having certain phenomenolog-
ical experiences and with treating those as perceptions of
objects goes the development of a notion of the circum¬
stances of observation. Qualities of space or objects are
understood to be perceived as a result of utilizing particu¬
lar perceptual equipment from a position or' a perspective.
With a change in any of these factors goes a change in what
is revealed of spatial reality. What can be said to be common
to the different perspectives of a single observer or to dif¬
ferent types of observer, such as ourselves and the bat, is
the notion of 3-space itself. The different experiences we
have at different distances from an object or the differing
perceptions of another type of perceiving entity are all
united around the same portion of space. The different qual¬
ities perceived relate to the same part of the three-dimen¬
sional space. Whether perceived by ourselves at different
distances or angles or by a different perceptual system the
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spatial boundaries remain the same, it is the qualities which
"fill out" those boundaries which differ.
To be committed to objects on this approach is to be commit¬
ted to items which are endlessly rich in their qualities -
but, then, is this not how we do think of them, really, how¬
ever simplistic our mental pictures of them can be some¬
times?
The usefulness of objects having different qualities or ap¬
pearances under different perceptual conditions can be ap¬
preciated with a little reflection. It would be possible for
us to see the things we currently see, at a higher level of
magnification, say. The scene outside the window could be
displayed to me at the highest degree of magnification
available. The effect would be unimaginably cumbersome, one
feels that the image would be massive, certainly it would be
immensely rich in detail. At a psychological level the effect
would be overwhelming: from the wealth of microscopic detail,
we would have great difficulty in distinguishing the objects
we are normally familiar with and interested in. This brings
out the crucial point about our level of visual perception;
it is appropriate to us as physical beings, it is on a scale
fitted to our own physical size in the world, to the kind of
objects we can handle and which are important to us, partic¬
ularly in terms of our survival. For most of our purposes,
the kind of detail a microscopic view of the world would pro¬
duce is redundant. Knowing the cellular structure of what is
in front of him is of no value to the lumberjack in his task
of cutting down and preparing timber. Similarly, the atomic
structure of cells might be of little importance to the biolo¬
gist. Given the undoubted value of taking objects at a given
level of understanding, of ascribing qualities to them that a
particular form of perception or analysis reveals, why
should we not treat these qualities as part of the objective
nature of those objects, though not the whole of the nature
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of those objects? I shall return to this issue shortly, but
first, it is important to say a few words about the develop¬
ment of science or of a not directly perceptual understand¬
ing of the world.
(ii> SCIENCE AND REALITY
In discussing the way in which an exploration of the visual
qualities of objects can lead into a microscopic analysis of
them, we have described one area where science gains a
foothold. Such methods extend our sensory understanding of
objects into beliefs that have no direct perceptual repre¬
sentation. This is clearly an important development in the
intellectual process of moving from raw phenomenology to a
complex ontology. There are other important sources of this
initiative. The single most significant of these is the impe¬
tus towards the explanation of phenomena and the desire to
produce physical laws. These motivations arise at the level
of a sensory based understanding of the world which, as we
have noted, is already quite sophisticated and involves com¬
plex notions such as that of a three-dimensional object
which is a significant abstraction from any phenomenological
visual item. So it is not surprising that attempts would be
made to account for occurrences at this level of understand¬
ing by reference to other objects and events of the same
accepted domain. It is the failure of this approach which
generates the need to look for and, moreover, postulate the
existence of new entities and forces - items which have made
no direct appearance in sense-experience. Many of the per¬
ceived qualities of things turn out to be of little value in
the search for law-like physical qualities and propensities.
Colour would be a classic example of this failure; perceived
colour usually has very little to do with the rest of an ob¬
ject's physical qualities and behaviour and this is com¬
pounded, of course, by the way in which the apparent colour
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of things varies in the ways we have discussed. Imagine try¬
ing to relate the combustibility of objects to their per¬
ceived colour, for example.
Measurement emerges as an important activity. The formation
of laws depends upon relating identifiable states to other
identifiable states. Perceptual identification of these turns
out to be unreliable, it does not provide a basis upon which
to frame laws. Ordinary perceptual judgements of size, shape
and quantity fail to provide identifications which can enter
into law-like relations. Whereas, resorting to indirect sys¬
tems of measurement does produce suitable relations for
physical laws. Perceptual judgement is involved in these de¬
terminations but indirectly so; it is involved in the act of
measurement which will involve the use of some form of in¬
strument. Of course, a degree of theory will attach to these
items: their stability or rigidity will be assumed and this
will be derived from their observable qualities, from their
perceived relationship with other objects. But, ultimately,
the justification for these assumptions will be retrospec¬
tively acquired from their pragmatic value. If using a cre¬
ated system of measurement produces results which ground
successful laws, in a way that using direct perceptual
judgements does not, then that provides an argument for say¬
ing that these devices really do isolate properties of ob¬
jects. Naturally, sceptical considerations can still be ap¬
plied to these methods and their background assumptions,
but, as in previous situations, it is a question of making a
rational interpretation of events rather than any possible
interpretation.
The motivation behind the search for laws and regularities
in the behaviour of worldly objects is not purely abstract
curiosity; a desire to increase one's control over the world
is of prime importance. This means control over the world as
we experience it at the level of our perception, even though
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acquiring this control involves becoming committed to enti¬
ties and properties which do not directly figure at this
level. Possessing an understanding of how certain things
happen, in the sense of understanding precisely what events
or states of affairs lead to other events or states of af¬
fairs, is an important means of gaining this kind of control.
Although it is essentially a descriptive activity and based
upon particular past regularities, making such laws has a
significant predictive dimension. This can be enhanced if
the laws are not tightly confined to very specific sets of
circumstances but are more generalised, allowing one to ex¬
tend them to unfamiliar situations. To achieve laws of this
generalised nature, a process of investigation and experi¬
mentation is required, in order to sift out common properties
from seemingly disparate sets of conditions. This power to
move from known situations to unknown ones, in the sense of
being able to predict or create them, can be further en¬
larged by the development of theoretical explanations of es-
tablished laws. Some measure of theoretical interpretation
may be involved in the formation of laws, in that, non-per¬
ceptual features may be posited as part of establishing a
regularity, but frequently this will be minimally present. The
sort of theoretical element I am considering, here, is the
postulation of a metaphysical underpining to the observable
relationships between states of affairs. That is, an explana¬
tion of these connection which relies upon the notion of a
structure, or mechanism or entity which is present, but which
is not perceptible. A new level of metaphysical commitments
is thereby introduced. The terms in which these new, imper¬
ceptible items are conceived may draw heavily upon familiar
objects and properties which do figure in perceptual experi¬
ence. It may also be an assumption in such theories that the
metaphysical sub-structure is imperceptible merely through
being too small and that it would emerge under a suitable
degree of magnification. Many items which are observable un¬
der the microscope had a prior existence for us as theoreti-
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cal postulates; viruses, would be an example of such. Other
theoretical entities have an intrinsically more shadowy ex¬
istence. The character they are assumed to have may make it
impossible in principle for them to be perceived even by
sense-enhancing devices. Fields of force such as magnetism
would be like this and also the high level particles of nu¬
clear physics, which are as much energy as they are objects.
Simpler postulates such as sound waves could not be percep¬
tible as they are actually conceived to be, the patterns
they make in the air are invisible and whatever tactual sen¬
sations we might experience from loud, low pitched sounds
they do not give an accurate representation of them as they
physically are. Light-waves are in a similar situation; for
logical reasons, it is not possible to see that which medi¬
ates one's seeing and this is further compounded by the kind
of mixed analogy light is articulated in terms of. Light is
supposed, in some ways, to behave like a stream of particles
and, in others, like a wave. The "wave-packet" model is meant
to do justice to both aspects, but one can see the difficul¬
ties this entails from a perceptual point of view. There is a
tendency to feel conceptually more comfortable with the
first kind of theoretical entity than with the second. It
seems less controversial to ascribe existence to items which
could ultimately figure in our experience as they are
posited to be than to ascribe existence to items which never
could be perceived by us and which, in fact, have properties
which make them unimaginable in terms of the kinds of ob¬
jects we are perceptually familiar with. Several considera¬
tions apply here, however. It should be remembered that
where perceptual contact is attainable it is mediated by de¬
vices which depend upon a theoretical justification and, be-
*
cause direct sensory experience is not possible, it is an
issue whether the representation produced by the machine is
reliable (in the case of the electron microscope, justifying
the images produced would involve reference to entities of
the non-perceptual variety). A crucial source of justifies-
- 254 -
tion as far as these mediated forms of perception, as we
might term them, are concerned is the fact that assuming
them to be faithful involves beliefs which have conse¬
quences at the directly perceptible level. The assumptions
concerned have testable results; they imply things not just
at their own abstracted, theoretical level but also at the
level of our direct awareness. If the entities supposedly re¬
vealed by microscopes failed to gain confirmation at this
level we would have no good reason for taking them seri¬
ously. In saying this, however, we have cited a justification
which applies equally well to the more controversial type of
theoretical entity, the non-perceptible variant. What is sig¬
nificant about such postulates is that they do have testable
consequences in the above sense. They both explain known
behaviour of objects or physical laws and also embody pre¬
dictions about future, unfamiliar situations. We are able to
say, if a theory is correct, not only that it should entail
the events it has been tailored to explain, but that it
should also entail the occurrence of other events provided
certain conditions arise and it is this that provides a pos¬
sibility of justifying the theory and the entities it posits
("justification" here does not mean establishing to the level
of certainty). It is the rich predictive import of theoretical
explanations which gives them their practical value and ex¬
pands the kind of control afforded by descriptive laws.
I have argued that we should accommodate extensions of our
knowledge achieved via sense extending instruments such as
microscopes into our conception of what is real. The view of
an object obtained from six feet away with the naked eye and
the view obtained with a powerful microscope, although visu¬
ally very different from each other, both reveal a part of
the nature of that object. We should not think of one reveal¬
ing the true nature of the object and the other merely a
subjective appearance. One reason for this derives from the
impossibility of producing something like a "true picture" of
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reality. The three-dimensional character of objects pre¬
cluded this to start with (consider the conclusions we ar¬
rived at in Chapter Three as to what the character of a 3-d
object and corresponding space would have to be to unite
disparate images under the notion of a single particular)
and also the fact that we become committed to features which
could not be incorporated into some kind of single unitary
image, partly because of our drawing upon different senses.
I would suggest that having a full or rich understanding of
an object involves entertaining a whole complex of beliefs
rather than one or a few privileged images of it. Many of
these interlinked beliefs will have a perceptual content;
they will be commitments to possible appearances of the ob¬
ject. Others will be more theoretical and will only cash-out
indirectly in perceptual terms. The question of context is
important also. We do not just believe that an object is
"like this" - an image from six feet away - and "like this" -
an image through an electron microscope. We have to rela-
tivise such perceptual beliefs to a mode or level of percep¬
tion. The significance of such images is only relative to
such levels; only in a certain context can they be informa¬
tive. Gilbert Ryle's remarks in DILEMMAS (6) at pp 75-81 are
relevant here when he tells us, for example, that an artist's
rendition of a landscape is compatible with a geologist's
description of the same area. To think that a microscopic
image of a tree was an image at a certain microscopic level
would be a grave misunderstanding; the informative content
of the image would be lost. This is because much of the con¬
text for these items is a purposive one - an ability to act
upon the basis of the information given and to achieve cer¬
tain effects. There should be a connection, in other words,
between any particular belief and other beliefs and experi¬
ences. If a given belief about an object fails to be con¬
firmed by other experiences, then that puts it in doubt. If
we know the context or level of the belief then we know the
kind of information it can give and the purposes to which it
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can be put. This is why I would claim that an image of an ob¬
ject obtained through some "distorting" medium is still a
genuine image of that object and not some kind of non-
veridical impression of it. It only fails to be informative if
it is understood as being produced through some other
medium than the one it actually is. Once one becomes used to
it, the data it gives can be related to the rest of one's ex¬
perience. One might be able to make it informative of the
touch properties of the object concerned. There is no such
thing as a neutral or uniquely correct way of looking at
things. Why should our eyes be preferable to the more wide-
angle variant of a fish? The fish is quite capable of con¬
necting the information its eye provides with the rest of its
sensory experience, just as we can similarly interpret the
information our eye provides. We also have every reason to
believe that the fish has an adequate understanding of what
it sees. It does not swim into things and is perfectly skilful
at evading threatening objects. Problems would only arise if
we attempted to bring an understanding appropriate to the
images of a human eye to the fish-eye. This relativity is
generally necessary: macroscopic information would be use¬
less for certain operations just as microscopic detail would
be for others. Thus, we can see that any given sense-experi¬
ence or phenomenological item is subjected to a complex
metaphysical interpretation, one which involves the image
pointing in two directions at once. The phenomenological
item points forward as it were, to an object and its quali¬
ties and also backwards to the observer and his mode of ex¬
periencing that object. The appearance the object presents
through that particular sense-experience has to be seen as
dependent upon certain facts about the perceiving situation.
We can come to think that differences of perspective, dis¬
tance and perceptual equipment allow for different aspects
of an object's nature to be apprehended. Different modes of
perceptual encounter allow for different levels of an ob¬
ject's properties to be "peeled off", as it were. There is a
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kind o£ symbiotic relationship between the object and the
perceiver involved in the process o£ building up an under¬
standing of the nature of each: both arrive together, inter¬
linked. As a subject moves towards an object and its appear¬
ance changes, the only way that he can make the changing
images compatible with the idea of their being of a single
object is by availing himself of the concept of a three-di¬
mensional space and by conceiving of himself as perceiving
the object from different places in that space. The notions
of an object and its qualities and of perceiver location
emerge together and they determine each other. As a subject
develops a deeper understanding of what is involved in the
perceptual process (as ever this is a conceptual rather than
a genetic, individualistic account) other factors enter into
the equation and become points to which the qualities of ob¬
jects are relativised. Ultimately, the stage is reached where
one can conceive of other creatures with perceptual systems
differing from our own and it becomes reasonable to counte-
nance their having access to qualities of objects which we
are denied.
Having made these comments, it should be said that one im¬
pulse behind scientific endeavour is the desire to produce a
description of the world which is independent of any mode of
perceiving it, but which can account for or predict those
perceptual experiences. What is aimed at, if you like, is an
account of the world which is neutral as between a bat's, a
fish's and my experience of it, a something which is common
to all three, and which each of us by dint of investigative
and intellectual activity could become committed to, in spite
of our radically different phenomenological experiences.
Should we hold this understanding up as capturing the
essence of objective reality, then? We could do so and I
cannot say that such a purist approach is actually wrong; it
is more that there is no good reason for taking such a line -
common though it is. Also, such an understanding is still
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relative to a viewpoint namely, the scientific one, as
Strawson points out (8). Although, unlike those other view¬
points we have considered, it is an intellectual rather than
a perceptual one. Additionally, one might claim that the no¬
tion of space itself which prevails in the scientific account
is derived from the perceptual level of understanding. It is
not as if, once we have a high-level theoretical understand¬
ing, we can dispense with all our perceptual beliefs and
commitments. They are essential to living our lives and car¬
rying out many of our purposes. It would be impossible to
deal with the world purely in terms of these abstract, non-
perceptual items. We can retain a commitment to the percep¬
tible lower-level objects and properties as well as the high-
level theoretical ones to which, in some sense, they may be
reducible. To use what is only partly a metaphor, we can be¬
lieve in the existence of houses no less than in the exis¬
tence of configurations of bricks. Further it is important to
remember the contingent link between the initial, low-level
perceptual commitments and the abstract, 'scientific commit¬
ments that are developed out of them. An empirical and in¬
vestigative process is involved: the behaviour of the famil¬
iar, perceptual world might have dictated different underly¬
ing theoretical entities. Just as the appearance and func¬
tions of a house could have been achieved by other material
components than bricks.
This leads us into another justification for the retention of
our ordinary, perceptual level of ontological commitments, a
justification based on their evidential primacy. It is from a
world of perceptual objects and properties and a desire for
greater explanatory power over their nature and behaviour
that we arrive at the world of non-directly perceptible enti¬
ties, and this original perceptual level persists as a source
of review for these entities (9). It is only insofar as a the¬
ory's consequences are consistent with perceptual experi¬
ence that it is acceptable Ca theory that has no perceptual
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consequences, although, perhaps a metaphysical possibility,
is of no value - given the explanatory motivation behind
theory-formation). However abstracted research might be, it
can, ultimately, only be contradicted through its having a
connection with happenings at the gross, observable level. I
do not wish to suggest in this that there is a simple link
between theories of this sort and individual bits of percep¬
tual data. Theories rarely stand alone and as science ad¬
vances the relationship between theory and observation will
be highly complex and such that the power of any single ob¬
servation to revise or refute an important theoretical tenet
will be very limited (10). This does not mean that, in the fi¬
nal analysis, experience does not have the last word; ulti¬
mately it does. Also, it has to be remembered that the highly
developed set of theoretical commitments we have has been
arrived at by a lengthy process beginning with fairly basic
connections between experience and theory and accompanied
at each stage by a fresh observational input.
In the light of this and given that there is no actual con¬
tradiction involved in ascribing perceptual and theoretical
or scientific properties to reality - so long as we do not
conflate the two - there is no reason why we should discard
familiar perceptual entities from our ontology. Such entities
still meet criteria that many other phenomenological particu¬
lars do not: they recur in structured, systematic ways and,
once this level has been reached, they are subject to inter¬
personal agreement. In other words, a commitment to the ex¬
istence of such perceptual entities does not, by any means,
amount to a carte-blanche objectification of everything that
we experience. Many phenomenological items we encounter are
to be treated as subjective; dreams, hallucinations, after¬
images, and the like.
It should be clear from this, that a Primary/Secondary qual¬
ity (11) analysis of experience is not appropriate. Firstly, I
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have suggested that the development of science does not
compel us to downgrade many of the qualities we unreflec-
tively take the world to possess; they are not necessarily
suspect just because they do not figure in a scientific ac¬
count of what there is. In addition to this, the approach in
question does not bear scrutiny even on its own terms. The
supposed harmony between science and perception upon the
Primary Qualities such as shape does not exist. Size and
shape are not in perception as they are for physics. Purely
visual (or tactual) judgements of these qualities would be
woefully inadequate for the purposes of science. Our percep¬
tual assessments of these qualities lack the accuracy or
consistency of scientific determinations of them. We have
already stressed the crucial role instrumentation plays in
the scientific measurement of these qualities, perception
being only indirectly involved. Additionally, there are well
established difficulties about the Primary/Secondary dis¬
tinction dating back at least to the writings of Berkeley and
Hume but also to be found in the work of Ayer among others
(12). These criticisms center upon the problem of how prop¬
erties such as size and shape can be allowed to enter into
our perception as they objectively are when the property of
colour is denied such a status; given that it is hard to
imagine how an object could yield up its properties of size
and shape without doing this through the vehicle of colour.
I should, perhaps, briefly mention one source of challenge
faced by a theory of perception which accepts the claims of
science and, in particular, claims that relate to the mechan¬
ics of perception itself. There has been a traditional belief
that the acceptance of a causal basis for perception leads
to some kind of incoherence or that it undermines all our
normal perceptual judgements. The idea is that if our sen¬
sory experiences are caused by physical processes, many of
which bear no content relation to what is sensed and if our
having the particular experience we do is purely dependent
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upon the last event in such processes then it might be that
we could have all of the experiences we do, without any of
the items we believe we are thereby perceiving actually ex¬
isting. But, to assume that such is the case is to negate all
of the perceptual commitments upon which the causal account
is based. It is only by taking our perceptions seriously that
we arrive at the theory in the first place. Just because,
from a conceptual point of view, there is potential in a
causal account for the possibility of being perceptually de¬
ceived does not mean that the theory entails that such is
the case. A causal account is not plainly self-contradictory.
To assume that the possibility of permanent deception does
prevail is, essentially to reject the presuppositions of the
theory, so the principles of the theory never come into play
in the first place. The theory, thus, would not become self-
refuting, but rather, would never be generated at all.
Consequently, a causal account of perception is perfectly
self-consistent and there is no logical objection to adopt¬
ing such a view. Whether a causal understanding is required
is determined by the character of a subject's experience.
Our form of experience supports such a interpretation, oth¬
ers, such as the proposed sound space, might not.
(iii) CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, then, it should be apparent that there
is not a tension between our more ordinary perceptual be¬
liefs about the world and our developed, scientific views,
contrary to what is so often supposed. Our scientific com¬
mitments arise out of our lower-level perceptual commitments
and, properly, should be seen as an extension of them,
rather than a replacement of them. The complexity of such
scientific views and their failure to translate into simple
perceptual terms should not be a source of criticism of them,
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because, in this, they are not radically different from our
so-called "direct" perceptual allegiances. We have noticed
that, for obRectification to occur at all in our form of expe¬
rience, complex and abstracted postulates are required. To
interpret experience along three-dimensional spatial lines
is to postulate entities that are not simply reducible to
phenomenological particulars. Possessing an objective in¬
terpretation of experience is not like having an unglossed
rdsumd of past phenomenological experience; it is to have
subsumed that experience under abstract theoretical con¬
structs. Theory is not something that enters late in the day
in the development of our ontological scheme, it is present
from the very beginning. Thus, science belongs to a single
activity which commences with a subject's first tentative
speculations about the ontological status of parts of his
experience. This should be a reiteration of a point that has
lain behind much of what has been said in this work, namely
that it is possible to have an account of perception which
t
grounds it in a basic phenomenological awareness without
this entailing that the beliefs and commitments which arise
from this source be simplistic, unsophisticated, and lacking
in abstraction. The point to be stressed is that, although
perceptual knowledge is founded upon a simple, unin¬
terpreted awareness of phenomenological particulars, an in¬
tellectual or judgemental process has to be' performed upon
the sensory raw material before an objective spatial scheme
can emerge. I have suggested that the experiential base may
never actually necessitate the objective judgements that
are made, in some logical sense - scepticism may remain an
alternative possible interpretation of it - but I have argued
that such judgements can at least be rational in the light of
such experience (not forgetting that there are some possible
forms of experience for which no objective interpretation
could be rationally justified).
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In all, I hope to have given a philosophical outline of how
the range of ontological commitments we have is justifiable
on the basis of the kind of experience we have. In the pro¬
cess, I have tried to illuminate some general principles con¬
cerning the form (or forms) experience needs to take in or¬
der to support an objective conceptual scheme and thereby
to shed light upon certain crucial concepts such as objec¬
tivity, subjectivity, space and objects.
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world face the tribunal of sense experience not indi-
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vidually but only as a corporate body" and also tor
his views on the continuity of common sense and sci¬
ence. Other sceptical voices about empiricism and sci¬
entific theory are amongst others, T.S. Kuhn in THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS University of
Chicago Press, Chicago 2nd. ed. 1970 or P. Feyerabend,
AGAINST METHOD Verso, London 197S
(11) As archetypally expounded by J. Locke AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING Fontana ed. 1964 book
2.
(12) Ayer THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY at p 85-86.
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